City demonstrates negative secondary effects of adult entertainment establishment sufficient to overcome preliminary injunction

by Hannah Dankbar

BBL, Inc. and Butler v. City of Angola
Federal 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, December 7, 2015

Alva and Sandra Butler own BBL, Inc. which bought a restaurant in Angola, Indiana with plans to convert it to an adult-entertainment venue. Immediately after the purchase the City of Angola amended its zoning ordinance to prohibit this use of the property. BBL, Inc. sued the City claiming a First Amendment violation and requesting a preliminary injunction be issued to prevent enforcement of the ordinance.

As part of the new ordinance Angola requires sexually oriented businesses to locate “at least 750 feet from every residence.” There is no debate that BBL does not meet this requirement.

In regards to the First Amendment claims BBL claimed; (1) the new licensing and zoning amendments violated its right to expressive conduct; and (2) the permit requirement was an impermissible prior restraint on speech.

Angola requested judgment on the applicable legal test (from City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.) in two separate motions. The steps in this analysis require Angola to show: (1) the challenged  requirements are aimed at reducing the negative secondary effects of adult-entertainment establishments; (2) the requirements are narrowly tailored to serve to that purpose: and (3) the zoning scheme leaves open reasonable alternative sites for this form of expression.

At the preliminary injunction stage BBL reserved the right to later challenge the factual basis on which Angola adopted its ordinance (whether the city’s evidence of negative secondary effects was sufficient) but presented no such evidence at that time. Tactically this was a mistake because, the city provided an extensive (but boilerplate) catalog of secondary effects research.  By not challenging the city’s evidence at that time BBL “radically reduced its chances of obtaining a preliminary injunction.”  In fact BBL’s preliminary injunction was not granted by the trial court, and the 7th Circuit concurred.

Federal district court should not decide state law claims associated with nude dancing establishment suit

by Andrea Vaage

Green Valley Investments v Winnebago County
Federal 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, July 27, 2015

Stars Cabaret, a nude dancing establishment owned by Green Valley Investments, opened in Winnebago County, Wisconsin in 2006. At that time, Winnebago County regulated adult entertainment establishments under Ordinance 17.13, which required the establishment of an “adult entertainment overlay [AEO] district.” The AEO district was to be located within an at-the-time undefined “B-3 Highway Business District.” A conditional-use permit issued by the county to the operator of the business was also needed, which, among other things, required that no alcoholic beverages be sold in the AEO district.

The cabaret offered nude dancing and also served alcoholic beverages. The cabaret never sought a permit to operate the business under Ordinance 17.13; instead, Green Valley sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the ordinance was an unconstitutional First Amendment restriction on expression. The case was dismissed without prejudice when the County amended the ordinance during the suit. Another series of suits and subsequent modifications to the ordinance ensued. Finally, in 2012, Green Valley requested that Stars Cabaret be allowed to operate as a nonconforming use. The County did not agree to this request, leading to this suit.

Green Valley asserted that since the initial ordinance was unconstitutional, and Stars Cabaret was established and in operation before the invalid ordinance was amended, it was legal from the outset, “reasoning that anything is legal that is not forbidden.”  As a part of this position Green Valley filed a supplemental claim under state law seeking a declaration that the use was lawful in 2006 and should now be considered a nonconforming use. The district court found that parts of the 2006 ordinance were unconstitutional, but these could be severed from the rest of the ordinance, leaving the setback and alcohol provisions intact. The federal district court found that Stars Cabaret would not have been legal if these provisions were kept in place. Green Valley appealed.

Thus the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with two questions: the federal question of the constitutionality of the original ordinance, and the state law questions of nonconforming uses and severability. On the first issue, the Court found the 2006 ordinance was an impermissible prior restraint on speech because it left it up to the discretion of a local body, using ambiguous standards, to allow or deny the the speech.

The state law questions were more complex.  The district court had to determine if the remainder of the ordinance could be modified under the power of severance or if this remainder could function as a standalone law if additions or modifications were necessary to make it a valid freestanding zoning provision. These questions are considered by a federal court under supplemental jurisdiction since such claims are a matter of state law. The Court found no precedent set by Wisconsin which would answer either question. Although the district court had the ability to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, it need not have done so. In this case, the state law claims “substantially predominate over the claim or claims over which the [federal] district court has original jurisdiction.” The federal district court was not properly equipped to answer the state law questions brought up in this case, and should not have exercised supplement jurisdiction.

The Court found that, once the district court determined part of the 2006 ordinance was unconstitutional, they should have relinquished jurisdiction over the supplemental state claims and dismissed them without prejudice. The federal district court’s decision was reversed and remanded.

Illinois village must produce some evidence of negative secondary effects to adopt adult entertainment regulation

by Gary Taylor

Foxxxy Ladyz Adult World, Inc., v. Village of Dix
(Federal 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, March 10, 2015)

[I love the spelling of these places.  Apparently Xs and Zs are sexy!]

The Village of Dix is a “dry” municipality (it prohibits the sale of alcohol in village limits) of approximately 500 residents, located in Jefferson County, Illinois. In October 2010, Dirt Cheap, Inc. purchased commercial real estate in Dix and opened a nightclub offering erotic entertainment. Two years later, Foxxxy Ladyz Adult World, Inc. began to rent the property from Dirt Cheap. Now operated by Foxxxy Ladyz, the nightclub features nude dancing and is open to all members of the public age twenty-one and over. Although Foxxxy Ladyz does not sell alcohol, it allows its customers to bring their own alcoholic beverages (“BYOB”) onto the premises. Foxxxy Ladyz is one of the few commercial establishments in Dix, and is located across the interstate from the Village’s other businesses, residences, and grade school.
In December 2010, shortly after Dirt Cheap opened, Dix passed three ordinances: (1) an ordinance prohibiting open containers of alcohol in public, (2) a public nudity ban, an (3) a prohibition against the possession of alcohol in places of public accommodation, such as restaurants and retail establishments.  In adopting these ordinances, Dix conducted no studies of the possible negative secondary effects of erotic nightclubs or other adult entertainment establishments, nor did it reference studies done in other locales.  In 2013, the Village sent Foxxxy Ladyz a notice that it was in violation of all three ordinances.  Foxxxy Ladyz responded by filing suit.  Foxxxy Ladyz concededly operates in violation of all three ordinances; however, Foxxxy Ladyz argued that (1) the public nudity ban violates the Free Speech provisions of the First Amendment, and (2) Dix did not have the authority under Illinois law to pass the alcohol-related restrictions.  The district court sided with the Village, and Foxxxy Ladyz appealed.
Free Speech claim.  Foxxxy Ladyz contended that the Village must point to actual evidence of potential negative secondary effects – whether it be developed by the Village itself or cited from studies of other jurisdictions – for the necessary justification for the public nudity ban. Dix argued that because the language in its public nudity ordinance was intentionally modeled after bans in other jurisdictions  “that have been approved by the courts as being consistent with the Illinois and United States Constitutions” that the findings from those bans provide all the justification needed for its own ban.  The 7th Circuit found guidance in the following statement from the US Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books:

In Renton, we…held that a municipality may rely on any evidence that is “reasonably believed to be relevant” for demonstrating a connection between speech and a substantial, independent government interest. This is not to say that a municipality can get away with shoddy data or reasoning. The municipality’s evidence must fairly support the municipality’s rationale for its ordinance.

The 7th Circuit “has been consistent in requiring that a regulating body produce some specific, tangible evidence establishing a ling between the regulated activity and harmful secondary effects” (Citing Annex Books v. City of Indianapolis).  Based on the fact that Dix “has not offered an iota of evidence” on secondary effects, the 7th Circuit reversed he district court and remanded the case to district court.  The 7th Circuit noted that Dix may still have an opportunity to “demonstrate a reasonable belief in a causal relationship between public nudity and secondary effects” in litigation at the district court.

Alcohol restrictions.  The 7th Circuit interpreted Illinois law to confer on municipalities broad discretion to regulate alcohol consumption in order to promote public health and safety, including via the imposition of a prohibition on open containers of alcohol in public. The court also affirmed that the First Amendment “does not entitle a bar, its dancers or its patrons, to have alcohol available during a presentation of nude or semi-nude dancing.” Furthermore, the ordinances apply broadly to all public accommodations and do not, on their face, target establishments where protected expressive conduct is likely to occur. Under a rational basis test the Dix alcohol ordinances passed muster.

Story County District Court invalidates Ames lap dance ordinance

by Gary Taylor

Relying on Mall Real Estate v. City of Hamburg (blogged here) Story County District Court recently ruled that the Ames “lap dance ordinance” is preempted by state law.

Rebekah Beth Williams and Alijah Blue Allison v City of Ames (PDF)
Story County District Court, November 14, 2014

Dangerous Curves serves alcohol and hires women to dance while wearing bikinis or underwear.  In October 2013 an Ames police officer conducted a bar check of Dangerous Curves and observed the defendants performing lap dances while having exposed buttocks.  Ames Municipal Code Section 17.31(1) prohibits this activity.  It provides

No person appearing as an entertainer on commercial premises subject to an Iowa liquor license or beer permit, or on premises of an ‘adult entertainment business’ … shall fondle, caress or sit on the lap of any customer on said premises if the entertainer presents a performance on the premises while nude or so attired as to leave exposed the entertainer’s ….buttocks….”

The defendants were each issued a citation for violation of Section 17.31. The defendants pled not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss, arguing (1) Iowa Code 728.11 preempts Section 17.31, and (2) Section 17.31 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The motion to dismiss was denied, and the District Associate Judge found the defendants guilty of violating Section 17.31.  The defendants appealed to the Iowa District Court for Story County.

Preemption.  Iowa Code 728.11 provides

In order to provide for the uniform application of the provisions of this chapter relating to obscene material applicable to minors within this state, it is intended that the sole and only regulation of obscene material shall be under the provisions of this chapter, and no municipality, county or other governmental unit within this state shall make any law, ordinance or regulation relating to the availability of obscene materials.  All such laws, ordinances or regulations shall be or become void, unenforceable and of no effect on January 1, 1978.  Nothing in this section shall restrict the zoning authority of cities and counties.

Iowa Code 728.5 regulates public indecent exposure, and specifically provides
1.  An owner, manager, or person who exercises direct control over a place of business required to obtain a sales tax permit shall be guilty of a serious misdemeanor under any of the following circumstances:
b.  If such person allows or permits the exposure of the genitals or buttocks or female breast of any person who acts as a waiter or waitress.
The District Court noted that in Mall Real Estate v. City of Hamburg the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that the legislature intended to include live nude dancing within the meaning of ‘obscene materials,’ and the effect of Section 728.11, therefore, was to preempt Hamburg’s nude dancing regulations.  The defendants asserted that Mall Real Estate makes it clear that Section 17.31 is preempted by the Iowa Code.  The City argued, however, that Mall Real Estate only works to apply the Iowa Code to nude dancing performances, while Section 17.31 addresses physical contact. According to the City, “once the dancer touches a customer the dancing is no longer a performance fitting within the definition of ‘obscene material.'” The City then has a governmental interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.
The District court sided with the defendants, noting that the performances in question in Mall Real Estate included physical contact between the dancers and customers and, therefore, “the Supreme Court has already determined that a live nude dancing performance, including physical contact with customers, is obscene material under the Iowa Code.”  As a result, Section 17.31 regulates obscene material and is expressly preempted by state law.
Vague and overbroad ordinance.  Even though the ruling for the defendants on the preemption argument had the effect of ending the controversy, the District Court proceeded to the constitutional question “in the event that this decision is appealed and the Appellate Courts of Iowa take another look at the [Mall Real Estate] case, which was decided by a split court.”
The District Court made quick work of this argument.  It first cited a 1977 Iowa Supreme Court case that stated “we find it difficult to believe [the defendant] seriously contends people of common intelligence would not understand the meaning of nudity or would not be able to determine when the ordinance was violated by exposing to public view the breasts, buttocks, or genitals.”  Because the term ‘buttocks’ is not vague, requiring the entire buttocks to be covered is not overbroad.  “It would be easily discernible to observe whether or not the buttock was covered either partially or fully.”
Based on the preemption determination, the District Court reversed the defendants’ convictions.

Indianapolis ordinance requiring nightly closure of adult bookstores violates First Amendment

by Gary Taylor

Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis
(Federal 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, January 24, 2014)

The city of Indianapolis requires all adult bookstores to close between midnight and 10am daily, and to remain closed all day on Sundays.  In previous (2010) litigation before the 7th Circuit on the same ordinance, the Court found the city’s evidence for the need for a statute requiring closure “weak.”  The evidence the city offered addressed different types of adult materials, and pertained to cities with different types of ordinances, including ordinances that do not require closure.  When the 7th Circuit remanded the case to the district court the city offered one lone justification for the ordinance: that closure resulted in fewer armed robberies near adult bookstores.

The 7th Circuit pointed out that the statistical evidenced offered on this point was not the result of multivariate regression.  When regression analysis was utilized the data no longer supported the proposition that robberies were more likely at late-night adult bookstores versus other late-night establishments such as taverns, liquor stores, pharmacies or convenience stores (which the city did not require to be closed as part of the ordinance).  Moreover, the robberies that did take place more often happened to the bookstore itself and its patrons, rather than to other businesses or passers-by.  “The Supreme Court has not endorsed an approach under which governments can close bookstores in order to reduce crime directed at businesses that knowingly accept the risk of being robbed, or persons who voluntary frequent their premises.”  Citing the Supreme Court in Alameda Books, the court affirmed that “a city cannot regulate the secondary effects of speech by suppressing the speech itself….[The benefits of the Indianapolis ordinance] come from closure: the shuttered shops can’t be robbed at gunpoint, and they lack customers who could be mugged.  If that sort of benefit were enough to justify closure then a city could forbid adult bookstores altogether.”  The case was remanded with an order to issue an injunction preventing the enforcement of the closure ordinance.

Content-neutral zoning ordinance that resulted in total ban on adult entertainment businesses deemed valid; alternative avenues of communication existed in other jurisdictions

by Gary Taylor

David Peterson and The Juice Bar, LLC v. City of Florence (MN)
(Federal 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, August 16, 2013)

Florence, Minnesota – a municipality in Lyon County – has a population of 39, and covers approximately 0.2 square miles.  It is home to sixteen single-family residences, a shop where Florence’s road equipment is stored, an unheated office that serves as the city office, and a park.

In 2008 the city adopted an ordinance prohibiting the operation of a sexually-oriented business within 250 feet of day cares, schools, parks, libraries, and any property zoned for residential use.  At the same time the city adopted a zoning ordinance that established three zoning districts (residential, commercial, and business) and zoned the entire city residential.  Sexually-oriented businesses were only permitted in the commercial district.

Peterson opened The Juice Bar in December 2010, which featured live, nude dancers.  The next day Peterson was charged with three misdemeanor counts for violating the sexually-oriented business ordinance, for operating The Juice Bar within 250-feed of a park.  Peterson filed suit against the city to enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance, for a declaratory ruling that the ordinance violated his First Amendment freedom of speech rights, and sought damages and attorney fees.  Shortly thereafter in 2011, the city repealed its sexually-oriented business ordinance in its entirety, and amended its zoning ordinance to eliminate the business and commercial districts, citing the city’s “limited infrastructure, staff, and resources” which could not support business or commercial uses.  The criminal case against Peterson was dismissed, but Peterson’s First Amendment suit continued; that is, until the district court dismissed the suit.  Peterson appealed the dismissal.

Peterson first argued that the 2011 zoning ordinance constitutes an invalid total ban on the operation of adult entertainment businesses in the city.  The 8th Circuit agreed that the zoning ordinance resulted in a total ban; however, this was not fatal to the ordinance because the ordinance prohibited an entire class of conduct – all commercial and business uses – not just adult entertainment establishments. “A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.” A content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation will be upheld if it is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and leaves open ample alternative channels for communicating the speech.  The Court found that the city articulated substantial governmental interests with its zoning ordinance; mainly the preservation of the quality of life of its residents, and its limited ability to accommodate commercial or business establishments.  Further, the Court found that ample alternative channels of communicating the speech existed because over 200 acres of Lyon County were zoned in a manner that would accommodate adult entertainment businesses.  “The Supreme Court has left open the question of whether, at least in the case of small municipalities, opportunities to engage in the restricted speech in neighboring communities may be relevant to determining the existence of adequate alternative channels.”  The 8th Circuit thus walked through that opening to close the door on Peterson’s claim.




Hamburg (IA) adult business licensing scheme preempted by state law

by Gary Taylor

Mall Real Estate, LLC v. City of Hamburg
(Iowa Supreme Court, July 27, 2012)

In 2008, the Hamburg city council passed its “Sexually Oriented Business Ordinance.” It contains provisions relating to licensing and zoning and imposes a range of regulations upon sexually oriented businesses.  Businesses subject to the terms of the ordinance include adult cabarets, which the ordinance defines, among other things, as any “business or entity that is with the emphasis on observation or viewing of nude or semi-nude performances whether the performers receive compensation or not, that regularly features persons who appear nude or semi-nude.” The ordinance requires a sexually oriented business to have a valid sexually oriented business license and an employee of a sexually oriented business to have a valid sexually oriented business employee license. Further, the ordinance regulates many aspects and activities of sexually oriented businesses, including the consumption of alcohol on the premises, exterior design aspects of the businesses including signage, hours of operation, the exhibition of sexually explicit films, live nudity, and siting. For example, the ordinance prohibits any person from intentionally or knowingly appearing in a state of nudity or from intentionally or knowingly violating Iowa Code section 728.5. The ordinance contains requirements that seminude employees remain more than six feet away from customers and on a stage at least two-feet high. It also prohibits the exchange of gratuities between customers and seminude employees and prohibits intentional contact between customers and seminude employees.  If a sexually oriented business licensee violates the ordinance or knowingly allows an employee to violate the ordinance, then the City may suspend or revoke the license of the business and the employee.

Mall Real Estate (MRE) leases space in Hamburg to the Hamburg Theatre for the Performing Arts, aka Shotgun Geniez.  Performers at the Hamburg Theatre perform nude, seminude, and fully clothed. At times during performances, performers physically contact customers, often by sitting in their laps. The performers also spend time talking to customers. The Hamburg Theatre does not have a liquor license or sell alcohol, but it does allow customers to supply their own alcohol.  Shortly after the City adopted the ordinance MRE filed a lawsuit seeking to declare the ordinance unconstitutional, and also that the ordinance is in conflict with, and is therefore preempted by state law. The district court upheld the validity of the Hamburg ordinance, and MRE appealed.  The Iowa Supreme Court decided the case on the preemption issue and did not address MRE’s constitutional claims.

MRE argued that because Iowa Code 728.5(3) creates a “theater exception” to the regulation of obscenity and the Hamburg ordinance did not, the ordinance is therefore in conflict with and preempted by state law.  The City argued that the final sentence of 728.11 – also in the state code chapter pertaining to obscenity – allows local governments to pass ordinances related to zoning and licensing of businesses dealing in obscene materials.

Iowa Code 728.5 provides in part:

1.  An owner, manager, or person who exercises direct control over a place of business required to obtain a sales tax permit shall be guilty of a serious misdemeanor under any of the following circumstances:
a.  If such person allows or permits the actual or simulated public performance of any sex act upon or in such place of business.
b.  If such person allows or permits the exposure of the genitals or buttocks or female breast of any person who acts as a waiter or waitress.
[c.  through f. contain more such circumstances]
2.  However, if such person allows or permits a minor to participate in any act included in subsection 1, paragraphs “a” through “d”, the person shall be guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor.
3.  Except for subsection 1, paragraph “f”, the provisions of this section shall not apply to a theater, concert hall, art center, museum, or similar establishment which is primarily devoted to the arts or theatrical performances and in which any of the circumstances contained in this section were permitted or allowed as part of such art exhibits or performances.
Iowa Code 728.11 is a “uniform application” (preemption) provision. It states:
In order to provide for the uniform application of the provisions of this chapter relating to obscene material applicable to minors within this state, it is intended that the sole and only regulation of obscene material shall be under the provisions of this chapter, and no municipality, county or other governmental unit within this state shall make any law, ordinance or regulation relating to the availability of obscene materials.  All such laws, ordinances or regulations shall be or become void, unenforceable and of no effect on January 1, 1978.  Nothing in this section shall restrict the zoning authority of cities and counties.
The Iowa Supreme Court looked to its previous cases construing these provisions and concluded that Hamburg’s ordinance is preempted by the Iowa Code.  In Chelsea Theater Corp v. Burlington the Court determined that chapter 728 was not limited to the dissemination of obscene materials to minors, but rather restricted local governments from enacting any local ordinances regulating obscene materials.  This led the Court to examine whether live nude dancing constituted “obscene materials” as the term is used in 728.11.  “Materials” is defined in 728.(3) as “any book, magazine, newspaper or other printed or written material or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or other pictorial representation or any statue or other figure, or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical or electrical reproduction or any other articles, equipment, machines or materials.”  “Obscene materials” is defined in 728.(5) as “any material depicting or describing the genitals, sex acts, masturbation, excretory functions or sadomasochistic abuse which the average person, taking the material as a whole and applying contemporary community standards with respect to what is suitable material for minors, would find appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offensive; and the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, scientific, political or artistic value.” The Court looked to legislative history to conclude that the legislature intended to include live nude dancing within the meaning of obscene materials in the code.  As a result, Hamburg’s attempt to regulate live nude dancing through its licensing ordinance was preempted by chapter 728 of the Iowa Code.

The Court noted that, contrary to the City’s assertion, the last sentence of 728.11 only creates an exception to the preemption for local zoning authority, not for licensing or permitting authority.  “Accordingly, unless a local ordinance is a zoning ordinance it is preempted to the extent it regulates material regulated by chapter 728.”

Chief Justice Cady and Justice Waterman each filed separate dissenting opinions.  Chief Justice Cady took issue with the reasoning the majority followed to find that “obscene materials” included live nude dancing.  “In the judgement of the majority, ‘materials’ means a dancer to our legislature.  This conclusion not only defies common sense, it defies our accepted rules of [statutory] construction….Thus, for the majority to conclude it would be absurd for our legislature to have left nude dancing out of its preemption scheme is itself absurd.”

Justice Waterman joined in the preemption analysis of Justice Cady, and wrote further to express his opinion that not only is the Hamburg ordinance not preempted, it passes constitutional muster under well-settled precedent.

Warren, Michigan adult entertainment restrictions pass constitutional muster

by Melanie Thwing

Big Dipper Entm’t, L.L.C. v. City of Warren

(U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit, April 13 2011)

In 2006 the City of Warren, Michigan amended the city code to restrict the location of adult businesses. This was in an attempt to “halt property value deterioration,” “eliminate the causes of deterioration,” and “eliminate blight.” Before enacting this ordinance the City received and reviewed 49 studies and reports about secondary effects of adult businesses.

The City published a notice of intent to amend Section 14.01 of the City code, which again was to “prohibit the location of sexually oriented businesses within the boundaries of the Warren Downtown Development Authority.” A temporary ban on all new permits was enacted during the consideration of the proposed amendment.

Big Dipper Entertainment filed a petition to operate a topless bar one day prior to the ban going into effect. The city code specifies that the application must be acted upon within twenty days. The city clerk denied the application after twenty-four. Two years later in 2008 Big Dipper filed this U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court, arguing that Section 14.01 of the Warren City Code violates the First Amendment, and that the untimely rejection of the application acted as a prior restraint on protected expression. The district court granted summary judgment for the City and Big Dipper appealed to the Sixth Circuit.

Big dipper first argued that § 14.01 was an unconstitutional restriction on speech, and that the main purpose of § 14.01 was not to limit secondary effects but to prevent new adult businesses from opening. The Sixth Circuit noted that “the speech at issue here was that conveyed by a topless bar” and it is common sense to say that in a democracy “society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate.”  To satisfy its burden, the city need only show that its “predominate concerns were with the secondary effects” of adult businesses.  The city met this burden through the evidence provided in the collection of studies and reflected in the city council meeting minutes.

Also Big Dipper argued that the district court disregarded their expert’s analysis that showed that § 14.01 restricted locations to only ten potential sights from thirty-nine. The Sixth Circuit noted that Big Dipper did not raise this issue in district court, and that the burden to create a genuine issue of material fact falls to Big Dipper not the district court. Only two applications for adult businesses were filed in the five years leading up to the litigation. Even a reduction from thirty-nine potential sites to ten, as would be the result of § 14.01 still supplies almost thirteen times more sites than the five-year demand. This was “more than ample for constitutional purposes.” The decision of the district court was affirmed.

Hamburg IA strip club really a theater (no, I’m serious)

by Gary Taylor

State v. Judy
(Iowa Court of Appeals, February 10, 2010)

The State charged Clarence Judy, owner of a strip club in Hamburg, Iowa, with three counts of public indecent exposure in violation of Iowa Code sections 728.5 (3), (4), and (6)At trial, Judy moved for a judgment of acquittal alleging that his establishment fell into an exemption for “theaters.”   The theater exception reads:

The provisions of this section shall not apply to a theater, concert hall, art center, museum, or similar establishment which is primarily devoted to the arts or theatrical performances and in which any of the circumstances contained in this section were permitted or allowed as part of such art exhibits or performances. 

 The district court reserved ruling until the close of trial. In its final order, the court sustained Judy’s motion and dismissed the charges against him.

 The State sought a discretionary ruling from the Iowa Supreme Court, seeking an “interpretation of the theater exception in section 728.5.”  The Supreme Court assigned the case to the Iowa Court of Appeals.

The district court required the State to prove its case “that Judy’s place of business was not a theater.” After summarizing the evidence proffered by the State on this element, the court concluded that the State “failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the strip club] is not a theater.” On appeal, the State frames the issue for review by the courtas “whether a strip club in which the defendant permitted a minor to dance fully nude qualifies as a ‘theater’ exempted under the public decency statute contained in Iowa Code section 728.5.”
The Court of Appeals refused to issue a discretionary ruling, finding that “the issue as framed squarely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the theater element.”  In other words, the State was asking the court to make a finding on the facts of the case, not offer an interpretation of the term “theater.” “No useful purpose would be served by reaching the merits of this factual issue.”



7th Circuit needs more evidence of secondary effects of adult entertainment establishment

by Allison Arends

New Albany DVD, LLC v. City of New Albany, Indiana
(Federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, September 10th, 2009)
(For a map of the geographic boundaries of the federal courts of appeals click here)

Court remands case for evidence concerning trash and theft resulting from adult entertainment facility.

In 2003 the Plaintiff, New Albany DVD, bought property, secured all necessary licenses, and renovated a store for the operation of a store that sells adult books, magazines, and videos.  Plaintiff’s plans did not include live, on-site adult entertainment.  At the time of the purchase there were no zoning restrictions to the type of business New Albany DVD intended to operate, yet the City refused to carry out the final inspection of the store in February 2004, and on that day enacted a six-month moratorium on new adult businesses.  In March the City Council amended the zoning rules to forbid sexually-oriented business at the plaintiff’s site, and prohibited a sexually-orientated business from operating within 1,000 feet of a church or residential zone. The Plaintiff’s store is located 175 feet from the nearest church and 115 from the site of a proposed residential building. 

The plaintiff contended, among other claims, that under 42 U.S.C section 1983 and the First Amendment the studies used by the city to justify adverse secondary effects of adult stores on the community were flawed, in that those studies addressed the secondary effects of live adult entertainment facilities, not the retail-only type facility being proposed by the plaintiff.  The city argued that the studies used show a correlation between the concentration of sexually-orientated businesses and higher levels of crime and lower property values in a community; however, the city’s own expert “conceded that he knows of no research that shows… effects for various subclasses of business,” like the plaintiff’s retail-only store. 

The city also attempted to use its concerns over theft and trash to justify suppression of the plaintiff’s First Amendment right.  Using Alameda Books as precedent the Seventh Circuit quickly rejected the city’s theft argument by stating that it is paternalistic, and that the “police must protect the readers… rather than ease their workload by forbidding the speech,”  The Seventh Circuit found that New Albany did not supply sufficient evidence to support the the idea that adult bookstores located near churches or residences attract thieves.  The court goes on to reject the trash concern by stating that, the reduction in “adverse secondary effects may not be achieved just by curtailing speech… and that for this justification to work, it will be necessary to establish (a) how much sex-oriented litter an adult book- store generates; (b) who is likely to see that litter in the parts of New Albany where adult bookstores are allowed to operate; and (c) how much adult litter will remain in New Albany’s central business area (generated by adult corners of other businesses) if plaintiff is exiled to an industrial district or highway.”  The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court to take further evidence concerning the city’s theft and trash justifications, and to apply intermediate scrutiny to New Albany’s ordinance. 





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