Year: 2016

Date of Board’s decision, not date of approval of meeting minutes, starts clock for filing appeal

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by Gary Taylor and Hannah Dankbar

Hyde v. Sully County Board of Adjustment
 South Dakota Supreme Court, September 28, 2016

Hyde appealed a decision from the Sully County Board of Adjustment (the Board) to grant a conditional use permit (CUP) to Ring-Neck Energy & Feed, LLC for an ethanol plant. The Board approved the CUP in a meeting held on July 20.  When the next met on August 4 it approved the minutes of the July 20 meeting.  Hyde challenged the approval in district court on August 20, which was 31 days after the Board’s approval but only 16 days after approval of the meeting minutes.  Hyde claimed that the approval was illegal due to violations of the open-meeting laws, and that an ethanol plant is not allowed under the Sully County zoning ordinance. The court determined that the petition was untimely, and Hyde appealed.

Regarding the timeliness of the petition in district court, state statute (SDCL 11-2-61) requires these petitions to be filed within 30 days of the day the decision is filed. Hyde argued that the relevant date for appeal purposes was the date of the Board’s approval of the meeting minutes, not the Board’s decision to grant the CUP.  The state statute requires that a petition set forth  “the grounds of the illegality” of the decision being challenged; thus the statute is referencing the date of the decision claimed to be illegal.  That decision would be made on July 20.  The Hydes do not claim any illegalities associated with the decision made on August 4 to approve the minutes.

Because the petition was not filed in a timely manner, the court did not hear the other arguments raised on appeal.

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Constitutional claims not preserved in defense to nuisance citation

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by Hannah Dankbar and Gary Taylor

Beaver and Sanderson v City of Davenport
Iowa Court of Appeals, April 27, 2016

Clifford Beaver and Pamela Sanderson have lived as common law husband and wife at their property in the City of Davenport for the past 14 years.  In 2014 the City sent a letter to  Beaver and Sanderson declaring their property a public nuisance under Davenport Municipal Code §8.12, after several neighbors circulated a petition seeking the property to be declared as such. The City’s letter explained that Sanderson’s “erratic behavior” prevented multiple neighbors from enjoying their property. The letter detailed nine directives regarding the activity on and around the property, including prohibitions against “criminal related activity”, harassment of neighbors and guests, calling authorities without cause, accosting people parking on the street, letting their dog run without a leash, and restrictions on using security cameras.  The letter warned Beaver that failure to abate the nuisance could result in citations and fines.

Beaver requested an appeal hearing. After a two-day hearing in April at which seven police officers and seven neighbors were called as witnesses, the hearing officer determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the nuisance abatement and approved the “Nuisance Abatement Plan” which included seven directives. One of the directives prohibited recording or pointing security cameras at any part of any neighboring structure.

Beaver challenged in district court the legality of the hearing officer’s order. The court ruled in favor of the City and Beaver appealed.

On appeal, Beaver argued the district court wrongly upheld the city’s abatement order that declared his property a public nuisance. He presented two claims: (1) “Davenport’s Nuisance and Residential Camera Statutes are unconstitutional on their face; and (2) unconstitutional as applied to his situation.

The court concluded that these challenges were not preserved for their review. These two claims were not presented in district court and therefore cannot be ruled on in the appeal.

The only constitutional claim that was addressed in district court was regarding the residential-camera regulations. Beaver claimed that the City’s ordinance unconstitutionally restricted his “right to maintain surveillance for the purpose of monitoring or protecting [his] property.” The ordinance limits the camera’s field of view to less than fifty-percent of a neighbor’s property. The court determined that this balances a property owner’s right to survey their property with their neighbor’s right to privacy.

On appeal, Beaver claimed that the hearing officer misapplied the camera ordinance. This specific attack on the abatement order was not ruled on in district court, so the appeals court refused to rule on it.

On appeal, the court did not reach any conclusions on the propriety, constitutionality or enforceability of the City’s order due to the issue of preservation. Because of these issues the orders from the lower court were affirmed.

 

 

 

 

 

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Field of Dreams site cleared for development of baseball complex and tourist attraction

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Residential and Agricultural Advisory Committee, LLC et al. v. Dyersville City Council
Iowa Supreme Court, December 9, 2016

The Dyersville City Council voted to rezone the area containing the site of the 1989 movie Field of Dreams from A-1 Agricultural to C-2 Commercial in order to facilitate the development of a  a 24-field baseball and softball complex, along with the farmhouse and original baseball field used for the movie which would continue to be maintained as a tourist attraction. Community members filed two writs of certiorari to challenge the rezoning on a number of grounds.  The District Court annulled the writs and found in favor of the city council.  This appeal followed.  The Iowa Supreme Court engaged in a 20-page recitation of the facts of the case on its way to its 44-page decision.  Only those relevant to the outcome of each challenge will be repeated here.

Quasi-judicial vs. legislative action.  The petitioners argued that the city council’s actions were quasi-judicial in nature rather than legislative, and therefore the council should have been required to conduct a more formal fact-finding proceeding and make findings of fact in support of its decision.  Quasi-judicial proceedings are also subject to greater judicial scrutiny when reviewed by an appellate court.  Petitioners relied on the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. Dubuque City Council in support of their position. In contrast, the city council maintained that the action of  a legislative body in rezoning land is legislative in nature, which gives the legislative body wider latitude in the conduct of the proceedings.  Courts also give greater deference to legislative decisions made by city councils and county boards of supervisors.

In ruling on this issue the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed Sutton and several other past cases.  It recognized that in its Sutton decision the Court set forth three factors in determining whether zoning activities are quasi-judicial (versus legislative) in nature (1) [when the rezoning] occurs in response to a citizen application followed by a statutorily mandated public hearing; (2) [when] as a result of such applications, readily identifiable proponents and opponents weigh in on the process; and (3) the decision is localized in its application affecting a particular group of citizens more acutely than the public at large.   Recognizing that the Court “cited these factors with approval” in Sutton, it noted that at the time it chose not to hold that all public zoning hearings should be classified as adjudicatory.  It stated:

The Sutton Case dealt with a different situation than many of our previous zoning cases because it involved PUD zoning.  We noted the ‘quasi-judicial character of municipal rezoning is particularly evident in matters involving PUD zoning.’  We discussed the distinction between traditional rezoning and PUD zoning:

Creating zoning districts and rezoning land are legislative actions, and…trial courts are not permitted to sit as ‘super zoning boards’ and overturn a board’s legislative efforts….The [PUD] concept varies from the traditional concept of zoning classifications.  It permits a flexible approach to the regulation of land uses. Compliance must be measured against certain stated standards….Since the board was called upon to review an interpretation and application of a n ordinance…and the ordinance was not challenged per se, the board’s decision was ‘clearly quasi-judicial’.

Rather than follow Sutton, the Court found the present case to be “much more analogous” to the case of Montgomery v. Bremer County Board of Supervisors.  In Montgomery, the county Board rezoned two parcels of land from agricultural to industrial after two rezoning petitions were filed.  In Montgomery, the Court found that the zoning decision of the supervisors was “an exercise of its delegated police power,” and held that “the generally limited scope of review applicable to the case [was] to determine whether the decision by the Board to rezone [was] fairly debatable.”   In making the analogy, the Court observed:

The city council [in the present case] was acting in a legislative function in furtherance of its delegated police powers.  The council was not sitting ‘to determine adjudicative facts to decide the legal rights, privileges or duties of a particular party based on that party’s particular circumstances.  The [decision] was not undertaken to weigh the legal rights of one party (the All-Star Ballpark Heaven) versus another party (the petitioners).  The council weighed all of the information, reports, and comments available to it in order to determine whether rezoning was in the best interest of the city as a whole.

The Court held that the proper standard of review “in this case is the generally limited scope of review” utilized to “determine whether the decision…is fairly debatable.”  A decision is “fairly debatable” when “reasonable minds may differ, or where the evidence provides a basis for a fair difference of opinion as to its application to a particular property.”  If a rezoning decision is “fairly debatable” then a court will decline to substitute its judgment for that of the city council or board of supervisors.

Impartiality of the city council.  The Court noted that, while it was true that several council members viewed the rezoning and the project as an opportunity for the city, each council member attended all meetings, read reports, listened to citizens speak for and against the project, asked questions, and investigated issues and concerns.  Nothing in the record demonstrated that any council member had any conflict of interest.  Several members participated in an economic development bus trip to Des Moines to discuss the project with legislators and state officials, but the Court found that mere participation in such activities for the potential benefit of the city does not establish partiality or bias. “Rather, this is more akin to the council members upholding their public duty by performing their due diligence in determining what state aid might be available to help with the project before any formal action was taken.  The council make its decision based on what it believed was best for the community after a full and open discussion of the issues over many months.”

Decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable. A decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable when it is not authorized by statute, or is unsupported by the facts.  For the reasons cited above, the Court declined to find in favor of the petitioners on these grounds.

Inconsistent with comprehensive plan.  Under Iowa Code 414.3, zoning regulations “shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”  The Court referred to its prior decision in Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County for the principle that “compliance with the comprehensive plan requirement merely means that the zoning authorities have given ‘full consideration the problem presented, including the needs of the public, changing conditions, and the similarity of other land in the same area.'”  The Court referred to the boilerplate language found in every plan that says rezonings should be made with consideration of the unique character of the area, the suitability of the land for the proposed use, the conservation of buildings or value, and the encouragement of the most appropriate use of the land.  It noted that the Field of Dreams site is a unique parcel of land, and that the council considered the distinctiveness of the land and whether the proposed rezoning would be the best use of the site for the benefit of the community as a whole.  The city’s community builder plan also specifically addresses the importance of preserving the site in order to maintain and increase tourism.

Illegal spot zoning. To determine whether illegal spot zoning has occurred, a court must consider (1) whether the new zoning is germane to an object within the police power; (2) whether there is a reasonable basis for making a distinction between the spot zoned land and the surrounding property; and (3) whether the rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan.  Noting again the uniqueness of the Field of Dreams site, the Court refused to find this to be a case of illegal spot zoning even though the result is an island of commercial development surrounded by agriculturally zoned properties.

200-foot buffer zone.  Under Iowa Code 414.5, if 20% or more of the landowners immediately adjacent to the property proposed to be rezoned protest the change, then the city council must approve the rezoning by a four-fifths vote.  The rezoning applicants left out of the rezoning request a 200-foot buffer zone along the three sides of the perimeter of the property  (leaving it as A-1 Agricultural).  The petitioners challenged the use of this 200-foot buffer as a way to prevent nearby property owners from objecting to the project and thereby triggering the requirement of a unanimous vote.  While the Court acknowledged that “at first blush the buffer zone can appear to be unfair,” the Court concluded that the buffer in fact provides a benefit to adjacent landowners by addressing their expressed concerns about hunting and farming operations directly adjacent to the ballfields.  The Court also noted that other courts have validated the use of buffer zones to avoid supermajority requirements.  Regardless, even if the 200-foot buffer was improper, the rezoning was adopted by 4-1 vote of the city council.

Incorrect legal description.  While the notice of the original ordinance (Ordinance 770) contained errors in the legal description, the council corrected the legal description in the ordinance that ultimately rezoned the property (Ordinance 777).  No new notices were published, however, for Ordinance 777.  The Court does not require complete accuracy when providing notice.  Neither Iowa Code nor the city ordinances require the publication of a complete legal description.  The purpose of the notice requirement is to give the public reasonable notice of the pending action.  The public was well aware of the ongoing proceedings, and no one was confused or misled by the inaccuracy of the legal description.

Equal Protection.  Petitioners argued that all neighboring landowners were similarly situated, yet the 3-sided 200-foot buffer prevented those neighbors along the buffer from exercising the same right to object as the neighbors along the side of the property without the buffer.  The Court found that the council’s decision met the rational basis test required by the Equal Protection clause in this case.  The buffers, as described above, served a legitimate purpose of protecting the neighboring properties on the three sides.

Due Process.  Petitioners and the public in general were given adequate notice.  Further, they were heard in multiple public hearings.  All community members wishing to speak were allowed to do so.

Based on all preceding points, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the rezoning of the Field of Dreams property.

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Iowa County Annual Fiscal Condition reports for FY 2015 released

Gary Taylor

Iowa Government Finance Initiative County Annual Fiscal Condition reports, FYE 2015 released

The Community and Economic Development (CED) unit of ISUEO has released the Iowa Government Finance Initiative (IGFI) Annual Fiscal Conditions report, Fiscal Year Ending (FYE) 2015 for the 99 counties in Iowa. In addition to including the updated revenue and expenditure data for all the counties in Iowa for FYE 2015, the report also includes select county level socioeconomic data released by the U.S. Census data earlier this year.

The IGFI reports are a valuable resource to communities in Iowa, especially those that are small and primarily rural in nature to learn about the economic, demographic and fiscal changes taking place and potentially use them as they plan for their future. The FYE 2014 and 2015 county reports can be accessed by clicking on the ‘county reports’ tab at http://igfi.extension.iastate.edu/.

IGFI is the public finance outreach program from ISU Extension and Outreach that provides resources and works with Iowa local governments on a host of issues including finance and community economic development. The team working on county reports consists of Biswa Das, Cindy Kendall, Liesl Eathington, Chris Seeger, Bailey Hanson and Sandra Burke. Questions on the report can be sent to Biswa Das at bdas@iastate.edu or Cindy Kendall at ckendall@iastate.edu.

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Iowa Supreme Court broadens application of Open Meetings Act by including “agent or proxy” of public body

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor and Hannah Dankbar

Hutchison, et al., v. Douglas Shull and The Warren County Board of Supervisors
Iowa Supreme Court, March 18, 2016

On March 4, 2014 the Warren County Board of Supervisors held a public meeting to unanimously approve an annual budget that included all county employees’ salaries, with raises.  Before, during, and after that time, however, members of the Warren County Board of Supervisors met with the County Administrator individually to discuss a restructuring of county government, which included the termination of a number of employees.  These meetings went as far back as January 2014.  On March 25 and 26 the County Administrator, one Board member and the County Attorney met with each employee who was terminated to give them notice of the restructuring and offer them a severance package, the details of which had been worked out through the individual conversations between the County Administrator and the Board members.

On April 16 six employees who were eliminated brought suit the employees who were eliminated brought suit against the County, claiming that the Board, the County, and the individual supervisors violated Iowa’s Open Meeting Law.  Then, on April 18 the Board provided notice for their next meeting which included consideration of the restructuring and the severance agreements. The meeting that day lasted about 20 minutes- the Board passed both resolutions and did not allow for public comment.

The Warren County District Court found that because a majority of the Board of Supervisors was never together in one place to discuss the restructuring, the Board did not explicitly violate Iowa’s open meetings law.  The Board members had testified, however, that they understood the law and used the various one-on-one meetings between the Administrator and the individual supervisors to work around it.  The terminated employees appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court first reiterated that ambiguities regarding the Open Meetings Law (OML) should be resolved in favor of openness.  To do so it found it necessary to resort to common law rules of “agency” to interpret OML.  “To do otherwise would undermine the clear purpose of the statute.”  After examining the common law, the Supreme Court determined that the relevant statutory definition of “meeting” in the OML should be effectively read to now say:

“all in-person gatherings at which there is deliberation upon any matter within the scope of the policy-making duties of a governmental body by a majority of its members, including in-person gatherings attended by a majority of the members by virtue of an agent or a proxy.”

Deliberation is the province of elected bodies.  An elected body cannot use agents to deliberate.  The Court was troubled by the use of the County Administrator to “conduct ‘shuttle diplomacy’ [which] worked so well they managed to implement the restructuring…without deliberating a single detail of the reorganization during a public meeting.”

The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court in light of their revised interpretation of “meeting” in the OML.  It directed the district court to determine whether an agency relationship legally existed between the County Administrator and one or more of the Supervisors.

Three justices dissented, raising the following points:

  • The decision could have unintended consequences for well-meaning government actors. It arguably overrules a 35-year old case in which the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the idea that serial phone conversations with less than a majority of a board could violate the open meeting law.
  • The Iowa legislature twice considered, but failed to pass, legislation that would have addressed serial gatherings of elected officials. This is evidence that they did not intend to include such gatherings within the meaning of the existing statute.
  • Other jurisdictions have “resoundingly rejected” the majority’s interpretation of a “meeting.”
  • The interpretation will chill necessary and appropriate private consultations by public officials that precede open meetings.
  • The majority’s new agency theory rests on a legal fiction that treats the county administrator as a supervisor.

 

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Prestage Farms CAFO in Poweshiek County not protected from nuisance suit by Iowa Code

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Patricia McIlrath v. Prestage Farms of Iowa, LLC
Iowa Court of Appeals, November 23, 2016

The McIlraths purchased their farm in rural Poweshiek County in 1971.  Their son and his family also live on the farm, in a house about 300 feet from the original farmhouse where Patricia and her husband live.  In 2012 Prestage Farms built an animal confinement facility (CAFO) for 2,496 hogs about 2,200 feet from the McIlrath’s home.  In July 2013, the McIlraths brought suit against Prestage, claiming the odor from the CAFO constituted a nuisance.  Prestage requested summary judgment prior to trial, claiming immunity from the suit based on Iowa Code 657.11(2) (Iowa’s right-to-farm legislation), but the Poweshiek District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the McIlraths on this point, finding section 657.11 to be unconstitutional based on the Iowa Supreme Court’s ruling in Gacke v. Pork Xtra.  The Court found, even if the statute was not unconstitutional based on the facts of the case, the statute would not provide immunity to Prestage Farms if (1) the CAFO unreasonably and for substantial periods of time interfered with the person’s comfortable use and enjoyment of the person’s life and property, and (2) the CAFO failed to use existing prudent generally accepted management practices reasonable for the operation.  The jury returned a verdict affirmatively determining that both points were met by the evidence.  It awarded damages of $100,000 for loss of past enjoyment, $300,000 for loss of future enjoyment, and $125,000 for diminution of property value.  Prestage appealed.

The Court of Appeals first examined Prestage’s claim that Iowa Code 657.11 in fact confers immunity from nuisance claims in the present case.  The court focused on the following passage from Gacke:

Property owners like the Gackes bear the brunt of the undesirable impact of this statute without any corresponding benefit.  Moreover, their right to use and enjoy their property is significantly impaired by a business operated as a nuisance, yet they have no remedy.  Unlike a property owner who comes to a nuisance, these landowners lived on and invested in their property long before Pork Xtra constructed its confinement facilities.  Under these circumstances, the police power is not used for its traditional purpose of insuring that individual citizens use their property “with due regard to the personal and property rights and privileges of others.”  [citation omitted].  Instead, one property owner—the producer—is given the right to use his property without due regard for the personal and property rights of his neighbor.  We conclude that section 657.11(2) as applied to the Gackes is unduly oppressive and, therefore, not a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.  Accordingly, the statutory immunity violates article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution and may not be relied upon as a defense in this case.  We express no opinion as to whether the statute might be constitutionally applied under other circumstances.

The Court of Appeals concluded that in all relevant aspects, the factual situation in the present case was substantially similar to that presented in Gacke, making 657.11 unconstitutional in the present case.  There was no evidence McIlraths received any benefit from the statute, and they lived on and made improvements to their property long before the CAFO was built.

Prestage claimed several irregularities in the trial proceedings warranted a new trial; however, the Court of Appeals rejected all Prestage’s claims. Similarly, the court rejected all claims of Prestage that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s conclusion of liability and award of damages.

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Creek stabilization plan went beyond scope of original drainage easement

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by Hannah Dankbar and Gary Taylor

Hamner v City of Bettendorf
Iowa Court of Appeals, October 12, 2016

Property owners in the Rolling Meadows subdivision complained that the City of Bettendorf overstepped their powers when they used a 25-foot “utility and drainage easement” established in 1968 for a stream bank stabilization project in 2015. Property owners claimed that the use of the 25-foot easement for stream bank stabilization constituted a taking and argued that they should be compensated for the land. The City did not offer any compensation for the removal of trees, change in land elevation, or the regrading of the property owners’ land.

The City argued that it was in the public interest to stabilize the creek, and that the easements granted in 1968 contemplated the type of work conducted by the City in 2015; thus the landowners were not entitled to compensation.

The district court ruled in favor of the landowners because the 1968 easement was granted to maintain the sanitary sewer, storm sewer, Stafford Creek drainage, and utility poles. The court determined that stabilizing the creek overstepped the City’s powers.  The City appealed.

On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals used a three-part test to evaluate the scope of the easement: 1) the physical character of past use compared to the proposed use; 2) the purpose of the easement compared to the purpose of the proposed use; and 3) the additional burden imposed on the servient land by the proposed use.

Physical character of past use compared to the proposed use. The City planned to remove all trees and foliage, install a retaining wall on one side of the creek, and place twenty-five tons of rocks along both sides.  The court concluded that this work would substantially change the physical character of the past use of the properties.

Purpose of the easement compared to the purpose of the proposed use.  The court found that while the proposed work did pertain to drainage in a general sense…the purpose of the project was to reshape Stafford Creek and the surrounding creek bed to cure past erosion and prevent future erosion.

Additional burden imposed on the servient land by the proposed use. The landowners presented estimates from a consultant of the loss of value of their properties ranging from $27,500 to $30,250.  This suggested a burden way beyond that contemplated by the original easement

The court determined that the original grantors of the easements did not “contemplate the expansive use of the easement now sought” by the City, and that the radical changes to the land demanded compensation to the landowners under Article I, Section 18 of the Iowa Constitution (the Takings Clause).

 

 

 

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Failure to sue the proper party proves fatal to rezoning challenge

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Rita Aust, et al. v. Platte County, PC Homes L.L.C., Kelly Jo Yulich Trust, Arlene Kagan and Wendy Winer
Missouri Court of Appeals, December 29, 2015

Real Estate developer PC Homes entered into a purchase agreement with three landowners to buy their property with the purpose of developing it into a single-family community in Platte County, MO. Platte County Planning and Zoning Commission twice denied the application to rezone the property from “agricultural” and “rural estates” to “single family high density” and “planned residential.” The Platte County Commission approved the rezoning to “planned residential.”

Aust and 41 other Platte County property owners (Appellants) filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Platte County for a writ of certiorari and declaratory judgment that the Commission’s decision was illegal, unreasonable and arbitrary. They wanted the rezoning to be denied or rescinded. Platte County was the only defendant on the petition. Platte County filed to dismiss the petition on multiple grounds.

The circuit court dismissed the petition, which was followed by an appeal.

The Appellants argued that the circuit court erred in dismissing their complaints because: (1) the provided proper notice to all parties; (2) their failure to file the record of the administrative proceedings within the statutorily-required time frame was not fatal to their claim; (3) declaratory relief was available to them; and (4) they sufficiently pled a claim for injunctive relief.

In addressing the first two points on appeal, the court referenced Section 64.660. Even though Platte County is a non-charter first class county, its planning and zoning program operates under statutes of second and third class counties. Section 64.660 provides in part, that any land owners disturbed by a county commission decision may present a petition in circuit court within 30 days after the decision. The statute also provides that after the petition is presented the court should allow a writ of certiorari. The court is allowed to reverse, affirm or modify the decision brought up for review (64.660.2).

The Appellants filed the petition against the County, not the County Board of Commission. This led to the Appellants being unable to file the record within 30 days of filing their petition. The Appellants sought to include the individual Commissioners within their official capacities, they did not ask to join the Commission as a body. Because the Appellants failed to seek a writ of certiorari against the proper party under Section 64.660 and did not turn in the record within 30 days the first two points were denied.

Regarding the third point, Section 64.660 provides for judicial review of the Commission’s zoning decisions through a petition for writ of certiorari. A declaratory judgment is not available to the Appellants because the option of the legal remedy precludes declaratory relief. Point three was denied.

Regarding point four, parties are not allowed to obtain equitable relief, such as an injunction, “unless the facts pleaded in the petition show they lack an adequate remedy at law”. The Appellants did not plead any facts showing that they lacked an adequate remedy at law. Point Four was denied and the circuit court’s judgment was affirmed.

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North Dakota county fights for zoning control over oil and gas development

Gary Taylor

Dunn County will ask the North Dakota Supreme Court to uphold its authority to apply zoning to oil and gas development.

The county decided to appeal a district court judge’s decision that the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC) has sole jurisdiction over an oil waste treatment facility in the county.

The dispute started in 2013, when Environmental Driven Solutions sued the county for denying zoning for storage tanks on property adjacent to the treatment facility. EDS said state law gives NDIC authority that preempts local zoning. In this case, the NDIC had issued a permit for the treatment plant.  The district court agreed, saying that state law gives the commission control over drilling, all operations for oil and gas production, and, since 2013, the disposal of saltwater and oilfield wastes.

The North Dakota Attorney General filed in support of EDS’s case.

The full story is here, courtesy of the Bismark Tribune.

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Community group did not have standing to challenge rezoning denial

hdankbar

by Hannah Dankbar and Gary Taylor

Iowa Coalition Against The Shadow (ICATS) and Rockne Cole v City Council of Iowa City
Iowa Court of Appeals, January 27, 2106

Iowa City owned property zoned as “Neighborhood Public Zone” (P-1) that was no longer needed for city purposes.  The City Council requested developers to submit proposals, and accepted a proposal for a twenty-story building that would have both commercial and residential units. The proposed building would require the property to be rezoned as CB-10, which contains no height restrictions.  Cole and others filed an application to rezone the property to “Central Business Support Zone” (CB-5) to prevent a building that height from being constructed (CB-5 allows for mixed-use buildings that are less than 75 feet fall). None of the rezoning applicants owned property neighboring the parcel in question or sought to purchase the property to erect a building to comply with CB-5 zoning.  Their application urged the City Council to “protect our cherished commons, and allow future generations of children to enjoy the bright sunlight at Chauncey Swan Park without a 20 story tower looming over them.

The Planning and Zoning Commission held multiple meetings, and ultimately recommended denial of the rezoning application.  The City Council ultimately denied the request.  this left the property as P-1

Cole and ICATS filed a petition for a writ of certiorari claiming that the denial of the rezoning application was arbitrary and discriminatory because City Council had prejudged the issue and intended to grant CB-10 to accommodate the development. They argued that CB-10 zoning violated the comprehensive plan and Iowa Code section 414.3 (2013) and was illegal spot zoning. The district court determined that Cole and ICATS did not have standing because they did not suffer an injury and did not have a vested interest in the property. Cole and ICATS appealed the decision.

On appeal, Cole argued that because he applied for rezoning he had standing. ICATS claimed that they had standing to assert the rights of its members in challenging the rezoning denial.

To determine whether a person has sufficient interest to challenge a zoning decision Iowa is guided by a decision of the Florida Supreme Court: “(1) proximity of the person’s property to the property to be zoned or rezoned; (2) character of the neighborhood, including existence of common restrictive covenants and set-back requirements; (3) type of change proposed; and (4) whether the person is on entitled to receive notice under the zoning ordinance.” (Renard v. Dade County, 261 So. 2d 832, 837 (Fla. 1972)).

The court applied those factors to this case and determined that neither Cole nor ICATS had standing. There is nothing in the character of the neighborhood or the proposed zoning change that indicates Cole or ICATS had a particular interest in the change. They were interested in the change primarily so community members could enjoy the sun, but people with only a general interest shared by the public are not permitted to initiate action to promote judicial enforcement or interpretation of zoning regulations.

In addition to affirming that neither Cole nor ICATS had standing, the court also agrees that leaving that property zoned P-1 furthered the interest of ensuring residents can enjoy the sun. The specific injury that was the concern of Cole and ICATS (blocking the sun) did not occur by the denial of the rezoning application. Also, if the rezoning application was approved, there was nothing to prevent the developer from submitting an application to rezone the property to CB-10, so this zoning application did not necessarily prevent the injury Coke and ICATS sought to avoid.

The decision of the district court was upheld.

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