Declaratory judgment not appropriate avenue to appeal rezoning decision. Landowner gets second bite at appeal anyway.

By Gary Taylor

Dyersville Ready Mix, Inc., dba BARD Materials v. Iowa County (WI) Board of Supervisors and Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee

Wisconsin Court of Appeals, October 20, 2022

In October 2019, BARD submitted an application to the Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee, seeking to rezone its property from A-1 Agricultural to AB-1 Agri-Business to allow BARD to apply for a conditional use permit to convert its property from preserved agricultural land to a quarry.  The Town Board voted to oppose BARD’s rezoning application because it was inconsistent with its comprehensive plan. The Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee then voted to recommend denial of the application for the same reason. The Iowa County Board ultimately voted to deny BARD’s application. [Note: this sequence of events doesn’t make sense to me, but I’m just repeating what I read].  BARD then commenced this action challenging the denial of its application. BARD labelled its action, and specifically sought, a declaratory judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, it was entitled to the rezoning because it satisfied all of the criteria for rezoning its property. The Town moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the County moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that declaratory judgment was not the appropriate remedy. They argued, among other things, that BARD’s exclusive remedy to challenge the denial of its rezoning application was by certiorari. The circuit court denied both motions. The parties then filed competing motions for summary judgment.  The circuit court granted summary judgment to BARD and issued a declaratory judgment that Bard is entitled to rezoning of its property as a matter of law. The Town and the County appealed.

The Town and County contended that certiorari is the exclusive remedy for review of a rezoning decision because rezoning is a legislative act and, according to the 2018 Wisconsin Supreme Court case of Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, declaratory judgment is not a proper method for reviewing municipal legislative decisions.  BARD countered that “[t]ime and again, courts have entertained challenges to rezon[ing] decisions pleaded as claims for declaratory judgment” and provided a list of cases that it asserted adjudicated a rezoning decision through an action for declaratory judgment.  BARD also asserted that “general principles concerning review of legislative actions apply with ‘considerably lesser force’ to rezoning denials.” 

The Court of Appeals, however, was not persuaded.  “[BARD] does not explain why any of [the cases listed by BARD] control over the specific holding in Voters with Facts that certiorari review, rather than declaratory judgment, is the proper means to seek review of a municipal legislative determination. That is, BARD does not contend that any of the cases it cites addressed the legal question which was squarely addressed and answered in Voters with Facts.”  The Court noted with approval the observation in Voters with Facts that “declaratory relief is disfavored if there is a speedy, effective and adequate alternative remedy.” In this case, certiorari is available and therefore, is the exclusive method of review.

BARD argued alternatively that its complaint did, in fact, state a claim for certiorari review because it raised the questions, appropriate for such review, of whether the county’s actions were arbitrary or unreasonable.  The Court of Appeals did bite on this theory, concluding that BARD’s claims fit within the scope of, and therefore could be construed as a request for certiorari review.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case to circuit court because it was tried as a declaratory judgment action, and the record was therefore insufficient to enable certiorari review. 

Appeal filed in Michigan drone case

An update: The Maxons have filed an appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court seeking to overturn this decision. The Institute for Justice is backing the Maxons. The IJ attorney states that “Americans have a right to be secure in their homes and backyards without being watched by a government drone.” The Michigan Court of Appeals decided that even if the drone flights violated the Maxons’ Fourth Amendment rights, the government should still be allowed to use the evidence obtained from the unconstitutional search in court because the Fourth Amendment’s protection applies to criminal prosecutions and does not apply to civil code enforcement proceedings.

Solar debate heats up in Linn County

The Linn County Board of Supervisors voted in a moratorium on accepting rezoning applications for the county’s Renewable Energy Overlay District to allow planning staff to study the ordinance in light of recent applications. The moratorium is in place initially for three months, but can be extended to a maximum of twelve months.

On a related note, residents near two utility-scale solar projects are suing the Linn County supervisors, challenging the supervisors’ zoning decision that will allow construction of the facilities. The residents argue that the rezonings under the Renewable Energy Overlay District constitute spot zoning.

What is spot zoning? Well, since you asked you can click on the drop down “Categories” menu to the right and find cases from Iowa and beyond that address spot zoning.

Into the weeds of the National Trails System Act. (That rail trail you like to ride may have a long legal history)

by Gary Taylor

Memmer v. United States

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, September 28, 2022

This case originated in the United States Court of Federal Claims (Why?  Read this) when Jeffrey Memmer and eleven other Indiana landowners (landowners) brought suit seeking compensation for an alleged taking arising from the application of the National Trails System Act (NTSA) to the abandonment of railway easements by Indiana Southwestern Railway Company.  Landowners claimed they held reversionary interests in the property which were “taken” under the NTSA.  It’s complicated.  Bear with me.

The Surface Transportation Board (STB) has authority to regulate the construction, operation, and abandonment of most rail lines in the United States.  A rail carrier must either file an application with, or seek exemption from, the STB if it intends to abandon or discontinue a rail line.  At the same time, the NTSA allows a rail carrier to instead negotiate an agreement with a locality or a private trail sponsor to convert the railroad’s right-of-way into a recreational trail.  If a rail carrier agrees to negotiate an agreement with a trail sponsor, the STB will issue a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU). The NITU provides for a negotiation period during which the railroad can discontinue service on the rail line and salvage track and materials.   If no agreement is reached with a locality or trail sponsor during the negotiation period the railroad may file a notice of consummation of abandonment with the STB, thus abandoning the line.  If an agreement is reached, however, trail use of the right-of-way is authorized and abandonment by the railroad is blocked indefinitely, subject to restoration of the right-of-way for railway purposes.  Because it is possible to again put the right-of-way to use as a railway, the NTSA process is known as “railbanking.”

Another possibility is that after an application for abandonment is filed with the STB another party may make an Offer of Financial Assistance (OFA) to subsidize the operation of the rail line to keep it open.  This could be a local government, for example, or an entity such as a grain elevator that makes consistent use of the line.  If an OFA is proffered those negotiations take precedence over any proposed or ongoing negotiations with a trail sponsor.

It is possible that the railbanking process and conversion of property to use as a recreational trail can result in a takings claim.  It depends on state property law of the state in which the line is situated.  A taking occurs when state law reversionary property interests that would otherwise vest in the adjacent landowners are blocked from so vesting by the NTSA.  In other words, state property law in some states is interpreted to automatically revert the right-of-way to adjacent landowners, while in other states no such reversionary right exists. 

In the present case, Indiana Southwestern submitted a notice of exemption from abandonment proceedings on October 25, 2010, stating that it would consummate abandonment of its rail lines on or after January 15, 2011. In response, the STB published a notice on November 12, 2010 stating that the deadline for railbanking requests was ten days later, on November 22, 2010, and that absent third party intervention, Indiana Southwestern could abandon the lines on December 14, 2010.  The notice indicated that Indiana Southwestern was given until November 12, 2011, to file a notice of consummation of abandonment, if it chose to do so.  A few days after the STB’s notice was published, the Indiana Trails Fund (Fund) submitted a request for the Board to issue a NITU for the rail corridor to permit negotiations with Indiana Southwestern about railbanking. The STB also received notice from the Town of Poseyville, Indiana of its intent to file an OFA, which took precedence over the Fund’s request.  After several months of negotiations with the Town, the Town’s offer fell through.  An NITU was then issued that became effective May 23, 2011, and the Fund and Indiana Southwestern proceeded to negotiate.  Ultimately they failed to execute a trail-use agreement, even after four extensions of the NITU.  The final NITU deadline lapsed on November 8, 2013; however, Indiana Southwestern chose not to consummate the abandonment of the rail line at that time. In the meantime while the NITU was pending, Indiana Southwestern executed a contract with A&K Materials (A&K) to purchase and remove the rails on the rail line except those in rail crossings and move the ties from the center of the rail line. A&K completed its work by early February of 2012.

 Indiana Southwestern did eventually submit a new notice of exemption to start the process over in 2021.  No potential trail sponsors came forward, and no NITU issued, so Indiana Southwestern consummated the abandonment of the line on August 31, 2021.  As a result, the landowners’ fee simple interests became unencumbered by any railway easements on that date. 

While all this was going on, litigation ensued (which presumably why you are still reading this post).  The landowners claimed that a permanent categorical taking occurred with the issuance of the first NITU, because the evidence was that Indiana Southwestern would have abandoned the line absent the NSTA-mandated NITU; that evidence being that no rail traffic had moved over the line for at least two years and that they hired A&K to remove the rails regardless of the outcome of negotiations.  The federal government countered by arguing that there was no government action resulting in a change to the landowners property interests “when a railroad requests abandonment authority (from the STB) and then chooses not to exercise that authority.” 

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the government that a physical taking cannot occur when a NITU ends without either a trail-use agreement or the consummation of the railroad’s abandonment:

The NITU in this case, as in similar cases, was a government action that compelled continuation of an easement for a time; it did so intentionally and with specific identification of the land at issue; and it did so solely for the purpose of seeking to arrange, without the landowner’s consent, to continue the easement for still longer, indeed indefinitely, by an actual trail conversion….Thus, once initiated, a NITU can effect a “mandated continuation” of an easement by the STB that  provides a right of occupation by someone other than the landowner.

Memmer v. US, slip opinion p. 15

The Court then addressed the duration of the physical taking.  The Landowners argued that the temporary taking lasted from May 23, 2011 (the issuance of the first NITU) until August 31, 2021 (when the rail line was finally abandoned) because the requirements for abandonment under Indiana law were satisfied when the railroad removed the rails, yet their reversionary rights were still blocked until the railroad consummated the abandonment.  The government argued that the taking ended upon expiration of the NITU (and its extensions) on November 8, 2013 because it was on that date that the United States was no longer responsible for mandating the continuation of the easement.

The Court agreed with the government’s position because, from November 8, 2013 forward the decision rested solely in the hands of Indiana Southwestern.  “A takings claim must be predicated on actions undertaken by the United States….It is always the railroad’s choice that ultimately impacts the duration of the taking….Moreover, acceptance of [landowners’] argument would effectively contradict the STB’s authority to regulate abandonment which Congress granted over one hundred years ago.”

The Court remanded the case to the Court of Federal Claims for a determination of the compensation and interest due to the landowners as a result of the temporary taking of their property from May 23, 2011 to November 8, 2013. 

Township drone photos used to support zoning code violation are admissible

by Gary Taylor

Long Lake Township v. Todd and Heather Maxon

Michigan Court of Appeals, September 15, 2022 (published opinion)

In 2007 Long Lake Township brought a zoning action against Todd Maxon arising from his storage of junked cars on his property. The case was settled in 2008 when Maxon agreed to maintain the status quo – no more junked cars on his property than existed at the time of the settlement.

In subsequent years the neighbors complained that the Maxons had expanded their junk yard, but this could not be confirmed from ground level because buildings and trees obstructed views of the property. The township hired Zero Gravity Ariel to take areal photos of the property with a drone in 2010, 2016, 2017, and 2018. The photos allegedly show that the number of junked cars had increased considerably since the settlement agreement, so the township filed an abatement action against the Maxons. Invoking the Fourth Amendment, the Maxons filed a motion to suppress the drone photos. The trial court denied the motion holding that the drone surveillance was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. After more trips up and down the appellate ladder than are necessary to review here, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Michigan Court of Appeals to consider the legal question of “whether the exclusionary rule applies to this dispute” considering no past precedent has extended the application of the exclusionary rule beyond criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeals began by noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of the exclusionary rule in civil cases, explaining that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is twofold: to deter police misconduct, and to provide a remedy where no other remedy is available. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded after a thorough review of U.S. Supreme Court caselaw that the only application of the exclusionary rule to civil cases under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is in civil forfeiture actions “when the thing being forfeited as a result of criminal prosecution is worth more than the criminal fine that might be assessed.”

Turning to Michigan law the Court of Appeals notes that Article 1, Section 11 of the Michigan Constitution specifically constrains the application of the exclusionary rule, and Michigan courts have held that this provision provides “less search and seizure protections than required under the Fourth Amendment.” After a review of Michigan cases the Court of Appeals observed

Assuming that the drone search was illegal, it was performed by a private party. True, that
person acted at the behest of a township official. But the exclusionary rule is intended to deter
police misconduct, not that of lower-level bureaucrats who have little or no training in the Fourth
Amendment. There is no likelihood that exclusion of the drone evidence in this zoning infraction
matter will discourage the police from engaging in future misconduct, since the police were never
involved in the first place. Rather, exclusion of the drone evidence likely will deter a township-8-
employee who works in the zoning arena from ever again resorting to a drone to gather evidence
of a zoning violation. This is not the purpose of the exclusionary rule.

Long Lake Township v. Maxon, slip opinion p. 7.

The Court of Appeals concluded that “the exclusionary rule was not intended to operate in this arena” because the objective of the township was not to penalize the Maxons, but rather to abate a nuisance through the operation of equitable remedies.

Township zoning ordinance does not (necessarily) conflict with state law granting veteran right to operate mobile hot dog stand

by Gary Taylor

Padecky v. Muskegon Charter Township

Michigan Court of Appeals, September 8, 2022

Padecky is an honorably discharged military veteran.  He holds a license to sell goods pursuant to Michigan law, MCL 35.441, which provides that “[a] veteran may sell his or her own goods within this state if the proceeds from the sale of the goods are to be used for his or her direct personal benefit or gain.”  He obtained permission from a grocery store located in a C-1 – Commercial district to operate his hot dog stand in the store’s parking lot.  The Township contended that mobile food businesses were only permitted in M-1 zoning districts, and then only then by way of a special use permit.  Padecky did not dispute the fact that the C-1 zoning district does not support mobile food stands.  Instead he argued that requiring him to obtain a special use permit which would still limit him to the M-1 district violated MCL 35.441.

Relying on a case it decided in 2000, and a subsequent Michigan Attorney General’s opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that MCL 35.441 should be read to permit Townships to comply with regulations addressing the place and manner in which veterans sell goods, but may not require them to obtain permits or otherwise pay for the privilege of selling goods.  The court therefore determined that the outcome of this case turned on “how the Township’s ordinance is construed.” It first noted that the Townships zoning ordinance requires an applicant for a special use permit to have “fee title or equitable interest in the subject property.”  Padecky observed that it would be a burden for him to have a landowner seek a special use permit on his behalf.  The Court agreed, but held that permission from a landowner would be sufficient “equitable interest” in the property to allow Padecky to apply for the permit himself, and that the Township could not charge Padecky a fee for seeking the permit. “The Township may use the special use permit process for the limited purpose of ensuring that plaintiff carries on his sale of goods in an appropriate location and manner, but no more.”  From the record reviewed by the court it was unclear whether any land in the Township was zoned M-1.  The court therefore remanded the case back to the trial court for further fact finding on whether M-zoned land existed.  In doing so the court stated that “it is the Township’s obligation to ensure the existence of some property that might be appropriate for a mobile food stand – if necessary by sua sponte rezoning some other zoned property [to M-1].”

A path is not a street

by Gary Taylor and Luke Seaberg

Cornbelt Running Club v. City of Riverdale

Iowa Court of Appeals, March 2, 2022

The City of Riverdale fenced and gated a portion of a public right of way adjacent to South Kensington Street to prevent bicyclists and runners from using a five-foot-wide asphalt-paved path within the right of way as a short cut between two recreational trails.

In the above diagram, the path is the dark strip ending in a triangle and the fence is the line bisecting the dark strip.

Cornbelt Running Club (Club) sued the city, claiming the fence amounted to an improper closure of a street, thereby creating a public nuisance under Iowa Code 657.2(5), which states:

The following are nuisances:
….
5. The obstructing or encumbering by fences, buildings, or otherwise the public roads,
private ways, streets, alleys, commons, landing places, or burying grounds

Iowa Code 657.2

The city countered that a fence is only a nuisance if, in the context of this case, it crosses a street, and the path is not a street because it is not open to vehicles. Relying on its interpretation of state statutes defining “street,” “public roads,” and others the district court concluded that the path was not, in fact, a street, and therefore no nuisance could exist. The Club appealed.

The Court of Appeals determined the following statutory definitions were relevant to the case:

“Road” or “street” means the entire width between property lines through private property or the designated width through public property of every way or place of whatever nature if any part of such way or place is open to the use of the public, as a matter of right, for purposes of vehicular traffic.

Iowa Code 306.3(8)

“Vehicle” means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway. “Vehicle” does not include:
a. Any device moved by human power, including a low-speed electric bicycle….

Iowa Code 321.1(90)

The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court was correct. Te paved path was not a street because it was not open to the public as a matter of right for vehicular traffic; therefore, the fence across the path could not be deemed a nuisance. The Club argued that previous cases found sidewalks to be part of a street, but the Court distinguished those cases as addressing sidewalks that ran alongside streets, which was not the case here.

Sioux Falls, SD slaughterhouse proposal gives me an excuse to talk about zoning by initiative and referendum

In South Dakota, the people have a right to propose or refer legislation at the state and also local government levels through initiative (propose new legislation through direct public vote) and referendum (put a recent legislative action up for public vote to accept or reject).

Legislative power–Initiative and referendum. The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a Legislature which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives. However, the people expressly reserve to themselves the right to propose measures, which shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state, and also the right to require that any laws which the Legislature may have enacted shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions. Not more than five percent of the qualified electors of the state shall be required to invoke either the initiative or the referendum….This section shall apply to municipalities….

South Dakota State Constitution, Article III, Section 1

Sioux Falls City Charter Section 6.03 expressly reserves the powers of initiative and referendum to the citizens.

In September of 2021, Wholestone Farms announced their intent to build a $500 million-plus pork processing plant on a 170-acre parcel of land in northeast Sioux Falls. Soon after the announcement, an opposition group emerged seeking to halt construction of the plant. Smart Growth Sioux Falls objected to building a slaughterhouse inside the city limits. The group gathered the required signatures to have the voters of Sioux Falls weigh in on whether the city should prohibit future slaughterhouses in Sioux Falls city limits. The question is on the November 8 ballot. If approved by the voters the following language would be added to the city’s code of ordinances:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code to the contrary, no new Slaughterhouse may be constructed, or be permitted to operate, within the city limits.

This section does not apply to any existing Slaughterhouse constructed and operating before the effective date of this section. This section does not apply to the expansion or alteration of any Slaughterhouse constructed and operating before the effective date of this section so long as such expansion or alteration occurs at the existing site.

Governor Noem has weighed in, saying that the ballot measure was bad for business and that “at the last minute one person(1) can get mad, do a ballot petition and end my business and my investment.” The Sioux Falls Chamber of Commerce also opposes the measure and states its reasoning here.

Iowa does not allow zoning questions to be put to the people through either initiative or referenda, but a number of other states do and this South Dakota situation gives me an excuse to visit the topic. Referenda are commonly used to call for voter review of legislative actions such a rezoning or a major change to the ordinance. Administrative or quasi-judicial actions – such as conditional uses, variances, and staff decisions – are not subject to referendum, although the line between legislative and administrative decisions is well-known to get messy.

Would we be better off in Iowa if “ballot box zoning” were possible? From a policy perspective the availability of initiative and referendum for zoning matters is controversial. Proponents support ballot box zoning as the most direct expression possible of residents’ wishes for how their communities should grow and thrive. Opponents are concerned that such measures undermine planning, block needed reforms such as increased residential density and fair housing, and violate the due process rights of property owners (see the Sioux Falls Chamber’s policy position).

Zoning initiative and referenda have been the subject of a wide variety of state court cases. They focus on the validity of the ballot box process when a state’s zoning statutes define a process for notice and hearing, when individual referenda appear to conflict with state mandates for fair housing, when referenda appear to conflict with state statutes and/or caselaw requiring consistency with a comprehensive plan, and other issues. The US Supreme Court has weighed in on federal constitutional questions related to zoning referenda twice. In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises (1976) the majority opinion supported zoning referenda as giving “citizens a voice on questions of public policy” when it dismissed the developer’s contention that the referendum violated due process as a standardless delegation of legislative power to voters. The Court’s majority stated that the Ohio Constitution contemplated a reservation of the power of referendum by the people, and was not a delegation of power to them. The dissent asserted that the “‘spot’ referendum technique appears to open disquieting opportunities…to bypass normal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting individual rights.”

In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation (2003) voters petitioned to place site plan approval for a low income housing complex on the ballot. At city council meetings and independent gatherings, some of which the mayor attended to express his personal opposition to the site plan, residents voiced concerns that the development would cause crime and drug activity to escalate, that families with children would move in, and that the complex would attract a population similar to the one on Prange Drive, the City’s only African-American neighborhood. Voters rejected the site plan at the ballot box, and the Court rejected the developer’s Equal Protection challenge to the results. The Court affirmed previous holdings that “[S]tatements made by private individuals in the course of a citizen-driven petition drive, while sometimes relevant to equal protection analysis…do not, in and of themselves, constitute state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment….[R]espondents put forth no evidence that the ‘private motives [that] triggered’ the referendum drive ‘can fairly be attributed to [city government].”

In fact, by adhering to charter procedures, city officials enabled public debate on the referendum to take place, thus advancing significant First Amendment interests. In assessing the referendum as a “basic instrument of democratic government,” we have observed that provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice.

City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 188, 196 (2003)

(1) Over 6,000 petition signatures were in fact required for the measure to appear on the November ballot.

Intent must be “clear and unequivocal” to result in dedication of land to the public

by Gary Taylor

McNaughton v. Chartier and the City of Lawton
Iowa Supreme Court, June 24, 2022

In 1999 McNaughton entered into an easement agreement with the Chartiers to allow a small part of a road to pass through McNaughton’s property. The road was used to access the Chartiers’ business from Highway 20, and the dedication amounted to a 23’ x 80’ strip. The agreement provided that it was a “‘private’ easement granted for the use and benefit of the parties . . . and [was] not to be construed as an easement for the use and benefit of the general public.”

Shortly thereafter the city of Lawton paved and completed other improvements to the access road (now Char-Mac Drive). The paved portion covers 13’ x 60’ of the easement. During the early 2000s the city repeatedly asked McNaughton to dedicate the paved portion to the city but McNaughton refused. The reason he gave was that the city failed to maintain the paved portion of the easement. Language was included in the agreement between McNaughton and the Chartiers that the Chartiers “shall be obligated to take all action necessary to ensure that the town of Lawton becomes contractually obligated to maintain the easement area….” It is unclear whether this happened, but McNaughton testified that the city removed snow only a few times and generally failed to maintain the road.

When the Chartiers sold their property, they discovered that McNaughton had never recorded the easement agreement with the county. The Chartiers asked McNaughton to sign a Clarification of Easement essentially assigning the easement to the purchasers and offered him $15,000 but he refused, and thereafter made various escalating offers ($100,000, then $160,000, then $410,000, then in exchange for 50 acres of farmland) to the Chartiers to either sign the easement or sell his entire property. They refused. McNaughton sued, claiming purchaser had no rights under the easement because of failure to assign them.

The District Court found McNaughton had “dedicated the concrete portion of the easement to the City” because, among other things, the public had used the easement as the parties had agreed and because McNaughton had “never attempted to restrict the use of the concrete portion of the easement area.” Alternatively, the district court found that the easement was appurtenant to the Chartier’s property and passed to the purchaser upon sale. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both conclusions of the district court, as did the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court observed that a grantor’s intent to dedicate land to the public for public use must be clear and unmistakable, and must be accomplished through “deliberate, unequivocal, and decisive acts and declarations of the owner, manifesting a positive and unmistakable intention to permanently abandon his property to the specific public use.” “Mere permissive use of a way, no matter how long continued, will not amount to a dedication.” The Court found that the language in the original agreement; that the easement was “not to be construed as an easement for the use and benefit of the general public” established just the contrary. Furthermore, language in the easement that “[t]he easement rights granted herein may not be assigned by Chartier to any other party or parties without the express written consent of McNaughton or his successors or assigns” served to negate the district court’s conclusion that the easement passed to the purchasers upon sale.

The specific language in an easement must be given effect. McNaughton wins.

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