Under Iowa law, two or more corporations may form multiple housing cooperative

May 18th, 2015

by Gary Taylor

City of Iowa City v. Iowa City Board of Review
Iowa Supreme Court, May 15, 2015

Iowa Code 499A.1(1) provides in relevant part:

Any two or more persons of full age, a majority of whom are citizens of the state, may organize themselves for the following or similar purposes: Ownership of residential, business property on a cooperative basis.  A corporation is a person within the meaning of this chapter.

In May 2012 the Iowa City Board of Review sent notices to 18 properties indicating the board changed the classification for those properties from commercial to residential for property tax purposes.  They were reclassified because they had been recently organized into multiple housing cooperatives.  The City of Iowa City filed a notice of appeal with the district court, objecting to the Board’s reclassification.  All parties agreed that two Iowa corporations organized each of the multiple housing cooperatives for the purpose of owning residential property in a cooperative. The City argued that the Board’s reclassification was improperly because (1) two natural persons, not two corporations, must organize multiple housing cooperatives under the Iowa Code, and that (2) the Iowa Code requires a one-apartment-unit-per-member ownership ratio for a multiple housing cooperative to be properly organized.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and the City appealed.

Need for natural persons to organize cooperatives.  In Krupp v. Jasper County Board of Review the Iowa Supreme Court held that the proper test for determining if a property could be classified as residential is whether the multiple housing cooperative was properly organized, not the actual use of the property.  After examining the language of Section 499A.1(1) the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that a natural person need not be one of the organizers of a multiple housing cooperative.  The phrases “persons of full age, a majority of whom are citizens of the state” and “a corporation is a person within the meaning of this chapter” are not inconsistent with each other.  The Court said that “the intent of the General Assembly … was to put the same restrictions on corporate organizers as it did on persons who organized multiple housing cooperatives; [that is] the corporate organizers must have the authority to organize a multiple housing cooperative and a majority of the corporate organizers must be Iowa corporations. Had the General Assembly intended to adopt the City’s position…[it] would have said a corporation could organized a multiple housing cooperative only with two or more natural persons….”

One-apartment-unit-per-member ownership ratio.  The City read Iowa Code 499A.11 to require this ratio.  It reads in part

The cooperative has the right to purchase real estate for the purpose of erecting, owning, and operating apartment houses or apartment buildings. The interest of each individual member in the cooperative shall be evidenced by the issuance of a certificate of membership. The certificate of membership is coupled with a possessory interest in the real and personal property of the cooperative, entitling each member to a proprietary lease with the cooperative under which each member has an exclusive possessory interest in an apartment unit and a possessory interest in common with all other members in that portion of the cooperative’s real and personal property not constituting apartment units, and which creates a legal relationship of landlord and tenant between the cooperative and member. The certificate of membership shall be executed by the president of the cooperative and attested by its secretary in the name and in the behalf of the cooperative.

The Court stated that Section 499A.11 is not an organizational statute; rather Section 499A.1 is the statute that states the requirements that must be satisfied to organize as a multiple housing cooperative.  The Court refused to glean a one-apartment-unit-per member ratio requirement from Section 499A.11, instead finding that it requires only a coupling of ownership and membership interests.  “Put another way, while section 499A.11 certainly requires that each apartment be linked with a corresponding membership interest, there is nothing prohibiting one person from holding ownership and corresponding membership interest in more than one apartment unit.”

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed judgment for the Iowa City Board of Review.

Iowa Supreme Court, Property taxation , , ,

Failure to make minutes available “essentially contemporaneously” with the decision under Federal Telecommunications Act was harmless error

May 14th, 2015

by Gary Taylor

Smith Communications, LLC v. Washington County, Arkansas
Federal 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, May 12, 2015

In February 2013 Smith Communications applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to build a 300-foot-tall cell tower in Washington County, Arkansas.  The property was zoned “Agriculture/Single-Family Residential,” and homes are located within 1/4-mile of the site.  The criteria for granting a CUP are those general considerations typical for most zoning codes (compatibility with surrounding area, no endangerment to public health or safety, not injurious to use and enjoyment of nearby properties, etc.). The Washington County Planning Board approved the CUP, but nearby residents appealed the decision to the Washington County Quorum Court [Note: apparently a body akin to a Zoning Board of Adjustment].  The Quorum Court met twice – June 4 and June 24, 2013 – and held extensive hearings. The residents in attendance focused on safety, nearby property values, the tower’s “fit” with the surrounding area, and the “destruction” of scenic views.  At the end of the June 24 meeting the Quorum Court voted 10-3 to reject Smith’s application.  Four days later the county sent Smith an email containing a letter of denial that stated, among other things, that “the minutes and video of the first and last Quorum Court meetings will act as the County’s written reason for denial.”  The minutes from the June 4 meeting were already available at that time; however, minutes from the June 24 meeting were not available until July 22.  Smith appealed to district court citing a violation of the Federal Telecommunications Act (FTA).  The district court determined that the county could not rely on the meeting minutes to constitute a legally adequate explanation for the denial under the FTA, ans so remanded the matter back to the Quorum Court with an order to explain the reasons for the denial in a writing separate from the minutes and written record.  The county did so on April 18, 2014, largely citing the reasons advanced by the neighbors.  The district court was satisfied with this, and so it was Smith appealing this ruling that brought the case before the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals.

Smith argued that under the district court’s authority to review FTA matters “on an expedited basis” the court should have simply “ordered the issuance of a permit” because the county had failed to provide an adequate written explanation for its denial.  The Court of Appeals rejected this reasoning.  It noted that in T-Mobile South the US Supreme Court recently held that “a locality may rely on detailed meeting minutes so long as the locality’s reasons are stated clearly enough to enable judicial review.”  Thus, contrary to the district court’s first ruling, the county did not violate the FTA by relying on the meeting minutes.

What about the fact that the minutes from the June 24 meeting were not available until July 22?  In T-Mobile South the Supreme Court also said that a local governments must provide written reasons for its denial “essentially contemporaneously” with the denial.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the minutes of the June 4 meeting, which were available at the time of the denial, captured essentially the same concerns as were articulated on June 24.  Representatives of Smith attended both meetings.  “In light of these facts and the record before use, Smith received adequate notice of the reasons for the Quorum Court’s denial….[The county’s] failure to promptly make the latter meeting minutes available was, at most, a harmless error,” and did not require the district court to order immediate issuance of a CUP.

The Court of Appeals also went on to determine, after thoroughly reviewing all of Smith’s contentions and the record as a whole, that substantial evidence supported the Quorum Court’s denial of the CUP application.  “Aesthetic concerns can be a valid basis on which to deny [a] permit, so long as the aesthetic judgment is grounded in the specifics of the case and not based on generalized aesthetic concerns…that are applicable to any tower, regardless of location.”

The district court decision favoring the county was affirmed.


cell towers, Federal courts, Telecommunications towers , ,

Legislative update 5/11, thanks in major part to Iowa League of Cities

May 11th, 2015

I am shamelessly co-opting a good portion of the Friday legislative update from Robert Palmer and the Iowa League of Cities’ for this post regarding the progress of TIF legislation and cell tower siting.

An amendment to HF628, the bill that impacts Iowa’s Urban Renewal law, was filed online last week. The amendment removes the language related to ratcheting up by 7.5 percent the bases of TIF districts that do not currently have a sunset until no increment remains and replaces it with new language that would:

  • Make changes to the definition of “blighted area” under Code Section 403.17;
  • Set a sunset for pre-1995 economic development TIF districts in year 2035 and all future economic development TIF districts would continue to have a 20-year limitation, which is current law;
  • Set a sunset in year 2040 for any current slum and blight TIF district and all future TIF districts formed for slum and blight would be limited to 25 years, which is a change from no current time limitation to these districts;
  • Allow the Department of Management to make rules to implement the new limitations.

The bill still creates a reporting requirement for the Legislative Services Agency to separate out the total TIF debt from annual TIF debt on the existing forms in a report to legislators and would prohibit TIF from being utilized on future public buildings.

HF655, the “Iowa Cell Siting Act,” passed out of the House on Thursday morning with an amendment by a vote of 59-39. The goal of this bill is to provide a standard set of regulations in relation to wireless broadband deployment. It prohibits cities and counties from considering several important factors in making their determinations on the siting of new cell towers.  House Chamber Rules were suspended to allow Amendment H-1336 to be attached to HF655. The amended bill attaches the flood mitigation language that was originally removed from the Iowa Economic Development Authority Omnibus bill in the House Ways & Means Committee. The flood mitigation portion affects the cities in the Des Moines metropolitan area.

Iowa legislation ,

Kansas annexation statutes require substantive test for “reasonableness,” but annexation in question met the test

May 7th, 2015

by Gary Taylor

Stueckemann and Cedar Lake Association v. City of Basehor
Kansas Supreme Court, April 24, 2015

In 2008 the city of Basehor initiated the unilateral annexation of the Estates – a platted residential subdivision of approximately 115 acres adjacent to the city and accessible by city streets.  The Estates has been served by city sewer under a contract since 2004.  Residents of the Estates raised several issues to contest the annexation.

Improper notice.  The written legal description in the notice provided to parties erroneously included a parcel that was correctly excluded from the map.  The map incorrectly excluded a different parcel that was correctly included in the resolutions and published area sketch.  The Stueckemanns argued that these errors meant that the city failed to meet the statutory notice obligations found in Kansas Statutes.  The Supreme Court agreed with both lower courts that the city met the obligation of “substantial compliance” as the statutes have been interpreted to require in previous court cases.  “Because even with the initial identification errors and inconsistencies acknowledged by the city, the Stueckemanns seemed to be able to determine what area the city sought to annex as they actually notified the city council of the specific discrepancies….”

Plan for extending municipal services.  The city was required by state law to develop a plan for the extension of municipal services to the annexed land.  The Stueckmanns attacked the plan’s provisions for police services and for street and infrastructure maintenance, asserting the plan contained insufficient detail about Leavenworth County’s current services and how the city would proceed to provide its own services post-annexation.  As with the notice requirements, courts review annexation service plans for “substantial compliance” with state law.  The purpose of the plan is “to inform the affected landowners of the municipality’s decision, what benefits they will receive, and what costs they will incur,” so that affected landowners “may attempt to persuade the city that annexation would not be in the best interest of either party.”  In previous cases the Supreme Court had determined that a “bona fide plan” meets the requirement for substantial compliance, and that a “bona fide plan” is one that is prepared and submitted by the city in accordance with the statute in good faith and with honest intentions on the part of the city to implement the plan as submitted.”  In the present case the court could not conclude that the city’s plan was not being submitted in good faith.  The plan provided estimates of the cost and cost impact of providing police protection and extending street infrastructure and maintenance, states the means by which the Estates received such services prior to the annexation, and demonstrates how the city will finance the extension of services.  A specific timetable is not required, nor would it be feasible considering the facts of the case.

Annexation is unreasonable.  The requirement in state law that an annexation be “reasonable” was interpreted by the Kansas Supreme Court.  Prior to a 2005 statutory amendment, it was interpreted to simply mean that the annexation did not “violate constitutional protections or statutory authority….Courts do not pass on the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of legislative acts delegated to municipalities.”  Under the 2005 amendments, however, the court determined that “reasonableness” now means that a landowner may challenge an annexation on substantive grounds.  Despite this new standard, an annexation is not per se unreasonable when the value of new services does not exceed the new taxes imposed.  A court reviewing a city’s unilateral annexation may consider the inherent benefits residents enjoy by virtue of their proximity to the city.  Under the facts of the case, the city’s annexation met the statutory test for reasonableness.

Judgment for the city.


Annexation, Kansas courts ,

Shared driveway resulting from DOT condemnation may be undesirable, but does not constitute a taking

May 5th, 2015

by Hannah Dankbar

Bailey v Wisconsin DOT
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, April 23, 2015

Bradley and Caroline Bailey appealed the circuit court’s dismissal of their takings claim against the Wisconsin DOT. The Baileys claimed that the DOT took part of their land that resulted in a change in access to their property and left them with an “uneconomic remnant” which, according to Wis. Stat. 32.05(3m) means that the “property remaining is of such size, shape or condition as to be of little value or of substantially impaired economic viability.”

The DOT condemned two parcels of the Baileys’ property as part of a highway construction project.  As part of this project the DOT moved the Baileys’ driveway and created a new access point from the highway. The Baileys claimed that the DOT’s actions left them with an “uneconomic remnant,” but the circuit court dismissed the complaint.

The Baileys first argued that the circuit court erred because the DOT failed to make a prima facie case that the “Baileys’ property had reasonable access after condemnation.”  The DOT responded that the question of reasonable access is separate from, and plays no part in a determination whether an uneconomic remnant exists under the statute.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the Baileys’ argument over any supposed stand-alone “reasonable access” issue. Instead it focused on whether the change in access left the Baileys with an uneconomic remnant. The Baileys submitted four affidavits in support of this claim: one by the Baileys’ attorney, two by individuals the Baileys listed as experts, and one by Caroline Bailey. The circuit court excluded everything in the attorney’s and experts’ affidavits based on lack of foundation and other admissibility factors.  Caroline Bailey’s affidavit was the exception. She stated that they now shared a driveway with a neighbor whom they find difficult and threatening, and with whom they believe they will be unable to agree on driveway maintenance.  The Court of Appeals found that this only demonstrated that the Baileys’ situation is undesirable; not that the remaining property is “of little value or of substantially impaired economic viability.”

Because of these reasons the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal.

Condemnation, Highways, Wisconsin courts , ,

Iowa legislative update 5/4

May 4th, 2015

HF557 amending the requirements for establishing, financing, and dissolving Rural Improvement Zones, has been succeeded by HF615.  HF615 passed the Senate on April 29 by 49-0 vote.

HF556 – The Iowa Cell Siting Act – is now succeeded by HF655.  It will likely be brought up for debate soon.

HF 619 addresses the use of eminent domain authority for creating lakes for drinking water sources.

HF 628 would make several modifications to Iowa’s urban renewal law by modifying requirements for the annual report prepared by the legislative services agency, establishing restrictions on the use of divided revenues, and modifying the methodology for calculating the amount of divided revenues.

Iowa legislation ,

MN county ordinance required formal adoption of planning commission findings on the record at a meeting

April 30th, 2015

by Hannah Dankbar

Bio Wood Processing, LLC v. Rice County Board of Commissioners
Minnesota Court of Appeals, April 13, 2015

Bio Wood Processing recycles wood products into bedding for animals and mulch. Its facility is located in Rice County, near the City of Faribault. The area of the facility is zoned as urban-reserve, and any agriculture businesses must obtain a conditional use permit (CUP). Bio Wood received a CUP in 2011 that restricted the hours they could grind wood.

In 2013 Bio Wood asked to amend its CUP; this included an expansion of its hours of operation. The planning commission allowed longer wood grinding hours, but reduced the total hours of operation. In 2014 Bio Wood applied for another amendment that asked for a new set of conditions that did not include any restrictions on hours of operation. After hearing from company representative and community members who live near the facility, the planning commission took a voice vote and decided to recommend denial of the application.

Between May 1 and 13, 2014 a written document entitled “Findings of Fact” was written with notes from the Planning Commission meeting to pass along to the Board of Commissioners. The Board of Commissioners followed the recommendation and denied the application. Bio Woods appealed.

Bio Woods claimed that the county erred in judgment in multiple ways; (1) the planning commission failed to make findings of fact on the record, (2) the board failed to engage in reasoned decision-making, (3) the board’s findings are not supported by the factual record and (4) the board treated applicants who are similarly situated differently.

Bio Woods claimed that the Planning Commission did not meet the requirements of the county ordinance, which states in part that “the report from the planning commission to the County Board shall take the form of formal findings on the record.” The county argued that nothing in the ordinance required them to write the findings themselves or read them out loud on the record. A notary public did certify a portion of a transcript, but not the section that mentions findings of fact. The court found the plain meaning of the ordinance required the commission to make formal findings in the course of a public meeting, either by stating them orally or by approving a previously prepared document that includes written findings. The court determined that the county did not satisfy the plain meaning of the county ordinance because county staff prepared written findings from a meeting after the meeting happened and submitted the written findings to the County Board without the Planning Commission ever formally adopting them  “on the record.”

The court reversed the Board of Commissioner’s decision to deny the CUP. The matter went back to the county to make valid findings in this case.

Minnesota courts, Procedural Issues , ,

Missouri Right-to-Farm statute upheld by Missouri Supreme Court

April 29th, 2015

by Hannah Dankbar and Gary Taylor

Labrayere v. Bohr Farms
Missouri Supreme Court, April 14, 2015

Multiple landowners filed suit against Cargill Pork LLC and Bohr Farms alleging damages for temporary nuisance, negligence and conspiracy due to odors coming from a concentrated feeding animal operation (CAFO) owned and operated by Bohr Farms. The landowners who filed the complaint claimed that they lost the use and enjoyment of their property.  Neither rental value nor medical conditions were issues raised by the landowners in this case. The circuit court found that Bohr Farms was not responsible for paying damages.

In 2011 section 537.296 went into effect. This statute supersedes common law related to actions that result in an alleged nuisance coming from a property that is used primarily for crop or animal production. This statute prohibits non-economic damage recovery for items such as loss of use and enjoyment of property, inconvenience or discomfort that the agricultural nuisance caused, and allows recovery only for a diminished market value of property and documented medical costs.  Only a few days after the statute was passed Bohr Farms began their CAFO operation that can feed 4,000 hogs. Bohr owns and operates the CAFO and Cargill owns the hogs. The CAFO includes an on-site sewage disposal system as well as a system for composting deceased hogs. The plaintiffs raised seven constitutional issues. Appellants claimed that section 537.296 is unconstitutional for seven reasons.


Constitutional Claims

  1. Section 537.296 impermissibly authorized an unconstitutional private taking.  Plaintiffs argued that the statute, “effectively provide[s] the right of eminent domain to private companies.” The Court stated that, “The fact that private parties benefit from a taking does not eliminate the public character of the taking so long as there is some benefit to any considerable number of the public.”  A use is public if it reasonably likely to create some advantage or benefit for the public.  The Court noted that the statute did not authorize any private party to create a nuisance.
  2. Section 537.296 authorized a taking without requiring just compensation. Under the statute all nuisance claims following the initial temporary nuisance claim are to be considered a permanent nuisance. The plaintiffs claimed that this essentially grants an easement for the respondent to interfere with the full use and enjoyment of their land. The court found this argument was not ripe because the appellants were only seeking relief for a temporary nuisance in this case. The court noted that the statute specifically allowed the recovery of damages for loss in rental value of impacted property when a temporary nuisance was present.  That satisfied the constitutionally required just compensation when a temporary nuisance amounts to a temporary taking.
  3. Section 537.296 violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional right of equal protection. The plaintiffs claimed that the statute creates a suspect class of “rural landowners and residents” and therefore the statute should have to withstand strict scrutiny. Historically, rural landowners have not been oppressed and the statute benefits rural landowners who use their land for agricultural purposes, so there is no suspect class. The argument related to the fundamental right to property conflicts with the established right of the state to confiscate property to “substantially advance a legitimate state interest.” Therefore, the statute only has to withstand the rational basis test. The Court presumes the state has a rational basis for this statute and the appellants had to demonstrate a “clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality” before the statute can be declared unconstitutional.
  4. Section 237.296 violates due process. This argument relied on a finding that a fundamental right had been violated, but the Court already determined there was no fundamental right violated.
  5. Section 537.296 violates separation of powers. The appellants claimed that the statue requiring a person to have “ownership interest” in order to have standing is a judicial decision that the legislature did not have the power to make. Nobody in this case was denied standing because of this, and none of the plaintiffs were injured as a result of this part of the statute. The court will not rule on hypothetical questions of standing.
  6. Section 537.296 violates the open courts clause. Article I, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution guarantees “the right to pursue in the courts the causes of actions the substantive law recognizes.” The plaintiffs’ asserted that the statute denied access to the court to “lawful possessors and occupiers of land”; however, the plaintiffs did not claim that the statute restricts access to the courts, so they did not have an argument to support this claim.
  7. Section 537.296 is an unconstitutional special law. Finally, plaintiffs argued that this statute “benefits only the corporate farming industry.” Article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution does not allow the legislature to enact “special laws” when a general law will work. Special laws, “includes less than all who are similarly situated… but a law is not a special if it applies to all of the given class alike and the classification is make on a reasonable basis.” The court said that the landowners that can take advantage of the statute could change, as could the land uses.  The open-ended classification, the Court noted, was reasonable because it advanced the legitimate state purpose of promoting the agricultural economy.

Plaintiffs argued that, according to a negligence or conspiracy cause of action, they should receive “use and enjoyment” recovery. They also argued that there are not enough facts to demonstrate that Cargill was not vicariously liable for Bohr’s alleged negligence. The statute allows people to recover non-economic “use and enjoyment” damages only if their negligence and conspiracy claims are “independent of a claim of nuisance.” The court found that Appellants’ negligence, conspiracy and vicarious liability claims were not “independent of a claim of nuisance” because those claims were dependent on the nuisance claims.

The ruling of the circuit court was upheld.

Missouri Courts, Nuisance, Right-to-Farm, Takings , , ,

Iowa legislative update, 4/28

April 28th, 2015

The land use related activity seems to have narrowed to a few bills.

Cell towersHF556 passed out of the House Ways and Means Committee with a 14-9 vote.  It would provide a uniform set of regulations for the approval of new towers by local governments, thus preempting local zoning on several issues.  The FCC ruling issued last fall (blogposts here) addressed collocation of facilities and substantial modifications to existing facilities.  This legislation is primarily directed at new tower siting, and would provide standard definitions, uniform application standards and a streamlined process.

Abandoned nuisance properties:  The sections addressing abandoned nuisance properties and flood mitigation were stripped out of HF385.  before passing out of the House Ways and Means Committee.

Eminent DomainSF449, a bill relating to procedures and requirements for condemning property and disposing of certain condemned property, passed out of the House 92-3.  It previously passed out of the Senate 50-0. The bill specifies that the authority to condemn property is not conferred on an acquiring agency unless the governing body for the acquiring agency first approves a preliminary or final route or site location of the proposed public improvement.

Iowa legislation ,

Oklahoma annexation statute requiring notice by certified mail means what it says

April 27th, 2015

by Hannah Dankbar and Gary Taylor

In re: Detachment of Municipal Territory from the City of Ada, Oklahoma
Oklahoma Supreme Court, March 31, 2015

In February 2013 the City of Ada passed Ordinance No. 13-02 to annex property into its corporate limits. Property owners in this area attempted to set aside the ordinance, but were denied by the City. Petitioners were property owners within the annexed territory.  They filed for a Declaratory Judgment asking the court to nullify the annexation or, in the alternative, to detach their properties from the city.  The basis for the claim was that the city did not comply with 11 O.S. 2011 §21-103, which sets forth the notice requirements for a municipal annexation.  The trial court denied their request and this appeal followed.

11 O.S. §21-103(B)(2) states:

A copy of the notice of annexation shall be mailed by first-class mail to all owners of property to be annexed as shown by the current year’s ownership rolls in the office of the county treasurer and to all owners of property abutting any public right-of-way that forms the boundary of the territory proposed to be annexed and to the Sales and Use Tax Division of the Oklahoma Tax Commission; provided that the notice of annexation shall be mailed by certified mail to every person who owns a parcel of land of five (5) acres or more used for agricultural purposes.

Petitioners alleged the City failed to provide notice by certified mail to owners of property of five acres or more used for agricultural purposes, which abuts the boundaries of the annexed territory. Certified mail “return receipt requested” was sent to all owners of property within the territory to be annexed; however, the City provided only first class mail to abutting property owners of 5 or more acres of agricultural land, despite the use of the mandatory language “shall” in the statute.

The statute reads that “every person” owning five acres or more of agricultural land should receive notice by certified mail. The record clearly shows that the City did not send notice by certified mail to all owners of five acres or more of agricultural land abutting the boundaries of the annexed territory; rather the City used first-class mail.  The certified mail requirement is meant to protect the property owners who are affected by the annexation but are not within the territory. One such owner, Mr. Plumlee, who owns more than five acres of agricultural property in section 14, testified that he did not receive any kind of prior notice of the proposed annexation. If the City had utilized notice by certified mail, it would have been obvious whether City had sent notice to Mr. Plumlee.  According to the court, “one property owner without notice is too many.”  The Court found that the legislature intended nothing less than certified mail for the agricultural owners of five acres or more within the annexed territory.  The trial court erred in disregarding the legislative intent to provide a specific level of notice to specific groups of property owners.

Annexation, Notice, Oklahoma courts , ,