Tag: Plats

DoT must pay just compensation for property erroneously recorded as “dedication” on plat map

hdankbar

by Hannah Dankbar and Gary Taylor

Somers USA, LLC v. Wisconsin Department of Transportation
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, March 25, 2015

Somers purchased about 47 acres in 2007 to build a truck stop off of I-94. At the time the state was planning on using about 9.5 of those acres for a frontage road, and about 3 acres for an on ramp for a highway project. An engineering company helped create the Certified Survey Map (CSM).  The initial draft of the CSM reserved both the 9.5-acre and the 3-acre parcels as “Future Wisconsin D.O.T. Right-of-Way.”  The Kenosha County Land Use Committee approved the CSM without any conditions or communications regarding land dedication for public use.

In 2008 when Somers recorded their final CSM it dedicated the 9.5 acres as “Road Dedication for Future Highway Purposes,” and the 3 acres as “a road reservation for potential future state highway purposes.” All parties agree that Somers never intended to dedicate land for the highway project and that none of the governmental bodies involved had required or asked for a dedication. Individuals involved with drafting and signing the CSM stated that they do not know how the “dedication” language wound up in the document.  The State thereafter built a frontage road and on-ramp on the two parcels without compensating Somers, relying on the “reservation” and “dedication” language in the CSM to give it a right to the property without any requirement to pay Somers for the land taken. Somers filed a complaint seeking just compensation for their land. The court ordered the state to pay Somers $500,000 plus attorney fees, costs and interest. The state appealed this decision.

The Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution and Article I section 13 of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibit the taking of land without just compensation. The state relied on Wis. Stat. §236.29(1) which states, ““[w]hen any plat is certified, signed, acknowledged and recorded as prescribed in this chapter, every donation or grant to the public … marked or noted as such on said plat shall be deemed a sufficient conveyance to vest the fee simple of all parcels of land so marked or noted.” However, for the state to rely on this statute the land must be dedicated according to proper procedure under Wis. Stat. §236.34(1m)(e), which require a local governing board to approve the dedication in the CSM. No governmental board involved in Somers’ development approved any road dedication or land grant for inclusion in the CSM; therefore, the CSM lacked the force and effect required to convey the property to the State.

The court went on:  “Undeterred by the evidence that no dedication was ever intended or approved, the State proffers the absurd argument that it can still take Somers’ property without compensation as it was entitled to rely on an invalid dedication in a CSM.”

When a court leads by calling an argument “absurd” you can anticipate the results….

The court found no legal dedication, and therefore found that the state owes just compensation to the Somers.

 

 

 

 

 

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Platted village streets constitute “public highway” for purpose of defense to acquiescence claim

hdankbar

by Hannah Dankbar

Haynes v Village of Beulah
Michigan Court of Appeals, December 9, 2014

The Haynes argue that they are entitled to two strips of land within the platted rights-of-way of Lake Street and Commercial Avenue in the Village of Beulah citing the theory of acquiescence. The Haynes own Lots 10,11 and part of Lot 7 in Block 2. These lots are bordered by Lake Street on the northwest side and Commercial Avenue on the southwest side. Before 1968 the prior owners of the Haynes’ property installed railroad ties along Lake Street, separating the portion of the road used for travel from the grass and trees. On the southwest, a rock wall was installed in the 1950s to separate the part of Commercial Avenue used for travel from landscaping plants, a portion of the Haynes’ driveway, a maple tree and a strip of grass owned by the Haynes.

In 2012, the Village of Beulah introduced plans to create angled parking, a new sidewalk and a streetscape in the platted right-of-way of each street and would occupy land owned by the Haynes. The Haynes brought suit to prevent this action. The trial court granted the Village of Beulah’s motion for summary disposition based on MCL 247.190.

MCL 247.190 provides as follows:

 All public highways for which the right of way has at any time been dedicated, given or purchased, shall be and remain a highway of the width so dedicated, given or purchased, and no encroachments by fences, buildings or otherwise which may have been made since the purchase, dedication or gift nor any encroachments which were within the limits of such right of way at the time of such purchase, dedication or gift, and no encroachments which may hereafter be made, shall give the party or parties, firm or corporation so encroaching, any title or right to the land so encroached upon.

Plaintiffs argued that MCL 247.190 does not apply to platted village streets or property acquiescence claims.  The issue in this case is the definition of “public highways,” which is not defined in the statute. “Highway” has been defined through multiple cases and multiple legal dictionaries before the enactment of MCL 247.190. These definitions encompass a broad reading of the term “highway.” Because of this, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not err in broadly construing the term to include village streets.

The Haynes also argued that MCL 247.190 does not apply to property acquiescence claims, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. MCL 247.190 provides, “no encroachments” on a public highway “shall give the party or parties, firm or corporation so encroaching, any title or right to the land so encroached upon.” Nothing in the statute permits the court to distinguish between different legal theories used to assert a private right or claim to any portion of a public highway.  A claim for acquiescence constitutes an encroachment.

The Haynes also argued that the unimproved portions of platted right-of-ways are not “public highways” that are entitled to protection under MCL 247.190. The Court of Appeals disagreed with this assertion, as well.  It is sufficient for the spending of public funds on a road in a dedicated right-of-way to constitute public acceptance of the entire width, and therefore have the entire width constitute “public highway,” even if the municipality never improves the specific strips of land within the right-of-way.

Judgment for the Village of Beulah was affirmed.

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Plat approval results in town acceptance of public road, but does not obligate town to construct it

by Rachel Greifenkamp

Runkle, et al. v. Town of Albany
(Wisconsin Court of Appeals, June 19, 2014)

In the Town of Albany, Wisconsin several individuals purchased land and built homes along a street called Proverbs Pass. The developer of the subdivision entered into a development agreement with the town to build Proverbs Pass; however, neither the developer nor the town has completed construction or maintained the street. The people who built homes on the road filed a complaint asking the court to direct the town to complete the road and accept it as a town road, meaning the town would be responsible for it’s maintenance. The town admitted that the plat for the road had been approved and recorded with the register of deed but denied that it had any obligation to complete or maintain it as the town had not accepted the street as a town road. The circuit court ruled in favor of the town because certain conditions that were set forth in the development agreement were not met by the developer and the court concluded that that meant the town had not accepted the plat. The homeowners appealed the decision.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that the only issue was whether the town accepted Proverbs Pass as a town road when the town approved and recorded the plat. If the approval does not equal acceptance, then the Town would be correct in assuming no responsibility for the road. If the approval does equal acceptance, the the Town would be required to assume the same responsibility it does for all other town roads. The town argued that acceptance of Proverbs Pass as a town road hinged on the developer meeting conditions in the development agreement, and that those conditions were not met. Based on Wisconsin court precedent, a town accepts a plat when it is approved and recorded in the register of deed, therefore the Court of Appeals reversed the Circuit Court’s ruling and found that the the Town of Albany did in fact accept Proverbs Pass as a town road.  This, however, did not determine whether the town had an obligation to construct and maintain the street.  “The acceptance of a plat by the city does not require that it shall open all the streets and alleys for immediate use.”  This issue was handed back to the circuit court to determine whether any other events or agreements obligated the town to complete construction of Proverbs Pass.

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City (WI) cannot use extraterritorial plat approval authority to regulate land use

by Rachel Greifenkamp

Lake Delavan Property Company, LLC v. City of Delavan

(Wisconsin Court of Appeals, February 12, 2014)

Delavan, a city in southeastern Wisconsin recently attempted to “protect rural character and farming viability” by utilizing its extraterritorial plat approval authority to deny a proposal made by Lake Delavan Property Company to develop a 600-home subdivision just outside of the city limits.  According to WIS. STAT. § 236.10(1)(b), a municipality is authorized to exercise extraterritorial plat approval authority over land within one and one-half miles of the city limits. The land that the developer purchased is in the Town of Delavan, but within one and one-half miles of the City of Delavan.

The question in this case was whether the City’s denial of the Company’s plan is prohibited by WIS. STAT. § 236.45(3)(b). This provision states that a city may not use its extraterritorial power to deny the approval of a plat on the basis of the proposed land use unless the denial is based on zoning regulations passed cooperatively with neighboring towns. The only part of the statute that was contested was whether the proposed subdivision was denied on the basis of the proposed land use. The city maintained that the denial was based on its application of its density restrictions (one residential dwelling per 35 acres in the extraterritorial area), which is a permissible use of extraterritorial plat approval authority. Conversely, the developer claimed that the thirty-five acre density restriction is designed to keep the borders of the city agricultural.

When a developer believes that the denial of a plat was arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory, they can appeal to the circuit court where, if it is found that the denial of the plat was arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory, the court will direct the City to approve the plat. In the circuit court it was ruled that the city acted outside its jurisdiction by using its extraterritorial power to deny the proposed plat based on land use. The state court of appeals agreed with the circuit court. “The city’s 35-acre density restriction is an improper use if its extraterritorial plat approval authority to rezone land….Common knowledge and experience tell us that the ordinance’s blanket density requirements effectively preclude residential development throughout extraterritorial jurisdiction. Indeed, the ordinance’s preamble states the ordinance was enacted ‘in order to protect rural character and farming viability.'”  The judgment in favor of Lake Delavan Property Company was affirmed.

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Lakeway easement interpreted as providing access, not a park

Gary Taylor

by Victoria Heldt

Bedford, et. al., v. Joan Yvonne Rogers, Joan Yvonne Rogers Trust
(Michigan Court of Appeals, April 17, 2012)

The long list of plaintiffs in this case is comprised of property owners within the Glen Eyrie subdivision located on Crystal Lake.  The plat (recorded in 1920) and the parties’ deeds established a 100-foot wide strip of land designated as the “lakeway” between the plaintiffs’ property and the edge of Crystal Lake.  The lots do not extend all the way to the water.  The lakeway was to be “dedicated to the common use of property owners in Glen Eyrie plat.”  Sometime after 1920, Crystal Lake Drive was constructed parallel to, and partially within, the lakeway.  Surveys done in 2001 and 2010 indicated that the border separating the property owners’ lots and the lakeway is located near the center line of Crystal Lake Drive.

Historically, some of the property owners built boathouses or storage units in the lakeway.  When Rogers purchased her lot in 1987 a 20 x 28-foot boathouse was built in the lakeway in front of her property.  In September 2009 she applied to the township for a permit to build a new 28 x 34-foot boathouse to replace the existing one.  The township granted the permit and Rogers began construction in October 2009.  The new “boathouse” was to include running water, heat, toilet facilities, a kitchenette, a workshop, and a second floor cupola.

As Rogers’ construction was in its early stages, the plaintiffs wrote a letter through an attorney asking Rogers to cease construction since the lakeway was reserved for the common use of property owners.  Rogers refused to stop the construction.  In December 2009 the Lake Township Zoning Administrator wrote her a letter stating the building violated the township’s zoning ordinance since it “includes substantial space designated by the Building Department as living quarters” and issued a stop work order.  Rogers appealed the administrator’s opinion and, in April 2010, the Board of Appeals voted that the boathouse constructed should be “allowed as a compatible non-commercial recreational facility.”  The Board did place certain conditions on the property that included the removal of certain residential features (e.g. a tub, shower, and certain fixed kitchen appliances).

In trial court, the plaintiffs filed a request for summary disposition citing trespass and nuisance.  They argued that the plat dedication granted property owners an “irrevocable easement over the lakeway property and prevented defendant from exclusively using the portion of the lakeway in front of her lot by constructing a new structure that expanded the footprint of the old boathouse.”  Rogers also filed for summary disposition, arguing she owned the portion of the lakeway in front of her property and had the right to make use of it.  The court noted that a tacit agreement existed among land owners that 100% of the lakeway was not dedicated for common use since most property owners built boathouses for personal use.  History supported that claim since most of the structures had existed for over 40 years.  The court acknowledged that the expansion of this boathouse by several feet would not further prevent other land owners from using and enjoying the lakeway.  It determined the expansion should be allowed.

On appeal the Court of Appeals first noted that a use under a plat dedication must be within the scope of the dedication and must not interfere with the owners’ use and enjoyment of the property.  In this case, the plaintiffs interpreted the plat dedication to create a park for common use by the lot owners.  This Court of Appeals disagreed.  The dedication stated that “the drive, court, spring road and lakeway” were dedicated for common use.  When interpreting language like this, it is in accordance with precedent to treat word groups in a list as having related meanings.  The drive, court, and spring road are all used as right-of-ways (access) for lot owners to travel to, from, and within the plat, not as a park (which implied open space without obstructions).  The Court stated that the lakeway is to be considered similar; i.e., as a right-of-way.  The Court further noted that the term “lakeway” suggests it should be used as a right-of-way rather than a park (since the word “way” is found within the term.)

Subsequently, the Court determined that “the scope of the dedication created an easement within the lakeway for common use of lot owners of the land as a right-of-way that allows lot owners to use the lakeway in the same manner as the drive, court, and spring road.”  Since Crystal Drive, which runs through the lakeway, satisfies the purpose of a right-of-way providing access, there is no need to prohibit obstructions such as boathouses from the lakeway.   The Court determined that the slightly larger boathouse would not prevent residents from using and enjoying the lakeway for its purpose as right-of-way any more so than the previous boathouse did.  Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s decision.

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Lake access provided through plat not interpreted to include boat docks

Gary Taylor

by Victoria Heldt

John J. Banacki v. David W. Howe and Jamie C. Howe, et al.
(Michigan Court of Appeals, March 20, 2012)

John Banacki, the Howes, and the remaining defendants are all residents of the Gilmore Lake Subdivision.  It consists of 62 lots, a street, a park, and two courts (East Court and West Court).  Lots 1-36 have water frontage on Magician Lake while the remaining 26 lots have frontage along Gilbert Street.  East Court is a 25-foot wide strip of waterfront land in between lots 12 and 13 and West Court is a similar strip of land between lots 29 and 30.  Banacki owns lot 13, while the defendants are the owners of lots 47, 48, 49, and 50.  When the property was platted in 1941, the dedication stated that “the park, street, and courts, as shown on said plat are hereby dedicated to the use of persons owning land adjacent to said park, street, or courts.”

Banacki filed a trespassing complaint regarding the defendants’ installation of a pier, boat lift, wooden dock, and decking adjacent to Magician Lake on the East Court.  He asserted that they do not have a right to use East Court or the adjacent lake frontage since they are not owners of land adjacent to East Court.  He further argued that defendants’ additions interfered with his ability to use and enjoy East Court and the adjacent property.  He sought an injunction to prevent future installation of such structures.  Banacki also pursued a quiet title to declare himself and another (Smit) the owners of the property adjacent to East Court.

The Howes and the rest of the defendants filed for summary disposition, arguing no trespass had occurred.  They asserted that the language of the plat dedication gave all persons owning land adjacent to any park, street, or court the right to use the parks, street, or courts.  They also argued they had a prescriptive easement for the use of East Court since their predecessors used the property in a similar fashion for 65 years without complaint.  Banacki responded by filing his own motion for summary disposition, arguing the language of the dedication clearly prevented anyone from the seasonal installation of boat lifts and the overnight mooring of boats  in East Court.  Therefore, the defendants’ actions interfered with all lot owners’ right to use East Court.  The district court concluded the defendants’ use of East Court exceeded the scope of the plat dedication and granted summary judgment in favor of Banacki.  This appeal followed.

The question in front of the Court was to what extent nonriparian land owners have access to East Court.  According to statute, a nonriparian owner has the right to “use the surface of the water in a reasonable manner for such activities as boating, fishing and swimming” as well as “to anchor boats temporarily.”  Any additional uses must be granted by easement, which defendants argued was given to them through the plat dedication.  Since the language was unclear, the Court looked to the way in which the land was used at the time of the plat dedication.  Defendants provided an affidavit of Jack Szymanski, a previous owner of lots 47-50 for over 50 years, who testified that he used East Court as “lake access” and for the “overnight mooring of boats, and seasonal installation and removal of a wooden pier and shore station.”  He further stated that his parents, the original owners of the property, used East Court in a similar way.  The Court noted, however, that the record did not show that these activities occurred at the time of the plat dedication.  Therefore, it relied solely on the language of the dedication.

Typically, the granted “use” of streets and alleys near navigable waters extends up to the edge of the water and includes public access to the water.  The Court consulted the common definition of a “court” and determined it should be treated in the same way.  It concluded that the defendants failed to prove that the plat dedication granted any other “use” outside of general public access to the water surface.  There was no evidence that the dedication allowed individual lot owners to monopolize East Court by permanently parking boats or installing decks and boat lifts within East Court.  In regards to the defendants’ supposed prescriptive easement, the Court noted that a prescriptive easement is usually appropriate only where an express easement has failed because of a defect.  This is not the case here.  It further compared a prescriptive easement to adverse possession, which requires an element of adversity.  There was no adversity or hostility present in this case.  Therefore, the Court concluded that no prescriptive easement was granted.  It affirmed the district court’s decision.

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