Category: Taxes

Transportation user fee assessed to landowners found to be a prohibited excise tax

Gary Taylor

by Andrea Vaage

Heartland Apartment Association v. City of Mission, Kansas
Kansas Court of Appeals, July 2, 2015

In 2010, the City of Mission, Kansas enacted a transportation user fee on all improved real estate. The fee was to be used for street maintenance and repair. The fee was imposed on owners of developed property and calculated based on an estimate of vehicle trips generated by the size and use of a building. Only real property exempt from property or ad valorem taxes, such as churches, were exempt from paying the fee. If the fee was not paid, additional fees and interest would be assessed and a lien could be placed on the property.

Heartland Apartment Association, Inc. and others filed a lawsuit challenging the legality of the fee. The district court ruled in favor of the City on all counts, declaring the fee was a tax that was legally adopted by ordinance under the City’s power of home rule. Heartland appealed, contending the fee was an illegal excise tax.  The issue at hand was whether Mission’s fee is really a tax, and, if it is a tax, if it is one that can be legally levied by a municipality under Kansas law.

The Kansas Court of Appeals first noted that the distinction between a fee and a tax is not determined by the label given it, but rather the nature and function of the charge.

[A] tax is a forced contribution to raise revenue for the maintenance of governmental services offered to the general public. In contrast, a fee is paid in exchange for a special service, benefit, or privilege not automatically conferred upon the general public. A fee is not a revenue measure, but a means of compensating the government for the cost of offering and regulating the special service, benefit, or privilege. Payment of a fee is voluntary—an individual can avoid the charge by choosing not to take advantage of the service, benefit, or privilege offered.

Using this principle, the Court determined the City’s “fee” to be, in reality, a tax.  Every landowner must pay the fee when they pay property taxes; no landowner can opt out of the fee unless they are exempt entities from property taxes. Failure to pay the fee may result in a lien, potentially leading to a sheriff’s sale of the property. Thus this fee is a “forced contribution.”

Furthermore, the landowners required to pay the fee do not receive special benefits or services. Transportation infrastructure is a common good provided to all members of the general public, such as police and fire protection, and is enjoyed by landowner and non-landowner alike.

Having determined that the fee was a tax, the Court then examined whether it was a tax that the City had the authority to levy.  The Home Rule Amendment of the Kansas Constitution grants cities the power to determine their local affairs and government.  Under the Home Rule Amendment cities are allowed to exempt themselves from a state statute by adopting either an ordinary or charter ordinance; however, there are limits to this opting-out process.   Cities are prohibited from opting out of (1) enactments of statewide concern which are uniformly applicable to all cities; (2) other legislative enactments uniformly applicable to all cities; (3) enactments uniformly applicable to all cities of the same class that limit or prohibit “the levying of any tax, excise, fee, charge or other exaction”; and (4) legislative enactments prescribing limits of indebtedness.

Under Kansas law, K.S.A. 12-194, cities cannot levy or impose an excise tax or a tax in the nature of an excise tax. This law applies uniformly to all cities, but no definition is given for “excise tax” or “in the nature of an excise tax.” After reviewing the legislative intent of K.S.A. 12-194 the Court concluded that “the legislature has enlarged what taxes are prohibited to such an extent that this tax can be no other tax than an excise tax and is thus prohibited by law.”  The Court based their decision on a change of the statute in 2006 that removed language limiting the prohibited taxes to those imposed on transactions.  The result was that the term “excise tax” has come to mean “practically any tax which is not an ad valorem tax.”  The Court found the transportation user “fee” enacted by the City of Mission was an excise tax, and as such was prohibited by law.

The case was reversed and remanded.

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US Supreme Court declines to hear Des Moines franchise fee case

Gary Taylor

Yesterday the US Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of the city of Des Moines in its franchise fee case, blogged here.  The Iowa Supreme Court ruled in March that the city’s 5-percent fee on utility bills was beyond that allowable as reasonably related to the administration of electric and gas franchises, and that the excess must be returned to the people who paid it.

You can read the Des Moines Register article concerning yesterday’s action here.

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Ohio Township’s impact fees constituted impermissible tax

Gary Taylor

by Victoria Heldt

Drees Company et al., v. Hamilton Township et al.
(Supreme Court of Ohio, May 31, 2012)

In the last twenty years, Hamilton Township in Ohio has experienced significant growth in its population and development.  In response to the growth, the Township adopted a resolution that required potential developers to pay impact fees in order to apply for and acquire a zoning certificate to develop in an unincorporated area.  The stated purpose of the impact fee was “to benefit the property by providing the Township with adequate funds to provide the same level of service to that property that the Township currently affords previously developed properties.”

The fee included four categories:  a road-impact fee, a fire-protection impact fee, a police-protection-impact fee, and a park-impact fee.  The amount assessed to each property was determined by its use.  Properties to be used for single-family dwellings were assessed a total of $6,153 while those being developed for retail/commercial purposes were assessed a $7,962.  The money received was placed into separate accounts (one for each category) not put into the general fund.  The funds in each account may be used only for the purpose of each account.

Drees Company, among others, alleged that the impact fees are contrary to Ohio law and are unconstitutional.  Hamilton Township is a limited-home-rule township that may “exercise all powers of local self-government within the unincorporated area of the township…and shall enact no other taxes other than those authorized by general law.”  Drees Company argued that the impact fee is really a tax and, therefore, the Township was not authorized to enact the resolution.  The trial court ruled in favor of the Township.  It stated that Hamilton Township “may make and fund improvements to benefit new development by use of its system of impact fees, because the resolution is not in conflict with any other Ohio statute, and because it is sufficiently narrowly tailored to provide services to the class of fee payers in exchange for the fees.”  The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting that the impact fee did not constitute a prohibited form of taxation.  Drees further appealed the case.

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio had to distinguish a fee from a tax.  It looked to precedent in its analysis to note how the two have been historically contrasted.  In State ex rel. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release comp. Bd. V. Withrow, the Court looked to “the substance of the assessments and not merely their form.”  It had to determine whether assessments imposed on owners and operators of underground storage tanks (“USTs”) were taxes.  The stated purpose of the fees was “to reimburse owners and operators of USTs for the costs of corrective actions in the event of a release of petroleum into the environment and to compensate third parties for bodily injury and/or property damage resulting from such occurrences.”

In Withrow, the Court determined the assessments to be fees for four reasons: (1) the fees were imposed to further regulatory measures to address environmental problems caused by leaking USTs; (2) the funds were never placed in general funds and were to be used strictly for problems related to USTs; (3) the fee was in exchange for protection from UST leaks; and (4) if the fund exceeded a certain amount, no assessment would be charged that year.  The Court noted that, when applying the factors from Withrow to this case, the impact fees seem to constitute taxes.  The fees lack any sort of regulatory function, can be spent on typical township expenses, are not in exchange for any particular service, and are not responsive to need.

The Court next looked to Am. Landfill, Inc. v. Stark/Tuscarawas/Wayne Joint Solid Waste Mgt. Dist., where the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with a similar situation.  It had to determine wither assessments imposed by Ohio solid-waste-management districts on people disposing of waste were fees or taxes.  The fees were to be used for various things pertaining to the county’s waste management plan.  The court employed a three-factor analysis that considered (1) the entity that imposes the assessment; (2) the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed; and (3) whether the assessment is expended for general public purposes, or sued for the regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed.

The Court noted that an assessment imposed by a legislature is more likely to be a tax than one imposed by an administrative agency.  Furthermore, an assessment imposed upon a broad class of parties is more likely to be a tax than one imposed on a narrow class.  The third factor, the use of the assessment, is the predominant factor.  Applying the Am. Landfill test to this case points to the fact that the impact assessments constitute taxes.  They were imposed by a legislative body, not an administrative one.  They were also imposed on a fairly large group of people.  Furthermore, the funds were to be used for public benefit, not solely for the benefit of those property owners.

The Court noted that an essential question was whether the assessments were for public or private benefit.  It noted that the goal of the assessment was “for the township to have the necessary funds to allow all properties in the township to maintain their same level of service despite recent, rapid growth.”  The resolution itself stated it was for “the protection of the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens and property owners of the Township.”  Consequently, the Court concluded that the assessments constituted a tax and were therefore not authorized.  It reversed the decision and remanded it to trial court.

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Iowa Supreme Court requires Des Moines to refund roughly $35 million in franchise fees

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Kragnes, et al., v. City of Des Moines
(Iowa Supreme Court, March 2, 2012)

In 2004, the City of Des Moines considered raising property taxes to hire more police and firefighters, maintain the library’s hours, and rehabilitate deteriorating neighborhoods. The City realized the state was phasing out sales and use taxes on residential gas and electric services and determined that it would be possible to increase the franchise fees on these services to raise revenue. After deciding this source of revenue was preferable to an increase in property taxes, the City renegotiated the franchise agreements with MidAmerican Energy and increased the franchise fee beginning June 2005. Lisa Kragnes promptly filed a lawsuit on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated challenging the franchise fees as illegal taxes. She sought reimbursement for all illegal taxes paid through the allowable statute of limitations and sought an injunction prohibiting the City from charging such franchise fees in the future. In the first suit that came before the Supreme Court the Court determined that a city has the authority to assess a franchise fee expressed as a percentage of the gross receipts derived from the utility’s sale of its services to the public, so long as the charge is “reasonably related to the reasonable costs of inspecting, licensing, supervising, or otherwise regulating the activity that is being franchised.”  The case was sent back to district court to determine whether all or part of the franchise fees were reasonably related to the City’s administrative expenses in exercising its police power.  It was also up to the district court to determine whether a class should be certified (which would allow all  City of Des Moines utilities customers who paid the electricity or gas franchise fee from July 27, 1999, forward to be represented in a single action).  The district court did, in fact, certify the class and determined that a portion of the franchise fee collected was excessive. The court held the City must refund to the class, with interest, the amount by which the franchise fees exceeded $1,575,194 per year for the electric utility and $1,574,046 for the gas utility (an amount that would cost the city roughly $40 million). The court retained jurisdiction to determine the details of how the refund would be calculated and refunded to class members. Both the City and Kragnes appealed.

Certifying class.  The City first contended the district court should have granted its motion to decertify the class because a conflict of interest exists between Kragnes, as the class representative, and Des Moines property owners who will suffer economically as a result of a judgment in favor of the class. Specifically, the City contended that if the City is required to refund the roughly $40 million in excess tax that was collected from 2004 until 2009, it will need to raise the revenue for this payment from property taxes. This puts Kragnes and class members in a fundamental conflict over the litigation because property owners would tend to oppose Kragnes’s refund objective because they benefitted from the collection of the excessive franchise fees from payors who were not property owners.  The Court sided with Kragnes, stating that the City’s position was “rife with speculation” —beginning with speculation about what City leaders would have done in the past and ending with predictions about what City might do to raise revenue to pay the refund.  In light of this the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class.  The Supreme Court further observed:

The litigation of this case has resulted in two Supreme Court opinions, a forty-nine page district court decision after a fourteen-day bench trial involving the testimony of twenty-eight witnesses, including eight experts—three for the City and five for Kragnes. The record fills five bankers’ boxes. However, Kragnes’s claim standing alone would likely fall within the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court. We think this case demonstrates the very necessity and importance of class action litigation both for the plaintiffs and for the City. The likelihood of a plaintiff bringing such a complex suit requiring substantial resources to litigate in small claims is highly unlikely. And if she, and scores of thousands of others like her, did bring their claims individually, it could easily overwhelm the legal department of the City and the resources of the Polk County district court….

It also determined that sufficient procedural safeguards exist to protect individuals when members are not given the option of excluding themselves from the class.

Proper amount of expenses.  Both parties disagreed with the categories and amounts of expenses that the district court counted as “reasonably related” to the administration of electric and gas franchises during the relevant time period, an amount which totaled nearly $1.574 million annually for the gas utility and $1.575 million annually for the electric utility.  After a lengthy review of the various costs claimed by the City (lost value of trees, indirect operating costs, construction costs paid by other governments, others) the Supreme Court concluded that the amounts the City were entitled to collect in franchise fees were $1.47 million annually for the gas utility and $2.1 million annually for the electric utility (still resulting in an overcollection by the city of roughly $35 million).

Refund to customers.  Finally, the City contended the district court erred in concluding the plaintiff class is entitled to a refund.  Citing with approval a 1990 U.S. Supreme Court case, the Iowa Supreme court reasoned that there must be financial consequences from the illegal taxation of the City’s residents notwithstanding that the funds received from the illegal taxation of the City’s residents were used wisely, legally, and with the best intentions for the residents. “Because exaction of a tax constitutes a deprivation of property, procedural safeguards are generally required to protect against “unlawful exactions in order to satisfy the commands of the Due Process Clause.” The Court further noted that Kragnes filed the case soon after the City decided to commence collecting the franchise fees. On notice of Kragnes’s claim that the franchise fees were illegal, the City nonetheless collected them and even increased the amount of the fees collected. “The failure of the City to respond differently after it was on notice of Kragnes’s claim does not mitigate in favor of depriving Kragnes and the class of a remedy for the unlawful taxation.”

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Local ordinance permitted to define “available public sanitary sewer system” more broadly than state statute

Gary Taylor

by Victoria Heldt and Gary Taylor

Roger Newell and Arelene Newell v. Village of Otter Lake, County of Lapeer
(Michigan Court of Appeals, November 15, 2011)

The Newells own property in the Village of Otter Lake on which sits a structure with a working septic system.  In 2004, the Village created a special assessment for its public sanitary sewage system.  The Newells were assessed $10,475; however, they were of the opinion that the assessment should not be applied to them so they filed a complaint with the Michigan Tax Tribunal.  During the time between when the Newells filed their complaint and the time of their hearing, the Village enacted an ordinance that changed the definition of an “available public sanitary sewer system.”  Under the new definition any public sewer system that “crosses, adjoins, or abuts a parcel upon which a structure is located” is considered an “available public sewer system” regardless of how many feet the system was from the structure it services or could potentially service.  This ordinance differed from the previously governing state statute (MCL 333.12751 (c)), which “available public sanitary sewer system as  “a public sanitary sewer system located in a right of way, easement, highway, street, or public way which crosses, adjoins, or abuts upon the property and passing not more than 200 feet at the nearest point from a structure in which sanitary sewage originates.”

At the Tax Tribunal trial, the Newells argued that the assessment was unjust because they received no benefit from the sewer system (they did not connect to it, nor did they need to connect to it).  The tribunal upheld the assessment and the Newells paid it.   Since they did not connect to the system, however, they refused to pay the operation and maintenance fees that were due each quarter thereafter.  When they were notified of their delinquency on the operation and maintenance fees, the Newells filed a claim in circuit court arguing that the ordinance was preempted by the previously governing state statute, that the fee violated the Headlee Amendment, and that the assessment violated the right to equal protection under the Michigan Constitution.  The court ruled in favor of the Village, finding that the preemption claim could have been resolved in the tax tribunal hearing so the court was prohibited from ruling on it.  Additionally it found that, although a municipality is not allowed to enact ordinances that conflict with state statutes, it is free to make ordinances that expand on them.

On appeal, the Newells again made a preemption claim arguing that the state statute preempted the Village’s ordinance.  They were of the opinion that they were not required to connect to the public sewer system (per the state statute MCL 333.12751 (c)) because their structure was located more than 200 feet from it.  The Court disagreed, finding that the Village’s ordinance was not in conflict with the state statute but merely expanded on it, which is allowable.  Thus, the Village’s ordinance was not preempted by the state statue.  The Court further noted that, in matters of public health such as a sewer system, municipalities act as an agent of the state in the regulation of such systems.

Citing People v. Llewellyn, the Newells additionally argued that this area of regulation was one in which state law has exclusive jurisdiction.  This argument rested on the fact that MCL 333.12751 was not included in the list of sections that the statute specified as being expandable by municipalities.  The Court rejected this argument, finding that the statute clearly anticipated changes by local governments.  It further found that the fact that the section was not listed did not equal a declaration that the state’s statutes were the exclusive governing power in that area.

The Newells also argued that the fee violated the Headlee Act, which prohibits municipalities from enacting a tax that was not authorized by state law, and from increasing an already authorized tax without a majority vote.  The Court found that since the fee is “serving a regulatory and not a revenue-raising purpose,” it is not considered a tax.  Consequently, the Headlee Act does not apply to it.  The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of the Village.

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Liquidated damages not a “tax” for purposes of determining priority of lien in mortgage foreclosure

Gary Taylor 1 Comment

by Victoria Heldt

Baylake Bank v. Fairway Properties of Wisconsin, LLC
(Wisconsin Court of Appeals, September 15, 2011)

Fairway Properties of Wisconsin, LLC (Fairway) planned to develop a single-family housing complex on a piece of property located in the City of Waupaca.  The property was in a “tax increment district,” which is a mechanism used to allow municipalities to fund public improvement projects by diverting the property taxes to pay for those improvements.  The company entered into a mortgage agreement with Baylake Bank to procure financing for the development.

Fairway also signed a development agreement with the City, in which it agreed to meet certain goals each year for eleven years to ultimately build a housing complex with a minimum value of $4,500,000.  In exchange, the City agreed to provide improvements to the property such as sidewalks, wells, and driveway approaches.  The contract contained a clause that required Fairway to pay a “liquidated damages penalty” if it did not meet the specified goal each year.  The fine amounted to the difference between the actual property tax levied for the year and the property tax that would have been levied had the project goal been met (increasing the value of the property.)  This clause ensured that the City would be reimbursed for the funds it used in making the improvements.

Fairway eventually defaulted on its mortgage, prompting the Bank to bring a foreclosure action into district court naming Fairway and the City in the case.  The City answered, alleging Fairway owed over $150,000 in delinquent property taxes and over $80,000 in fines resulting from the violation of the liquidated damages clause.  The Bank agreed that the delinquent taxes took priority over the Bank’s mortgage interests, however claimed the charges under the development agreement’s liquidated damages provision were subordinate to the Bank’s interests.

The issue hinges on whether or not the liquidated damages penalty is considered a tax which, therefore, takes priority over the Bank’s position as mortgagee in a foreclosure action.  In a summary judgment, the district court concluded the damages were “real estate taxes,” relying on the language of the contract which read:  “the payment due is a special charge which may be entered in the tax roll as a charge against the real property identified in Exhibit A then owned by the developer and collected in the same manner as real estate taxes.  The amount due is a lien upon the property superior to all other liens.”  Since the court classified the damages as a tax, they ruled that the Bank’s interests as mortgagee were subordinated to the City’s interests.  The bank appealed.

The Court of Appeals noted that cities have no inherent power to tax and that it may only tax in such cases where statutory or constitutional language authorizes a tax for that specific purpose.  In this case, the court relied solely on language in a contract for the authority to tax.  This is insufficient to give the City the right to classify fines from the liquidated damages clause as a tax.

Next the Court addressed whether the City provided any alternative basis for authority to classify the damages as a tax.  The City relied on the tax increment law (Wis. Stat. §66.1105) for authority to levy the tax.  The language of the law grants the power to create tax incremental districts, prepare projects in the districts, and enter into contracts necessary to proceed with the plan.  The statute is silent, however, regarding a city’s authority to impose taxes on the entities in the district.

The Court concluded that the development agreement’s liquidated damages do not have priority as a property tax.  The district court decision was reversed.

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Annexation/taxation agreement held to be valid by Missouri court

by Melanie Thwing and Gary Taylor

Western Taney County Fire Protection District v. City of Branson, Missouri
(Missouri Court of Appeals, February 10, 2011)

The Western Tansey County Fire Protection District (District) and the City of Branson, MO (City) both hold taxation authority within their boundaries for fire protection. Annexations of property within the District’s boundaries by the City in 1994 resulted in an overlap in taxation.   To avoid this, both entered into an “Agreement Concerning Provision of Fire Protection Services” (Agreement). In paragraph 2 it is stated that if the City’s corporate limits are extended by annexations in the future the City will provide the fire services to the annexed property. Paragraph 7 provided that the District would stop taxing any area within the corporate limits of the City after December 31, 1994. Further, if property is annexed District will maintain the right to tax until the end of that year. Finally paragraph 8 agrees that the City will pay $416,666.66 to District for three years starting in 1995 and ending in 1997. All contractual obligations were met.

Then, after the City annexed further property [the case does not specify when this annexation occured] the District sought more money under § 321.322 RSMo. This statute basically holds that a city will assume fire protection duties for annexed property and pay the district either “an amount mutually agreed upon,” or fees under the statutory formula.  The City refused payment claiming that the requested payments fell within the terms of the Agreement and were satisfied by the payments to District. In trial court it was found that § 321.322 was a consideration when crafting the Agreement and therefore the District was entitled to no further compensation.

The District argued to the Court of Appeals that § 321.322 provides a “sixty days’ statutory mandate” that does not allow agreements to extend to annexations outside of sixty days post-contract. The court disagreed.  Under the statute a compensation scheme would be enacted unless a city would contractually assume responsibility to pay a mutually-agreed consideration.  The statute provides that “nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the ability of a city to negotiate contracts with a fire protection district for mutually agreeable services.” The statute does not forbid agreements. Future obligations can be addressed by contract; parties are permitted by statute to craft terms that address foreseeable future annexations. The District argued that the Agreement does not discuss if it extends to future annexations; it only confirms that double taxation and coverage will not occur. However, paragraph 7 specifically states, “future annexations,” thus clarifying that future annexations were forseeable and meant to fall under the agreement’s terms.

Lastly the District argued that § 321.322 violates Article 10, §§ 1 & 2 of the Missouri Constitution and the common law rule against perpetual contracts. If the sections are read together they prohibit District from “contracting away” taxing power without legislative authority. The court, however, pointed out that the District did not lose their right to tax in the Agreement. It simply stopped duplication of services and wrongful double taxing.  The court also found that a contract for indefinite terms does not make it perpetual. Further the Missouri courts often reject the idea that contracts automatically create perpetual obligations or rights. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.

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Wisconsin village entitled to entire tax payment under MFL program

by Melanie Thwing

Town of Somerset v. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
(Wisconsin Court of Appeals, March 29, 2011)

J. Peterson owned property in the Town of Somerset, Wisconsin. In 1987 he enrolled the property in the Department of Natural Resources’ managed forest land (MFL) program. The program encourages, “management of private forest lands for the production of future forest crops for commercial use through sound forestry practices.” By enrolling the property the landowner commits to the program for either twenty-five or fifty years.  In return the landowner receives reduced property taxes. If the property is withdrawn from the program the landowner must pay the Department a withdrawal tax pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 77.82(2)(h).  Under Wis. Stat. § 77.89(1) the Department is then required to pay the withdrawal tax to “each municipality in which is located the land to which the payment applies.”

When Peterson’s property was first enrolled in the MFL it was located within the Town of Somerset. In November 2007 the property was purchased by the Village of Somerset and annexed to the Village.  In August 2008 the Village withdrew the property from the program. A withdrawl tax of $43,597.28 was paid to the Department by the Village, but that money was then refunded back to the Village because the property was in the Village at the time of withdrawl.

The Town filed for judicial review of the Department’s decision. They argued that the Department did not interpret Wis. Stat.  § 77.89(1) correctly, or alternatively that the statute is “unconstitutional on its face in that it deprives [the Town] of a protected property interest, contrary to [the] Wisconsin Constitution.” The town argues the withdrawal tax payment should have been split between the municipalities where the land was located while the tax burden was lessened.

The Department moved to dismiss this claim and the circuit court granted the motion. They found (1) the Town lacked standing to challenge the Department’s decision, (2) the Department’s interpretation of the statute was entitled to deference, and  (3) the Town lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of § 77.89(1).

The Town then appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals who finds that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the Town’s petition. Wis. Stat. § 77.89(1) requires the Department to pay “100 percent of each withdrawal tax payment received under 77.88(7) to the treasurer of each municipality in which is located the land to which the payment applies.” The present tense of the statute indicated that the payment should be made to where the property is located currently. The Town claims the statute is ambiguous because the statute states, “each municipality.”  The Court of Appeals did not consider this argument to be reasonable because it again ignores the present tense of the statute. The language “each municipality” simply directs the payment in cases where the land is presently located in more than one municipality.

Finally, the court concluded that municipalities do not generally have standing to challenge the constitutionality of statutes. The only exception to this is if the issue is of great public concern. However this exception only applies “to cases where a private litigant and a creature of the state are involved, and not to suits limited to creatures of the state.” No private litigants are present here and it involves a state agency and two municipalities. Because of this the great public concern exception cannot be applied. The decision of the circuit court was affirmed.

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