Category: Rezoning

Denial of rezoning is a legislative action not easily overturned

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Fettkether v. Grundy County Board of Supervisors

Iowa Court of Appeals, December 7, 2022

The Fettkethers requested rezoning of 12 1/2 acres of property from A-1 agricultural district to R-2 suburban residence district. On July 27, 2020 the Grundy County Planning and Zoning Commission considered the request, and after reviewing the application materials and listening to the Fettkethers and comments from the public voted unanimously to recommend denial of the request. On August 24, after proper notice was published, the Board of Supervisors (Board) met to consider the request, after which the Board voted 4-1 to deny the rezoning. As is often the case, litigation ensued. Sparing you some of the procedural machinations, the issues raised by the Fettkethers at the Court of Appeals were (1) the failure of the Board to make written findings, (2) the Board’s denial was not supported by substantial evidence, and was illegal, unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.

Standard of judicial review. At the outset, both parties got the court’s standard of review wrong. They cited Bontrager Auto Service, v. Iowa City Board of Adjustment, 748 N.W.2d 483 (Iowa 2008) for the principle that the court should review the Boards findings de novo (translation: anew, without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the previous court or other decision-making body); however, Bontrager was a review of a decision by a zoning board of adjustment, the standards for which are set out in Iowa Code chapter 414. In this case, which was a review of a rezoning decision by an elected body, “a court’s scope of review is limited…[to a] review for the correction of errors at law.” A court should only overturn if the decision “violates a statute, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.”

Written findings of fact. Again relying on Bontrager, the Fettkethers were “adamant in their claim the Board must make written findings of fact.” Again, however, the reliance on Bontrager was misplaced. Iowa courts have never extended the requirement for written findings of fact in board of adjustment cases to a board of supervisors’ legislative proceedings. “The comment-argument format cannot be confused with the evidentiary-adjudicatory hearing found in the board of adjustment setting, where findings and conclusions are mandatory.”

Substantial evidence. The Fettkethers contended there was not substantial evidence to support the rezoning denial because without written findings of fact “no [substantial evidence decision] can withstand appellate scrutiny”; however, having dispensed with the written findings argument already, the court found the record complete. It then moved on to examine the record in light of the standards of review for rezonings that by now should be etched in all our minds:

Zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity.

A party challenging a zoning decision bears the burden of showing the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory, with no reasonable relationship to the promotion of public health, safety, or welfare.

The court will not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authority. Thus, if the reasonableness of the zoning decision is fairly debatable and the decision is facially valid, the court will not interfere with the [Board’s] action.

The court found that the Board considered concerns related to traffic, dust, safety, character of the area, preservation of habitat, preservation of agricultural land, location of the development, and access through a narrow bridge. It also found that the Board considered the county’s comprehensive plan and found that the Fettkethers’ proposal was contraindicated by at least two of the policies designed to protect high quality farmground. Thus, the Fettkethers did not meet their burden of showing the Board’s decision was unreasonable, illegal, arbitrary or capricious.

Iowa Court of Appeals, Rezoning ,
Leave a Comment on Denial of rezoning is a legislative action not easily overturned

Declaratory judgment not appropriate avenue to appeal rezoning decision. Landowner gets second bite at appeal anyway.

Gary Taylor 1 Comment

By Gary Taylor

Dyersville Ready Mix, Inc., dba BARD Materials v. Iowa County (WI) Board of Supervisors and Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee

Wisconsin Court of Appeals, October 20, 2022

In October 2019, BARD submitted an application to the Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee, seeking to rezone its property from A-1 Agricultural to AB-1 Agri-Business to allow BARD to apply for a conditional use permit to convert its property from preserved agricultural land to a quarry.  The Town Board voted to oppose BARD’s rezoning application because it was inconsistent with its comprehensive plan. The Iowa County Planning and Zoning Committee then voted to recommend denial of the application for the same reason. The Iowa County Board ultimately voted to deny BARD’s application. [Note: this sequence of events doesn’t make sense to me, but I’m just repeating what I read].  BARD then commenced this action challenging the denial of its application. BARD labelled its action, and specifically sought, a declaratory judgment, arguing that, as a matter of law, it was entitled to the rezoning because it satisfied all of the criteria for rezoning its property. The Town moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the County moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that declaratory judgment was not the appropriate remedy. They argued, among other things, that BARD’s exclusive remedy to challenge the denial of its rezoning application was by certiorari. The circuit court denied both motions. The parties then filed competing motions for summary judgment.  The circuit court granted summary judgment to BARD and issued a declaratory judgment that Bard is entitled to rezoning of its property as a matter of law. The Town and the County appealed.

The Town and County contended that certiorari is the exclusive remedy for review of a rezoning decision because rezoning is a legislative act and, according to the 2018 Wisconsin Supreme Court case of Voters with Facts v. City of Eau Claire, declaratory judgment is not a proper method for reviewing municipal legislative decisions.  BARD countered that “[t]ime and again, courts have entertained challenges to rezon[ing] decisions pleaded as claims for declaratory judgment” and provided a list of cases that it asserted adjudicated a rezoning decision through an action for declaratory judgment.  BARD also asserted that “general principles concerning review of legislative actions apply with ‘considerably lesser force’ to rezoning denials.” 

The Court of Appeals, however, was not persuaded.  “[BARD] does not explain why any of [the cases listed by BARD] control over the specific holding in Voters with Facts that certiorari review, rather than declaratory judgment, is the proper means to seek review of a municipal legislative determination. That is, BARD does not contend that any of the cases it cites addressed the legal question which was squarely addressed and answered in Voters with Facts.”  The Court noted with approval the observation in Voters with Facts that “declaratory relief is disfavored if there is a speedy, effective and adequate alternative remedy.” In this case, certiorari is available and therefore, is the exclusive method of review.

BARD argued alternatively that its complaint did, in fact, state a claim for certiorari review because it raised the questions, appropriate for such review, of whether the county’s actions were arbitrary or unreasonable.  The Court of Appeals did bite on this theory, concluding that BARD’s claims fit within the scope of, and therefore could be construed as a request for certiorari review.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case to circuit court because it was tried as a declaratory judgment action, and the record was therefore insufficient to enable certiorari review. 

Procedural Issues, Rezoning, Wisconsin courts , ,
1 Comment on Declaratory judgment not appropriate avenue to appeal rezoning decision. Landowner gets second bite at appeal anyway.

Update: Johnson County Re-Zoning Application Goes Viral

ejchr

by Eric Christianson

The Johnson County Board of Supervisors voted 5-0 Thursday, September 14, 2017 to deny the rezoning of 63 acres from Agricultural to Agricultural Residential. The board’s primary reasoning was the potential impact of such a large rezoning in a rural part of the county and the impossibility of negotiating a conditional rezoning without approval of the current title-holder. The board encouraged another application after the applicant obtains full ownership of the property.

A video of the board meeting is available here, and read an updated Press Citizen article here.

The original post is below:

An Iowa City resident’s attempt to rezone 63 acres of rural Johnson County has attracted international attention. Grant Schultz manages a 143 acre farm he calls Versaland in northeastern Johnson County. He is seeking the zoning change to allow him to build rental cabins and worker housing in addition to other accessory uses. Staff recommended against the rezoning because of the potential impact of a large land use change in a rural part of the county and the infrastructural improvements that would be needed to support the potential new uses. On August 14 the planning and zoning commission voted 5-0 to recommend to the board of supervisors that the rezoning be denied.

In response on September 8, Schultz created a 25 minute video with the headline “Johnson County Assaults Local Foods“. The video has, as of today, been viewed over 80,000 times and received comments of support from all over the world.

Johnson County has since published a memo refuting many of the points made in the video.

Additionally, Paul Durrenberger and Suzan Erem, founders of the Sustainable Iowa Land Trust, and owners of the property in question have published a blog post of their own entitled, “Grant Schultz: Facts to Consider”. They are opposed to the proposed rezoning.

The Johnson County Board of Supervisors will vote on the rezoning request Thursday September 14, 2017.

For more information read the Press Citizen article about the fight.

current news, Rezoning ,
Leave a Comment on Update: Johnson County Re-Zoning Application Goes Viral

Field of Dreams site cleared for development of baseball complex and tourist attraction

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Residential and Agricultural Advisory Committee, LLC et al. v. Dyersville City Council
Iowa Supreme Court, December 9, 2016

The Dyersville City Council voted to rezone the area containing the site of the 1989 movie Field of Dreams from A-1 Agricultural to C-2 Commercial in order to facilitate the development of a  a 24-field baseball and softball complex, along with the farmhouse and original baseball field used for the movie which would continue to be maintained as a tourist attraction. Community members filed two writs of certiorari to challenge the rezoning on a number of grounds.  The District Court annulled the writs and found in favor of the city council.  This appeal followed.  The Iowa Supreme Court engaged in a 20-page recitation of the facts of the case on its way to its 44-page decision.  Only those relevant to the outcome of each challenge will be repeated here.

Quasi-judicial vs. legislative action.  The petitioners argued that the city council’s actions were quasi-judicial in nature rather than legislative, and therefore the council should have been required to conduct a more formal fact-finding proceeding and make findings of fact in support of its decision.  Quasi-judicial proceedings are also subject to greater judicial scrutiny when reviewed by an appellate court.  Petitioners relied on the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v. Dubuque City Council in support of their position. In contrast, the city council maintained that the action of  a legislative body in rezoning land is legislative in nature, which gives the legislative body wider latitude in the conduct of the proceedings.  Courts also give greater deference to legislative decisions made by city councils and county boards of supervisors.

In ruling on this issue the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed Sutton and several other past cases.  It recognized that in its Sutton decision the Court set forth three factors in determining whether zoning activities are quasi-judicial (versus legislative) in nature (1) [when the rezoning] occurs in response to a citizen application followed by a statutorily mandated public hearing; (2) [when] as a result of such applications, readily identifiable proponents and opponents weigh in on the process; and (3) the decision is localized in its application affecting a particular group of citizens more acutely than the public at large.   Recognizing that the Court “cited these factors with approval” in Sutton, it noted that at the time it chose not to hold that all public zoning hearings should be classified as adjudicatory.  It stated:

The Sutton Case dealt with a different situation than many of our previous zoning cases because it involved PUD zoning.  We noted the ‘quasi-judicial character of municipal rezoning is particularly evident in matters involving PUD zoning.’  We discussed the distinction between traditional rezoning and PUD zoning:

Creating zoning districts and rezoning land are legislative actions, and…trial courts are not permitted to sit as ‘super zoning boards’ and overturn a board’s legislative efforts….The [PUD] concept varies from the traditional concept of zoning classifications.  It permits a flexible approach to the regulation of land uses. Compliance must be measured against certain stated standards….Since the board was called upon to review an interpretation and application of a n ordinance…and the ordinance was not challenged per se, the board’s decision was ‘clearly quasi-judicial’.

Rather than follow Sutton, the Court found the present case to be “much more analogous” to the case of Montgomery v. Bremer County Board of Supervisors.  In Montgomery, the county Board rezoned two parcels of land from agricultural to industrial after two rezoning petitions were filed.  In Montgomery, the Court found that the zoning decision of the supervisors was “an exercise of its delegated police power,” and held that “the generally limited scope of review applicable to the case [was] to determine whether the decision by the Board to rezone [was] fairly debatable.”   In making the analogy, the Court observed:

The city council [in the present case] was acting in a legislative function in furtherance of its delegated police powers.  The council was not sitting ‘to determine adjudicative facts to decide the legal rights, privileges or duties of a particular party based on that party’s particular circumstances.  The [decision] was not undertaken to weigh the legal rights of one party (the All-Star Ballpark Heaven) versus another party (the petitioners).  The council weighed all of the information, reports, and comments available to it in order to determine whether rezoning was in the best interest of the city as a whole.

The Court held that the proper standard of review “in this case is the generally limited scope of review” utilized to “determine whether the decision…is fairly debatable.”  A decision is “fairly debatable” when “reasonable minds may differ, or where the evidence provides a basis for a fair difference of opinion as to its application to a particular property.”  If a rezoning decision is “fairly debatable” then a court will decline to substitute its judgment for that of the city council or board of supervisors.

Impartiality of the city council.  The Court noted that, while it was true that several council members viewed the rezoning and the project as an opportunity for the city, each council member attended all meetings, read reports, listened to citizens speak for and against the project, asked questions, and investigated issues and concerns.  Nothing in the record demonstrated that any council member had any conflict of interest.  Several members participated in an economic development bus trip to Des Moines to discuss the project with legislators and state officials, but the Court found that mere participation in such activities for the potential benefit of the city does not establish partiality or bias. “Rather, this is more akin to the council members upholding their public duty by performing their due diligence in determining what state aid might be available to help with the project before any formal action was taken.  The council make its decision based on what it believed was best for the community after a full and open discussion of the issues over many months.”

Decision was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable. A decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable when it is not authorized by statute, or is unsupported by the facts.  For the reasons cited above, the Court declined to find in favor of the petitioners on these grounds.

Inconsistent with comprehensive plan.  Under Iowa Code 414.3, zoning regulations “shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan.”  The Court referred to its prior decision in Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe County for the principle that “compliance with the comprehensive plan requirement merely means that the zoning authorities have given ‘full consideration the problem presented, including the needs of the public, changing conditions, and the similarity of other land in the same area.'”  The Court referred to the boilerplate language found in every plan that says rezonings should be made with consideration of the unique character of the area, the suitability of the land for the proposed use, the conservation of buildings or value, and the encouragement of the most appropriate use of the land.  It noted that the Field of Dreams site is a unique parcel of land, and that the council considered the distinctiveness of the land and whether the proposed rezoning would be the best use of the site for the benefit of the community as a whole.  The city’s community builder plan also specifically addresses the importance of preserving the site in order to maintain and increase tourism.

Illegal spot zoning. To determine whether illegal spot zoning has occurred, a court must consider (1) whether the new zoning is germane to an object within the police power; (2) whether there is a reasonable basis for making a distinction between the spot zoned land and the surrounding property; and (3) whether the rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan.  Noting again the uniqueness of the Field of Dreams site, the Court refused to find this to be a case of illegal spot zoning even though the result is an island of commercial development surrounded by agriculturally zoned properties.

200-foot buffer zone.  Under Iowa Code 414.5, if 20% or more of the landowners immediately adjacent to the property proposed to be rezoned protest the change, then the city council must approve the rezoning by a four-fifths vote.  The rezoning applicants left out of the rezoning request a 200-foot buffer zone along the three sides of the perimeter of the property  (leaving it as A-1 Agricultural).  The petitioners challenged the use of this 200-foot buffer as a way to prevent nearby property owners from objecting to the project and thereby triggering the requirement of a unanimous vote.  While the Court acknowledged that “at first blush the buffer zone can appear to be unfair,” the Court concluded that the buffer in fact provides a benefit to adjacent landowners by addressing their expressed concerns about hunting and farming operations directly adjacent to the ballfields.  The Court also noted that other courts have validated the use of buffer zones to avoid supermajority requirements.  Regardless, even if the 200-foot buffer was improper, the rezoning was adopted by 4-1 vote of the city council.

Incorrect legal description.  While the notice of the original ordinance (Ordinance 770) contained errors in the legal description, the council corrected the legal description in the ordinance that ultimately rezoned the property (Ordinance 777).  No new notices were published, however, for Ordinance 777.  The Court does not require complete accuracy when providing notice.  Neither Iowa Code nor the city ordinances require the publication of a complete legal description.  The purpose of the notice requirement is to give the public reasonable notice of the pending action.  The public was well aware of the ongoing proceedings, and no one was confused or misled by the inaccuracy of the legal description.

Equal Protection.  Petitioners argued that all neighboring landowners were similarly situated, yet the 3-sided 200-foot buffer prevented those neighbors along the buffer from exercising the same right to object as the neighbors along the side of the property without the buffer.  The Court found that the council’s decision met the rational basis test required by the Equal Protection clause in this case.  The buffers, as described above, served a legitimate purpose of protecting the neighboring properties on the three sides.

Due Process.  Petitioners and the public in general were given adequate notice.  Further, they were heard in multiple public hearings.  All community members wishing to speak were allowed to do so.

Based on all preceding points, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the rezoning of the Field of Dreams property.

Comprehensive Plan, Conflict of interests and/or bias, Due Process, Equal Protection claims, Iowa Supreme Court, Notice, Quasi-judicial land use decisions, Rezoning, Spot Zoning , , , , , ,
Leave a Comment on Field of Dreams site cleared for development of baseball complex and tourist attraction

Agland preservation district statutes not relevant to rezoning application. No conflicts of interest found, either

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Miller v. Grundy County Board of Supervisors and MidAmerican Energy
Iowa Court of Appeals, April 22, 2015

In August 2013 MidAmerican Energy requested to rezone approximately 1,200 acres in Grundy County, Iowa from A-1 Agricultural to A-2 Agricultural.  MidAmerican had “Wind Farm Option Agreements” on the acres to be rezoned, and A-2 zoning would allow MidAmerican to place larger wind turbines on the land than those that would be permitted by A-1.  The Grundy County Planning and Zoning Commission voted 6-1 to recommend denial of the request at its September 2013 meeting; however, the Grundy County Board of Supervisors went against this recommendation and voted 4-0 to approve the rezoning at its meeting later the same month (one supervisor recused himself due to a conflict of interest).   Susan Miller, a nearby landowner, appealed the decision to district court, where the appeal was dismissed.  Miller then appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Miller’s first issue on appeal was that the Board of Supervisors acted illegally because it failed to comply with the requirements of Iowa Code 352.6, which requires supervisors to make specific findings before permitting non-agricultural uses in an “agricultural area.”   Chapter 352 authorizes the creation of agricultural preservation districts.  It does not address county zoning as enabled through Chapter 335 of the Iowa Code.  The Court of Appeals summarily stated that Chapter 352 is inapplicable in this case because “there is no evidence in the record that the Grundy County Board of Supervisors has ever designated any of the land involved in the zoning amendment as an ‘agricultural area'” as it is meant in Chapter 352.  “Nor, for that matter, is there any evidence in the record that any owner of any of that land has ever consented to the owner’s land being included in an area designated as an ‘agricultural area.'”  Simply zoning land as A-1 Agricultural does not of itself create or expand an “agricultural area” as defined in Chapter 352.

Miller’s second issue was that two of the supervisors who voted for the rezoning had conflicts of interest that required their recusal.  Citing Bluffs Development Co. v. Pottawattamie County Board of Adjustment the court noted that proof of a conflict of interest must be “direct, definite, capable of demonstration, not remote, uncertain, contingent, unsubstantial, or merely speculative or theoretical.”  One of the supervisors called out by Miller owns the AmericInn motel, which offers discounted rates to wind energy officials who stay there.  The court found that Miller was unable to offer evidence that any discounts received by wind energy officials were different than discounts available to anyone else staying there.  Without that evidence, or other evidence that the supervisor’s vote was significantly influenced by a pecuniary interest Miller’s claim failed as to the first supervisor.

The second supervisor has multiple relatives that own lands subject to “Wind Farm Option Agreements” with MidAmerican Energy; however, none of those lands were the subject of the 2013 rezoning request, and so the court concluded that any advantages to the supervisor or his relatives were “uncertain, speculative, and remote.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Miller’s claims.

Conflict of interests and/or bias, Iowa Court of Appeals, Rezoning , , ,
Leave a Comment on Agland preservation district statutes not relevant to rezoning application. No conflicts of interest found, either

MI Court of Appeals interprets MZEA provisions regarding appeal of site plan approval

hdankbar

by Hannah Dankbar

Julie Visser Trust v. City of Wyoming
(Michigan Court of Appeals, October 30, 2014)

In July 2012 the City of Wyoming rezoned a parcel of land from R-1, single family residential, to R-4, multifamily residential so John Lee Koetje, Koetje Investors Limited Partnership, and Koetje Investors-Chateau Limited Partnership could construct Phase 4 of Chateau Village Apartments.  Phases 1-3 of the project border the rezoned property. Visser Trust owns property zoned R-1 in Chateau Estates, due South of the property in question. In December 2012 after the rezoning, the Wyoming City Planning Commission approved Koetje’s revised site plan for construction. Visser Trust challenged (1) the site plan approval, and (2) the rezoning approval, and further raised issues concerning (3) an alleged Freedom of Information Act violation, (4) an illegal contract rezoning, and (%) a violation of negative restrictive covenants.  In July 2013 the trail court dismissed all counts, and Visser Trust appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals.

Site plan. The trial court cited MCR 7.112(B) and said that because the plaintiff filed a complaint, and not an appeal of the planning commission’s site plan approval, the time for Visser Trust to object had passed. The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) does not specifically address whether and how an interested party may challenge the approval or denial of a site plan. There is no statutory provision that requires the plaintiff to challenge the Planning Commission’s approval of the site plan in a specific manner, as opposed to a general civil complaint. The trial court therefore erred in dismissing this part of Visser Trust’s lawsuit.

Rezoning. The plaintiff argues that the rezoning was invalid, contending that after Koetje added nine conditions to its voluntary offer of conditions , the entire application should have gone back through the Planning Commission for an additional public hearing and recommendation.  The Court of Appeals rejected this argument.  The MZEA says the legislative body may refer any proposed amendments to the zoning commission for consideration and comment.  The word “may” indicates that the city council was not required to send the revisions back to the Planning Commission.

Contract zoning.  The plaintiff also argues that the rezoning was illegal “contract zoning”. MCL 125.3405 permits local governments to “approve rezoning subject to voluntary conditions offered by a landowner,” and lists several criteria for distinguishing between a legal voluntary offer and illegal contract zoning. Plaintiff submitted a letter from Koetje’s engineer regarding the rezoning, wherein Stalsonburg wrote that Wyoming “desires to accomplish this as ‘contract rezoning.’” Plaintiff argues that the letter supports the inference that Wyoming engaged in illegal contract zoning. Apart from the use of the phrase “contract rezoning” in the letter, however, plaintiff did not produce any any evidence that Wyoming required Koetje to agree to certain conditions.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of this count.

FOIA. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its FOIA claim. Donald Visser submitted a FOIA request, but did not identify for whom the documents were being requested. The plaintiff referenced Donald Visser’s request in the complaint, but the trial court noted that plaintiff neither submitted the FOIA request, nor was the request submitted on plaintiff’s behalf. The plaintiff therefore did not have standing to bring a FOIA complaint.

Negative restrictive covenants. Plaintiff alleged that the subject property was at one time part of a larger parcel that contained the same restrictions as lots in the Chateau Estates—i.e. restricted to single-family development. The trial court found this accusation vague and unclear, and that plaintiff failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove this allegation.

“The essential elements of a reciprocal negative easement are: (1) a common grantor; (2) a general plan; and (3) restrictive covenants running with the land in accordance with the plan and within the plan area in deeds granted by the common grantor.”  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s findings that the questioned property was not part of the same development as the plaintiff’s property, and that the court was not able to find any documentation to support a contrary conclusion.

The trial court erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s challenge to the site plan approval, but was affirmed in all other respects.

 

 

 

Contracts/Conditional Zoning, Covenants and deed restrictions, Open Records, Rezoning, Site plans , , ,
Leave a Comment on MI Court of Appeals interprets MZEA provisions regarding appeal of site plan approval

Appellant in rezoning denial cannot turn appeal into inverse condemnation action

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Dahm v. Stark County Board of County Commissioners
(North Dakota Supreme Court, December 19, 2013)

Richard Dahm submitted an application to the County Board for a rezoning to change his property designation from agricultural to residential. Dahm also sought approval of a preliminary plat called Duck Creek Estates, a 99 lot residential subdivision to “provide a rural living environment in a quasi-urban setting . . . .” The land is two miles west of the Dickinson city limits, and located in between Interstate-94 to the north and Highway 10 to the south. The property is adjacent to a previously platted subdivision called Maryville Subdivision.  Two public hearings were held before the Planning and Zoning Commission. At the first hearing, the city/county planner recommended denial based on several alleged deficiencies, including: Dahm did not specify which residential district he wanted to rezone his property to; there was no contract with adjacent land owners ensuring access to Highway 10; the application did not indicate whether road and access widths would meet or exceed Stark County regulations; the application did not indicate what type of bridge would overpass Duck Creek; the application did not delineate the location of wetlands or flood plains or include a flood plain analysis and environmental study; development could result in “pinching” the water flow of Duck Creek; and no potable water was available at the site. The planner also found the application was inconsistent with the Stark County Comprehensive Plan.

Rather than making a formal recommendation to the County Board, the Zoning Commission continued the hearing to allow Dahm to revise his application. Dahm submitted additional information, including a letter responding to the deficiencies, a development narrative, an application package addendum, and proposed zoning maps. The Southwestern District Health Unit also submitted a letter stating that Dahm’s plans for a sewer system were satisfactory. Prior to the second public hearing, the city/county planner again recommended denying Dahm’s application based on several deficiencies, including: the lack of a traffic impact analysis; road access did not meet Stark County standards; the application did not include the location of wetlands and flood plains; the absence of a flood plain elevation study to ascertain whether the project met the requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program and state law; the absence of a field wetland delineation for use during U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 404 Permit Process; no potable water; and that the application was inconsistent with the Stark County Comprehensive Plan.

At the second public hearing, Dahm’s attorney stated that an adjacent landowner agreed to provide highway access, on the condition that the adjacent owner’s property could also be re-zoned. Dahm’s attorney also claimed traffic density would be about 925 vehicles per day. Members of the neighboring Maryville subdivision voiced their opposition to the application based on concern over traffic and dust control. The planner also spoke in opposition to the application. Members of the Planning and Zoning Commission reiterated their trepidation about traffic access points, increased traffic density, and the lack of a study concerning the wetlands and flood plains. Based on these concerns, the Zoning Commission voted 8-0 to recommend a denial of the zoning amendment request.  The County Board adopted the recommendation of the Zoning Commission and denied Dahm’s request by a vote of 5-0. In voting to deny the application the County Board also included a provision that Dahm could not appear before the County Board for six months.

Dahm appealed the County Board’s decision to the district court and also sought to introduce evidence of similar zoning requests that had been previously approved by the County Board. The court denied Dahm’s motion to submit additional evidence and affirmed the County Board’s decision to deny the application for zoning change.  Dahm appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.

The Court first noted that in framing its zoning decisions, the Zoning Committee and County Board looked to the Stark County Comprehensive Plan, a growth management policy amended in 2010 based on the county’s rapid growth in the agricultural and energy sectors. In its official recommendation, the Zoning Commission stated “there continues to be concerns with density, traffic, and sewer and water issues for residential development of the property.” Additionally, the Zoning Commission determined the application was inconsistent with at least four goals of the Comprehensive Plan related to compatibility of environmental characteristics of the site, adequacy of sewer and water services, the preservation of open spaces and natural resources, and the prohibition against locating development away from paved roads. The Court concluded that the procedure followed by the county “characterizes an exercise of discretion” that is “the product of a rational mental process by which the facts and the law relied upon are considered together . . . .”

Dahm also argued that when a subdivision plat addresses all issues listed in a county’s subdivision regulations it becomes the “mandatory duty” of the zoning authority to approve a subdivision plat.  The Court disagreed, stating that “The board shall consider all other relevant facts and determine whether the public interest will be served by the subdivision. . . . If it finds that the proposed plat does not make appropriate provisions, or that the public use and interest will not be served . . . then the board of county commissioners shall disapprove the proposed plat.”  The Zoning Commission and the County Board did take into account such factors as open spaces, drainage, streets, water supplies, and waste disposal, in addition to other considerations, in denying the application. Because it found Dahm’s application was at odds with the Comprehensive Plan, it was under no duty to approve the request.

Finally, Dahm argued the six-month restriction from appearing before the County Board was not only arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, it was also unconstitutional because a new ordinance (increasing minimum lot sizes from 7,000 square feet to 5 acres) was passed during the six-month prohibition period.  Because Dahm purchased the property in reliance on the original ordinance and subdivision regulations, the County Board’s denial deprived Dahm of all reasonable use of the property.  The Court stated that the moving party in a denial of a change in zoning request cannot turn his appeal into an inverse condemnation action, and declined to address Dahm’s claim of an unconstitutional taking of his property. It found that the decision to implement a six-month appearance restriction was also not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.  The Board noted that Dahm had presented the Duck Creek Estates project three months in a row without adequately resolving the issues of roads, sewage, water, and population density. As the district court reasoned, “the time and effort expended by the Stark County Zoning Board, the City and County Planner, and by the Stark County Commission persuades the Court that there was no violation of Stark County’s authority and obligation to regulate land use . . . by their decision to impose the six month prohibition.” Given the repeated attempts to re-zone and the failure to make the requisite adjustments, it was not unreasonable for the County Board to implement a six-month wait period.

Comprehensive Plan, Condemnation, North Dakota courts, Rezoning, Subdivision Regulation, Zoning amendments , , ,
Leave a Comment on Appellant in rezoning denial cannot turn appeal into inverse condemnation action

Conditional rezoning agreement limits processing and retail sales to deer season

by Kaitlin Heinen and Gary Taylor

Patricia D. and Michael P. Fowler v. Muscatine County Board of Supervisors
(Iowa Court of Appeals, October 23, 2013)

Patricia and Michael Fowler asked the Muscatine County Zoning Commission to rezone their property from A-1 agricultural to C-1 commercial, to permit the operation of a seasonal deer processing facility and retail counter. The Fowlers executed an agreement that restricted the property’s use to “[o]nly wild game processing….[r]etail products in the wild game category…and supporting wild game products….” This agreement included a description of “Steve’s Meat Shop” and its products. Once executed, the commission recommended that the Muscatine County Board of Supervisors approve the zoning request, which the board did, passing an ordinance that rezoned the Fowlers’ property accordingly.

The Fowlers petitioned to have their property rezoned again to “add service of ready-to-eat food,” such as hot sandwiches. The commission recommended that the board deny this request; the board did so. The Fowlers sought to annul and vacate the board’s denial of their application in district court. The board resisted, and additionally argued that retail services could only be offered seasonally. The district court allowed the retail services to be conducted year-round, but denied the Fowlers’ request to include “ready-to-eat foods” or a “deli shop.” Both the Fowlers and the board appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals.

The issues before the court in this case include: “(1) whether an ordinance that rezoned certain agricultural property to a commercial classification authorized the operation of a year-round retail establishment and (2) whether the retail establishment could sell ready-to-eat foods.”

The court initially observed that if an “ordinance is plain and its meaning is clear,” the court cannot search for meaning beyond those express terms. However, if the “ordinance is ambiguous, it is appropriate to apply the general rules of construction for statutes.” The board argued the “conditional rezoning agreement contains ‘no reference to year-round retail service,’” so the district court erred in the absence of such words to interpret. The Fowlers countered that the conditional rezoning agreement contains no time restrictions for the retail services, so the district court correctly concluded that they could operate year-round.

Both parties rely on the preamble of the ordinance—“the Property is…to be used as a seasonal deer processing and retail service.” The board argued “the term ‘seasonal’ ‘unambiguously and undeniably places limits on the privileges conferred by the spot zoning.’” The Fowlers countered the term “requires deer processing to occur on a seasonal basis but does not limit ‘retail service.’” The court reasoned that these competing arguments in regards to the term “seasonal” meant that there was ambiguity in the ordinance.

When confronted with an ambiguity, we may consider, among other factors: (1) the object sought to be attained (2) the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, (3) the legislative history, (4) the common law or former statutory provisions, (5) the consequences of a particular construction, (6) the administrative construction of the statute, and (7) the preamble or statement of policy.

The court examined the circumstances surrounding the ordinance’s passage. “At the first meeting with the zoning commission, Michael Fowler explained his reasoning for his rezoning request as follows: ‘[W]hat we’d like to do is to have a seasonal deer processing. We’d like to have a small retail counter that would just be open between October and January.’” Further, when asked whether the retail services would only be open during that period, he replied, “Yeah, deer season.” This resolves the ambiguity of the term “seasonal,” and thus the court concluded the Fowlers’ retail services were to operate seasonally. The court reversed the district court’s judgment in this part.

As for the second issue, the Fowlers argued the court erred in concluding they could not sell ready-to-eat foods at their retail counter. They contended that “retail service” encompasses the sale of ready-to-eat foods. However, the conditional rezoning agreement authorizes them to “prepare products for resale.” The court agreed with the district court that the conditional rezoning agreement did not authorize the sale of deli-style sandwiches that could not “be considered wild game specialty items.” In his statements to the zoning commission, “Michael Fowler stated that the retail store would be limited to wild game, ‘nothing domestic, like beef or pork.’” In addition, “Patricia Fowler explained that deer meat would be bought from a farmer and then sold to the customers.” These statements conclude that the retail service does not encompass ready-to-eat foods. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in this part.

Contracts/Conditional Zoning, Iowa Court of Appeals, Rezoning, Zoning ordinance interpretation , ,
Leave a Comment on Conditional rezoning agreement limits processing and retail sales to deer season

County’s actions did not constitute a taking: The continuing saga of Francis v. Bremer County

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

J.D. Francis, Inc. v. Bremer County Board of Supervisors
(Iowa Court of Appeals, January 9, 2013)

Prior history of this case was discussed in this blog here.  The present case includes some interesting facts about the dispute not disclosed in the prior opinion from 2009, namely:

On June 20, 2006, Anhalt and Francis requested the land be rezoned to “R-1” single-family residential. The 34.5 acres had an average corn suitability rating (CSR) of 53.60, a rating that classified it as “prime” agricultural land that should be preserved for agricultural use under the Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP). Following a public hearing, the Bremer County Planning and Zoning Commission unanimously recommended denial of the rezoning request….[and] the board of supervisors voted unanimously to deny the request, finding “that good agricultural farm land not be taken out of production and because of many other environmental concerns….The following day, Francis and Anhalt submitted a revised rezoning request, which excluded approximately four acres of productive farmland included in the original request. Excluding those acres dropped the CSR of the remaining 30.75 acres to 49.5. However, approximately half—or 15.46 acres—of that parcel had a CSR of fifty or higher….[On this request] the commission voted four to one to deny [and the] board of supervisors voted unanimously to deny.

More background.  In December 2009, after the Iowa Court of Appeals issued the decision linked above, the board of supervisors amended its CLUP to exclude planned residential developments on certain designated land. Francis’s property was included in this redesignation. Francis filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, alleging the board’s 2006 rezoning denials were an unconstitutional taking. He later amended his complaint to allege the December 2009 CLUP amendment was also an unconstitutional taking. The complaint was dismissed in March 2011 because the issue was not ripe for consideration; the court noted Francis had failed to seek compensation through state procedures by instituting an inverse condemnation action.

Present case.  On December 9, 2011, Francis filed the present case for inverse condemnation in state district court, alleging that the board’s denials of the rezoning request was arbitrary, and further that the CLUP amendment resulted in a taking of at least half of the value of the property in question without adequate compensation.  The court found the board was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the board’s actions did not constitute a taking that requires compensation. Francis appealed.

The Court of Appeals first ruled that the doctrine of res judicata prevents J.D. Francis, Inc. from relitigating the issue of whether the board acted arbitrarily in denying its rezoning requests. The question of whether the board’s denial was arbitrary was litigated and decided by the district court when it granted summary judgment in favor of the board on Francis and Anhalt’s 2006 action. That ruling was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

As for the takings claim, the Court of Appeals observed that, unlike cases cited by Francis as supporting his claim, there was no rezoning that led to a diminution of value; rather, the board simply refused to rezone the land to increase its economic viability. Furthermore, the plaintiff purchased the land after the board denied both rezoning requests. Even the CLUP amendment, which occurred after purchase and limits the likelihood that the land will be rezoned to residential, does not amount to a taking. The property remains economically viable as agricultural land, just as it did prior to the plaintiff’s purchase. Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court’s finding that the board’s actions did not constitute a taking.

Iowa Court of Appeals, Rezoning, Takings , , ,
Leave a Comment on County’s actions did not constitute a taking: The continuing saga of Francis v. Bremer County

Monona County’s rezoning of property along Loess Hills Scenic Byway did not constitute illegal spot zoning

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Woodward and Johnson v. Monona County Board of Supervisors
(Iowa Court of Appeals, November 15, 2012)

Cory Bumann purchased 2.8 acres of land in rural Monona County with the intent of constructing a bar and restaurant to serve tourist traffic coming to enjoy the Loess Hills. The land is located at the corner of the paved county road L-20 – which is a segment of the Loess Hills Scenic Byway – and the gravel road 153rd Street. Across county road L-20 (approximately 1/2- to 3/4-mile away), but not accessible directly by L-20, is the Timber Ridge Winery and Vineyard, which is owned by other members of the Bumann family. Timber Ridge does not have a bar or restaurant, but serves breakfast for approximately 400 guests on the weekends in the summer.  Timber Ridge also bike and ATV trails, and a campground.  The land that is the subject of this litigation is connected to Timber Ridge, across L-20, by a dirt path.

Bumann requested rezoning of the land in question from agriculture to a classification that would allow for a bar and a restaurant.  The county planning and zoning commission was unable to reach a recommendation, and forwarded a “split recommendation” to the board of supervisors.  on May 25, 2010 the board of supervisors approved the rezoning request.  Woodward and Johnston (plaintiffs), area landowners, challenged the decision as a case of illegal spot zoning.  The district court agreed and invalidated the rezoning.  Monona County appealed the decision.

After noting that a board of supervisor’s decision regarding a rezoning carries with it a strong presumption of validity, the Court of Appeals reviewed the relevant Iowa caselaw pertaining to spot zoning:

Spot zoning occurs when an ordinance creates a small island of property with restrictions on its use that are different from those imposed on surrounding property…. While spot zoning is not favored, it is not automatically illegal…. Spot zoning is valid if it passes a three-pronged test.  The court must determine (1) whether the new zoning is germane to an object within the police power; (2) whether there is a reasonable basis for making a distinction between the spot zoned land and the surrounding property; and (3) whether the rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan.

The district court found that the rezoning decision passed the first and third prongs, but failed the second.  The Court of Appeals confined its review to the second prong; plaintiffs did not challenge the district court’s conclusions with regard to the other two.

The Court of Appeals noted that to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for making a distinction between the spot zoned land and the surrounding property it must look at several factors:

Size of spot zoned and uses of surrounding property.   The county zoning administrator testified that the closest commercially zoned property was two to five miles away. The land surrounding the property on all sides was zoned for agriculture, but Timber Ridge had a special use permit to allow recreational uses such as a private campground and dirt-bike riding.  Plaintiffs land was farmland and timberland, but the county comprehensive plan did not identify the Loess Hills region as prime agricultural land.  One county supervisor testified that Timber Ridge at one time had a restaurant and bar that has since closed down.  Another supervisor testified that he considered the rezoned property and Timber Ridge to be similar in that they were gathering places.

Changing conditions of the area.  It was unclear from evidence at trial whether the extensive tourism promotion of the Loess Hills region was a recent occurrence, but the comprehensive plan specifically designating the Loess Hills as such was adopted in 2007.  L-20 had been paved for 20-25 years, and Timber ridge had been located in the area for much longer than that.

Uses to which subject property has been put.  Plaintiffs testified that the land in question previously had been used for row crops, but other testimony contradicted that.  It was recognized that the land was not prime agricultural land, but also that the site would have to be leveled for a bar to be constructed.

Suitability and adaptability for various uses.  County supervisors testified that the property’s location along the Scenic Byway on a paved road, its proximity to Timber Ridge, and favoring a location that was not prime agricultural land made this property suitable for a restaurant.

The district court found that the second prong was not satisfied because the paving of L-20 and the proximity to Timber Ridge were not recent occurrences, and that any land bordering L-20 would be equally suited for a restaurant and bar; however, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the district court is only to look to see if there has been a sufficient showing to reasonably support the board of supervisor’s judgment. The court is not to supersede the county’s discretion just because the court would reach a different conclusion.  Finding that there was a reasonable basis to support the county’s rezoning decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court.

Iowa Court of Appeals, Rezoning, Spot Zoning ,
Leave a Comment on Monona County’s rezoning of property along Loess Hills Scenic Byway did not constitute illegal spot zoning

Subscribe

Archives

Categories

Tags

Admin Menu