Proposal sufficient to pass muster at preliminary plat stage despite water pressure and sewage disposal concerns

NOTE:  With the start of fall classes the BLUZ welcomes its newest student contributor, Victoria Heldt.  Tori’s bio appears under “contributors.”  Melanie Thwing is continuing to report on all things land use in her homeland of Wisconsin before she starts law school next fall (Packers news will be filtered out.  Sorry Melanie).

by Victoria Heldt

State of Missouri, Ex Rel., Alexander & Lindsey, LLC v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Platte County, Missouri
(Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, August 16, 2011)

Alexander & Lindsey, LLC (Alexander) owns approximately 16 acres of property north of Missouri Highway 92 and east of Highway 45 in Platte County, Missouri.  In July of 2007, Alexander filed an application with Platte County for a preliminary plat to subdivide the property into five lots for commercial development with the name “Beverly Plaza.”  In order to subdivide land in Platte County, a property owner must comply with the Platte County Subdivision Regulations of 1992.  The Director of Planning and Zoning, Daniel Erickson, determined that Alexander’s preliminary plat application met all of the requirements of the Subdivision Regulations and recommended approval of the application.

Pursuant to Subdivision Regulations, a public hearing was held in March of 2008, at which Erickson testified that the preliminary plat application complied with regulations.  In addition, a traffic study was completed that was approved by the Missouri Department of Transportation and the Platte County Engineer.  A drainage study was also reviewed and approved by the County Engineer.  Several concerns were raised at the hearing, however, regarding the water and soil testing.  The spokesman for Water District No. 3 stated that the District could provide water service to the property but that it could not guarantee fire suppression adequacy.  The Health Department, which performed soil testing, stated that 2 of the lots did not have adequate soil testing results suitable for septic systems and that those lots may require waste treatment systems using a lagoon or another method.

Erickson stated that some revisions would be made to the plat in response to the opposition to the development from the City of Weston.  These include 75-foot setback along both Highways 45 and 92 would be provided that would require a detailed landscape plan at the time of final plat approval and an area containing a stand of trees would be permanently protected by a stream buffer setback easement.  Greg Hoffman, an alderman with the Weston Board of Alderman, testified that the City of Weston opposes the proposed development of the property because it violates Weston’s scenic overlay ordinance for properties within Weston, which requires a 100 foot setback and other provisions regarding landscaping, massing of buildings, and scenic views.  He noted that the Weston Planning and Zoning Commission had voted down this same request several years prior.

At the end of the hearing, the Planning and Zoning Commission denied the preliminary plat 7 to 1, finding that the application would be detrimental to the public good and would impair the intent, purpose and necessity of the Subdivision Regulations for the following reasons:  1) lack of specification as to the proposed uses 2) infrastructure limitations, such as water for fire suppression, lack of central sewage disposal facilities and inability of the proposed subdivision to support wastewater stabilization ponds 3) the potential impact of wastewater stabilization ponds on neighboring properties and the public 4) potential for traffic hazards created by two access points on Highway 45 adjacent to the proposed subdivision.  Alexander appealed to the County Commission and then to the circuit court, both of which confirmed the Planning and Zoning Commission’s denial of the request. Alexander then appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals

Alexander asserted that the decision to deny its preliminary plat was arbitrary and unlawful since the plat was in compliance with the requirements of Platte County’s Subdivision Regulations.  The Court of Appeals agreed.  The Court stated that the County Commission is acting in an administrative capacity, not a legislative capacity, when reviewing subdivision plats. As such it has no authority to make subjective judgments regarding the granting or denying of  plats.  It simply has the authority to determine if a proposal complies with regulations.  The Court noted that the County Commission’s four reasons it provided for denial (listed above) were outside the scope of the requirements of the Subdivision Regulations for preliminary plats.  As to lack of specification of proposed uses, nothing in the Subdivision Regulations requires specification of uses at the preliminary plat phase.  Similarly, the regulations do not require an applicant seeking approval of a preliminary plat to resolve infrastructure issues involving fire suppression, central sewage disposal facilities, or wastewater stabilization ponds. The Court emphasized the fact that this was a preliminary plat, which only gives the subdivider permission to proceed with the planning and development phases of the project.  The Subdivision Regulations will still require the final plat to comply with all Subdivision Regulations.  The Court further noted that the general purpose clause of a subdivision ordinance cannot be used as an independent basis for plat denial since it contains “no standards for approval.” Since Alexander’s plat complied, the County Commission had a ministerial duty to approve it and no authority to deny it.The Court concluded that the County Commission’s denial of Alexander’s preliminary plat was arbitrary, unlawful, and not based upon substantial and competent evidence.  It reversed the decision and remanded it to the lower court.

City cannot be sued for failure to enforce subdivision ordinance requiring developer provide improvements

by Gary Taylor

Nelson, et al., v. City of Hampton
(Iowa Supreme Court, August 26, 2011)

A rather complicated twenty year history associated with the platting and development of a residential neighborhood on the northwest edge of Hampton boils down to this:  Three separate subdivisions, each connected by streets dedicated within each subdivision, were planned.  As the project proceeded plans changed, and at a point in 2000 the city and developer reached an agreement that, among other things, obligated the city to surface a 300-foot portion of dirt road that connected one subdivision to the existing street network -which passed both within and outside the boundaries of the subdivision plat – and assess the cost to adjacent landowners.  When the city moved forward with the resurfacing project they prepared an assessment plat and schedule that assessed the adjacent landowners amounts ranging from about $4,000 to 9,000.  The landowners contested the assessments in district court, making three claims: (1) the assessments were void because they were contrary to a city ordinance that requires subdividers to “make and install” the grading and improvement of streets within the final plat of a subdivision by “surfacing or causing to be surfaced the roadways” per ordinance standards; and in the alternative, that (2) the assessments exceeded the special benefits conferred upon the adjacent properties in violation of Iowa law.  The district court rejected both claim, and this appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court ensued.

Agreement contrary to ordinance. The Supreme Court first noted that the legislature has given cities statutory authority to both assess property owners the costs of public improvements based on the benefits they receive from those improvements (Iowa Code Chapter 384) and to charge developers with installing public improvements through the plat approval process (Iowa Code Chapter 354).  Given that both alternatives exist for getting streets constructed, the Court viewed the core question to be whether the city was under a mandatory obligation to enforce the ordinance directive requiring subdividers to “make and install” improvements.  To decide this the Court examined whether the ordinance directive was mandatory or directory, and to decide this the Court will look at whether failure to mandate performance under the ordinance would undermine the purpose of the ordinance itself.  The purpose of the ordinance, as set out in the city code, is to “establish minimum standards for the design, development and improvement of subdivisions” and to make adequate provisions “for public services.” The court concluded that the provision requiring subdividers to install improvements was not mandatory because the end result (a paved road) could be accomplished just as satisfactorily by the city through the assessment process.  In either case, the cost is ultimately borne by the landowners in the subdivision.  In this particular case the agreement allowed for the recoupment of street costs from landowners outside the subdivision who nonetheless benefit from the street.  This result is also consistent with a long line of cases that have sanctioned cities’ decisions to waive plat approval standards when strict adherence to the standards would thwart the objectives of the ordinance.

Special benefits conferred.  The Court further found the amount of the special assessments to be reasonable.  It noted that the law “not only presumes the assessments are correct, but also that they do not exceed the special benefit derived.”  Despite the landowners’ assertions that they would not use the street and it provided them with no additional access, the Court found special benefit in the increase in property values that resulted, and in the transformation of a dirt road into a paved road (despite the landowners’ personal satisfaction with a dirt road).

The district court ruling was affirmed.

Subscribe

Archives

Categories

Tags

Admin Menu