by Victoria Heldt
Township of Blair v. Lamar OCI North Corporation
(Michigan Court of Appeals, October 27, 2010)
Lamar OCI North Corporation (Lamar) leases property along US highway 31 on which it maintains commercial billboards. Ordinances in the Blair Township Zoning Ordinance (BTZPO), passed in 2005, prohibit billboards exceeding 300 square feet in area, 30 feet in height, and closer than 2,640 feet to another billboard. One of Lamar’s billboards was in violation of all three of those stipulations, but was allowed as a nonconforming use since it was constructed before the relevant ordinances in BTZPO were passed. In 2005, Lamar removed a portion of the sign and installed an LED display face on the remaining portion of the board. This action brought the sign in compliance with the area and height requirements, yet it still violated the distance requirement.
The Township filed suit in district court claiming that the sign constituted a nuisance and Lamar countered with a claim that the spacing requirement between signs violated the First Amendment. The district court ruled in favor of the Township, but found a portion of the governing ordinance invalid under the First Amendment due to vagueness and removed it. The court ordered the removal of the billboard unless it appealed the ruling, in which case it could remain until the resolution of the appeal.
On appeal, Lamar first argued that Michigan law prohibited the Township from disallowing modifications to nonconforming uses if they reduce the nonconformity. The Court acknowledged that the Township has authority to regulate billboards under Article 20 under the BTZO. Specifically, the Township governs nonconforming uses under Section 20.08 which states that the ordinance may not prohibit alterations to the nonconforming use unless the cost of the alterations exceeds 30% of the cost to replace the sign. The Court noted that Lamar’s argument was invalid, since it cited cases that were not factually similar. The changes to Lamar’s sign exceeded 30% of the cost of replacement, so the BTZO had authority to prohibit them. Lamar failed to show that the trial court lacked authority to eliminate the nuisance.
Lamar next claimed that, since one sentence of the governing ordinance was stricken due to vagueness, the district court should not have been able to find them in violation of the ordinance. The sentence removed read: “If the face, supports, or other parts of a nonconforming sign or billboard is structurally changed, altered, or substituted in a manner that reduces the nonconformity, the Zoning Administrator may approve the change.” The trial court ruled that the phrase gave unbridled and vague authority to the Zoning Administrator. The Court found that the sentence was able to be removed without altering the goal or effectiveness of the ordinance. Another question the Court asked itself was whether the ordinance would have been passed in the first place had it been known that the sentence would be stricken. They found that it would, so the removal of the sentence did not render the clause ineffective. Lamar claimed that the Court should have eliminated the need for permission from the Zoning Administrator to solve the problem and retain the ability to reduce nonconformities; i.e., that requiring permission constituted prior restraint of speech. They based their argument on Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham in which the Court ruled against an ordinance requiring a permit to protest. The Court rejected Lamar’s argument, stating that Shuttlesworth did not apply to the facts in this case because the Township was not trying to restrict the content of the speech.
Lastly, Lamar challenged the constitutionality of the distance requirement found in the ordinance. The Township claimed the requirement was in place to “enhance the aesthetic desirability of the environment and reduce hazards to life and property in the township.” When analyzing restrictions on free speech, the Court considers four factors: 1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it; 2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest; 3) directly advances that interest; and 4) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. In this case, the Court found that lawful commercial speech was involved and that “promoting aesthetic desirability of the environment and reducing hazards to life and property in Blair Township are of substantial governmental interest.” It also found that the ordinances also passed the last two factors of the four-pronged test. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
