Category: Zoning board of adjustment

Failure to comply with previous ZBA SUP conditions does not render “illegal” ZBA’s decision to grant same party another SUP

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Brinkley v. City of Milford Zoning Board of Adjustment

Iowa Court of Appeals, November 2, 2022

In May 2021, Okoboji Community School District (OCSD) submitted applications to the Milford Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) seeking special use permits for the construction of a bus barn and a multipurpose building on its high school campus. The next month, the ZBA discussed OCSD’s applications during a special meeting, which the Brinkleys and their representatives attended. The Brinkleys raised multiple issues with the project, primarily focusing on OCSD’s failure to fully comply with a 2004 ZBA decision imposing a condition that OCSD must “plant, cultivate and maintain vegetative screening in an adequate and appropriate manner on the School’s property adjacent to the north, west and south of the Brinkley property” to receive a special use permit. It was essentially indisputable that OCSD had not installed or maintain the required vegetative screening along substantial portions of the border between the properties. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the hearing on the special use permit the ZBA approved the application. One of the conditions attached to the approval was that “The vegetative screens plan as presented by the school must be planted within 12 months after the ‘substantial completion’ of the school project.” The Brinkleys filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing the ZBA acted without substantial evidence and illegally by granting the special use permit despite OCSD’s failure to plant the vegetative screen required in the 2004 ZBA decision. The district court found the ZBA acted legally, and this appeal was taken.

The Court of Appeals found nothing illegal or arbitrary about the ZBA’s decision. Upon review the court concluded that the ZBA was not unreasonable in concluding that OCSD met the criteria for special use permits found in the Milford zoning ordinance, nor was it unreasonable to allow the 12-month window from project completion to install new vegetative screening. On the issue of the city’s failure to enforce the screening condition from 2004, “[a]lthough the city had an obligation to enforce its zoning requirements, such [failure to carry out its] duty does not equate to an illegality.” Mandamus action could have provided the Brinkleys a vehicle to compel compliance with the 2004 decision, but that avenue was lost when the ZBA granted the current permit.

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Posting unapproved minutes with ZBA decision does not start the clock for purposes of filing appeal

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by Eric Christianson

Burroughs v. Davenport ZBA
(Iowa Supreme Court, May 25, 2018)

To operate a daycare in the City of Davenport one must obtain a special use permit from the Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA).  In March 2014, the ZBA granted Tiny Tots Learning Center a permit. Tiny Tots closed its doors in late 2014, and in July 2016 a new lessee of the premises, Mz Annie-Ru Daycare Center, opened at the same location. The new day care center supervises more children and is open for longer hours than Tiny Tots was. The Davenport Zoning Administrator determined the special use permit issued to Tiny Tots “run[s] with the land” and the new daycare center would not need to obtain another special use permit.

Burroughs along with other neighbors disagreed and appealed that decision to the Board of Adjustment. On October 13 the ZBA voted 4-0 to uphold the administrator’s decision that the special use permit continued to apply. After that hearing, staff advised the residents that they could file a petition to revoke the special use permit. They did so and on December 8 the board held a public hearing to determine if the permit should be revoked. The BOA voted 0-4 against revoking the permit. Shortly after both of these meetings city staff posted unofficial minutes to the city’s website; however, they were not officially approved until the subsequent meeting of the ZBA.

On January 25, Burroughs along with five other residents appealed these decisions to District Court claiming that the ZBA had acted improperly in refusing to revoke the permit. The City filed a motion to dismiss the case, asserting that the petition was untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of the challenged decisions.

Iowa Code 414.15 states:

Any person […] aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment […] may present to a court of record a petition […] Such petition shall be presented to the court within thirty days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board.

The district court granted the City’s motion. Considering the posting of the minutes online to be the “filing of the decision.” Because the minutes of the December 8 meeting were posted on December 19th. The appeal on January 25th was untimely.

The court concluded that the:

“thirty-day time period begins to run from the time the appealing party has either actual knowledge or is chargeable with knowledge of the decision to be appealed.”  Because it was “undisputed” that plaintiffs attended both the October 13 and the December 8 meetings, they had actual knowledge of the Board’s decisions as of those dates: “[T]he Court cannot hold that they did not have actual knowledge or chargeable knowledge of the decision which they witnessed firsthand.”

Burroughs and the other plaintiffs appealed this dismissal.

The Iowa Supreme Court considered four possibilities of when the decision was “filed” in this case:

  1. The time that the decision is made in a public meeting wherein the parties gain “actionable knowledge.”
  2. When the unofficial minutes of the meeting are posted to the city websites.
  3. When approved official minutes have been posted online.
  4. When a signed physical document is present in the offices of the BOA and available for public inspection.

Both parties had an initial and fallback opinion. The city argued that the decision was “filed” at the meeting when the vote was taken and the parties were aware of the action. If that was not accepted, then they argued that the posting of the unofficial meeting minutes online should be considered filing the decision.

The plaintiffs argued principally that that for a decision to be filed it had to be a physical signed document including findings of fact and available for public inspection at the board’s offices. By this argument neither the October 13th decision nor the December 8th decisions had ever been properly filed and thus could still be appealed. If the court did not accept this argument, then they argued that only the posting of the approved minutes online could be considered “filing.” This fallback position would only preserve the December 8th refusal to revoke the permit for appeal as the approved minutes containing that decision were not posted until January 6th.

The court gave a few principles that can be used to determine when a ZBA decision has been filed and, therefore, how long plaintiffs have to appeal.

First, a decision cannot be simply oral.  It must exist in some documentary form. Simply having knowledge of what the decision is is not sufficient.

Second, the decision can be filed in electronic rather than paper form. The plaintiffs in this case tried to argue that a public document must be physical. The court disagreed indicating that in fact most of the Court’s own documents exist only digitally.

Third, a document has been filed in the “office of the board” when it has been posted on the board’s publicly available website that the board uses as a repository for official documents. The “office of the board” does not have to be a single physical location as long as the documents are accessible to the public.

Finally, the thirty-day period is triggered when the board posts the decision on its public website.  However, what is posted must be an actual decision.  Proposed minutes that have not yet been approved do not constitute a decision, but approved minutes do.

The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the December 8th ZBA decision. The case is remanded back to district court for further proceedings on the legality of the decision to allow Mz Annie-Ru Daycare Center to continue operation.

Implications for local governments

Although the court has clarified some aspects of 414.15, this decision does not answer all potential questions and you should rely on the advice of your attorney before changing your current practice. Some local boards have a long standing practice of approving a written Decision Order at the same meeting as the hearing and decision. Creation of such an Order as long as it clarifies the decision and the reasoning used, would likely qualify as filing the decision. Alternatively for boards that rely on approved minutes to file their decisions, it may be prudent to schedule a follow-up meeting to approve those minutes if the board of adjustment meets infrequently. This is especially true is litigation seems likely on a specific case.

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Court of Appeals affirms ZBA’s denial of liquor permit

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by Eric Christianson

Shop N Save v. City of Des Moines Board of Adjustment
(Iowa Court of Appeals, January 24, 2018)

Note: this is a separate case from Shop N Save v. City of Des Moines Zoning Board of Adjustment decided in August of 2017 year. Although both permits were denied at the same ZBA meeting citing much of the same evidence, they concern separate Shop N Save locations.

Shop N Save operates a convenience store located on Martin Luther King Jr. Parkway in Des Moines. As a limited food / retail sales establishment, it may derive no more than forty percent of its gross sale receipts from the sale of liquor, wine, beer, and tobacco products. In March 2015, Shop N Save applied for a conditional use permit to operate as a liquor store, which would eliminate the store’s limit on gross sales receipts from the sale of those products.

At the zoning board of adjustment hearing held in April 2015, city staff recommended denial of the permit, and neighbors testified of crime and nuisance issues associated with liquor sales at the location. The board also noted the close proximity of the liquor store to residential property.

Based on this testimony and the proximity to residential uses, the board voted to deny the permit.

In May of 2015 Shop N Save appealed to district court arguing that the board illegally denied the permit. The district court affirmed the decision finding that the board had relied on substantial evidence to deny the permit. Shop N Save appealed again to the Iowa Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals examined the case to determine if the Zoning Board of Adjustment acted within its authority in denying the permit.

According to the City of Des Moines’s zoning ordinance a conditional use permit must be show to conform to the following criteria:

  1. The business conforms with [zoning restrictions].
  2. The proposed location, design, construction and operation of the particular use adequately safeguards the health, safety and general welfare of persons residing in the adjoining or surrounding residential area.
  3. The business is sufficiently separated from the adjoining residential area by distance, landscaping, walls or structures to prevent any noise, vibration or light generated by the business from having a significant detrimental impact upon the adjoining residential uses.
  4. The business will not unduly increase congestion on the streets in the adjoining residential area.
  5. The operation of the business will not constitute a nuisance.

Failure to comply with any one of these conditions is fatal to the application.

Shop N Save argues that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence because “only four individuals” spoke against the permit, and all of the issues raised took place when the store was under previous ownership.

The court disagrees, finding that the testimony of the neighbors in addition to an additional email from the neighborhood association were substantial evidence that issuing the permit could create a nuisance. The court states that Shop N Save’s assertions that things would be better in the future could have reasonably been accepted by the board, but they were not and that is within the board’s discretion.

Because the ZBA’s ultimate decision was supported by substantial evidence. The boards decision is affirmed.

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Des Moines Board of Adjustment substantially complied with the law in granting setback exception

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by Eric Christianson

Graziano v. Des Moines Board of Adjustment
(Iowa Court of Appeals, November 8, 2017)

Cecelia Kent purchased a previously undeveloped lot in Des Moines with the intent of building a single family home. However the winding road and a thirty-foot easement for a public storm sewer running diagonally across the back of the lot complicated Kent’s plans. On November 14, 2015, Kent appealed to the Des Moines Zoning Board of Adjustment for an exception to the district’s fifty-foot front yard setback, allowing her to build a house with a front yard setback of just thirty feet. She also asked the board for a variance to the setback required for a parking lot and an exception to the side yard setback.

The board denied the variance and the side yard set back, but voted to approve the exception to the front yard setback.

Kent’s neighbor Craig Graziano challenged the board’s action on two grounds:

(1) the board failed to make required written findings
(2) substantial evidence does not support the grant of an exception.

As quasi-judicial bodies, boards of adjustment are required to make written findings of all facts present. The intent of these is “to enable a reviewing court to determine with reasonable certainty the factual basis and legal principles upon which the board acted.” In this case, the court of appeals determined that the staff report as well as the minutes of the discussion during the meeting was sufficient to allow the court to determine the factual basis and legal principles upon which the board acted.

 The criteria that the board is required to consider in granting an exception is detailed in Des Moines City Code:

1. (a) Such exception does not exceed [fifty] percent of the particular limitation or number in question . . .
2. The exception relates entirely to a use classified by applicable district regulations as either a principal permitted use, a permitted accessory use, or a permitted sign, or to off-street parking or loading areas accessory to such a permitted use;
3. The exception is reasonably necessary due to practical difficulties related to the land in question;
4. Such practical difficulties cannot be overcome by any feasible alternative means other than an exception; and
5. The exception is in harmony with the essential character of the neighborhood of the land in question.

Graziano challenged that the board had failed to show to show that there was no “feasible alternative” to granting the exemption  and that the reduced setback would be “in harmony with the essential character of the neighborhood.”

With regards to feasible alternatives, the meeting minutes show that the board of adjustment did discuss the possibility of moving the easement as well as to whether a smaller reduction to the setback might be adequate. Although this reasoning was not included in the final written findings, the court found this to be adequate to support the fact that the board “substantially complied” with the mandate to consider feasible alternatives.

Graziano also challenged that by not including expert testimony on the effect that this exemption may have on neighboring property values, the board failed to show that the setback would be “in harmony with the essential character of the neighborhood.” The court found that expert testimony is not required citing an earlier case which found:

[T]he board may rely upon “commonsense inferences from evidence relating to other issues, such as use and enjoyment, crime, safety welfare, and aesthetics, to make a judgment as to whether the proposed use would substantially diminish or impair property values in the area.”

The court affirmed the district court’s ruling upholding the exception granted to Kent.

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Untimely Filing Fatal to Appeal of Board of Adjustment Decision

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McCleary v. City of Des Moines Zoning Board of Adjustment
(Iowa Court of Appeals, April 19, 2017)

In September 2014, McCleary applied to the Des Moines Zoning Board of Adjustment seeking several conditional use permits and variances to allow him to operate a pet boarding business out of his home. A public hearing was held on September 22. The board voted to deny all of McCleary’s requests on October 23, 2014. On November 25, 2014 McCleary filed a petition for writ of certiorari appealing the board’s decision. Because of constitutional claims, the case was first sent to federal court. On March 11 the federal district court dismissed all McCleary’s federal claims and the case was remanded to state court.

On October 6, 2015 the Board of Adjustment filed a motion to dismiss arguing that McCleary’s petition for a writ of certiorari was late. State law allows for appeals to be filed only in the 30 days after a decision is made final. On November 2, McCleary filed a motion to disqualify the board’s attorney as that same attorney had previously represented McCleary in another matter. The district court determined on December 18 that McCleary’s petition was indeed untimely. The court also concluded that the plaintiff did not provide substantial evidence that his prior relationship with the defendant’s attorney bore “any relationship to the instant matter.” The district court granted the board’s motion to dismiss.

McCleary appealed that dismissal to the Iowa Court of Appeals. They reviewed the district court’s decisions in the areas of the timeliness of McCleary’s appeal as well as whether the board’s counsel should have been disqualified.

Timeliness Iowa Code section 414.15 establishes the right to appeal a decision from a zoning board and provides “[s]uch petition shall be presented to the court within thirty days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board.” Because McCleary filed his appeal more than 30 days after the board made its decision, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear it. McCleary asserted that his motion for declaratory relief was not subject to the same timeliness requirements as writs of certiorari. The Court of appeals disagrees. “Regardless of the avenue of relief McCleary chose, he was still appealing the decision of the zoning board and was subject to the statutory requirements of such an appeal.”

Disqualifying Counsel Because the attorney representing the board had previously been involved in representing McCleary, he claimed that the attorney should be disqualified.In determining if a prior relationship is enough to disqualify an attorney the court must determine if the two matters are substantially related. To do so, the court examines three factors:

  1. the nature and scope of the prior representation;
  2. the nature of the present lawsuit; and
  3. whether the client might have disclosed a confidence to [their] attorney in the prior representation which could be relevant to the present action.

The attorney described their prior relationship as, “providing a model letter of intent for a business purchase and reviewing a draft of the letter written either by [the former partner] or by Mr. McCleary.” He also stated that he, “did not meet Mr. McCleary in person and recall no further involvement in the transaction.” McCleary claims a connection exists because the prior representation involved the same property on which he eventually attempted to establish his pet boarding business.  The court failed to see how assisting McCleary’s representation in the property transaction would make him privy to any information that would be relevant to this zoning variance request.

On both matters the court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the district court.

Conditional Uses/Special Uses, Iowa Court of Appeals, Zoning board of adjustment
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When suing county, failure to serve notice on county is not a minor procedural error

Gary Taylor

by Gary Taylor

Dewit and Dewit v. Madison County Zoning Board and Madison County Zoning Board of Adjustment
Iowa Court of Appeals, September 13, 2017

In March 2015 the Madison County Zoning Office filed civil infractions against the Dewits for several zoning ordinance violations.  The case number assigned to these infractions was CVCV034188.  These infractions were resolved through a consent order in September 2015 which required the Dewits to abate the violations within six months (by February 2016).  After the consent order was issued, the Dewits filed an application for an agricultural exemption from the county’s zoning ordinance, which the county zoning administrator denied.  On appeal, the Madison County Zoning Board of Adjustment (ZBA) affirmed the denial.

On April 20, 2016 the Dewits filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the ZBA’s decision; however, they filed it in the civil infraction case CVCV034188.  The county attorney accepted service of the petition, but the original notice was not included in the materials sent to or accepted by the county attorney.  The county moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition should have been docketed as a new action and not as a filing in the civil infraction case.  On June 7, 2016 the district court denied the motion to dismiss, and ordered the clerk of court to transfer the petition and all related filings to the appropriate docket and to assign a new case number to the petition.

The ZBA then filed a motion to dismiss on September 1, 2017 for failure to timely serve original notice on the board.  The next day the Dewits served notice on the ZBA, but this was 135 days from the original filing of the petition on April 20.  (Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure require original notice to be served on a defendant within 90 days of filing a petition).

The Dewits contended that the original notice was served on the ZBA 80 days from the day the district court transferred the petition to a new docket with a new case number; however, at the time the district court specifically ordered that the petition “would relate back to and be deemed to have commenced on the date of filing, April 20.” Thus service of the original notice did fall outside the 90 day window.

The Dewits also contended that the county attorney’s acceptance of the petition alone is sufficient to comply with Iowa Rules of Procedure.  The court rejected this as well.

The original notice and petition are separate and distinct….The contents of the original notice are prescribed by rule.  In contrast, the petition is a pleading that sets forth a simple and concise statement of the claim or claims at issue. [While] it is true Iowa courts are committed to liberal construction of the rules of procedure to insure resolution of disputes on their merits, the failure to timely serve original notice cannot be deemed a minor or technical error.

The district court did not err in dismissing the Dewits’ petition.

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Courts Defer to Staff and Board of Adjustment Interpretation of Code

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by Eric Christianson

Doss and Huffer vs. Ames Zoning Board of Adjustment
Iowa Court of Appeals, February 22, 2017

The City of Ames received a complaint that Angela Doss and Duane Huffer were building a fence in violation of the city’s zoning ordinance. The fence was 6 feet high and located in their backyard abutting other residential properties. The city determined that the fence was indeed in violation of the following section of code and notified the homeowners in a letter.

The maximum height of fences in any setback abutting a street right-of-way is four (4) feet, except that up to six (6) feet of fence is allowed in any side or rear setback if:

(a) The lot does not abut the front yard of any other residential property along the same side of the street;
(b) The fence is at least (5) feet from the property line abutting a street right-of-way.

-Ames City Ordinance § 29.408(2).

The homeowners appealed staff’s decision to the Ames zoning board of adjustment. The board unanimously denied the homeowners’ appeal. The homeowners appealed to district court alleging:

  1. the Board misinterpreted the ordinance because it was not clear on its face whether the semicolon between (a) and (b) meant “and” (conjunctive) rather than “or” (disjunctive);
  2. the city enforced the ordinance inconsistently, only in response to complaints;
  3. the city’s delay before sending the December letter precluded enforcement on procedural grounds and laches;
  4. the city’s interpretation of the ordinance creates a notice issue in violation of due process; and
  5. the city’s fence ordinance conflicts with Iowa’s partition-fence law.

The district court ruled that the partition-fence issue was not preserved for its review and resolved the four other issues in favor of the board of adjustment.

The homeowners appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals. The court cited an earlier decision that, “the court may not substitute its decision for that of the board.” The decision of the board of adjustment is given a strong presumption of validity. In all other issues as well, the court affirmed the holding of the district court.

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Only the Board of Adjustment can approve Special/Conditional Use Permits

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by Eric Christianson

Holland v. Decorah

Iowa Supreme Court, April 2, 2003

This is an older case, a classic of Iowa planning and zoning case law. However, the issue of the role of the zoning board of adjustment is one that still comes up quite frequently.

In the late 1990s Wal-Mart began planning a new location in Decorah, Iowa. The location selected was located in the floodplain of the Upper Iowa River. To build there, Wal-Mart had to place fill in the floodplain. First, Wal-Mart obtained the required permits from the Iowa Department of Natural Resources. Then, Wal-Mart applied to the Decorah City Council for a permit to place fill on the floodplain. The city’s zoning code contained among its permitted uses in the F-1 floodplain district:

Dumping of approved materials for landfill purposes, subject to prior approval of the city council and appropriate state agencies. [emphasis added]

Following this section of city code, Walmart’s representatives appeared before the city council on August 15, 2000 and requested approval to fill the property. After a heated and confrontational public comment period, the city council approved the request by a vote of four to three. The council’s vote was only to approve the fill. It did not change the zoning of the area or approve of a site plan.

Previously, Upper Iowa Marine, which owns adjacent land, had attempted to dump fill in the floodplain. They also applied for and obtained the proper permits from the Iowa Department of Natural Resources. Instead of presenting their request to the city council. They applied for a special exception to the zoning ordinance from the zoning board of adjustment. The board of adjustment found the application inconsistent with the comprehensive plan and denied the request.

A group of citizens in Decorah filed suit, arguing that Wal-Mart’s request should have been submitted to the board of adjustment as Upper Iowa Marine had done rather than the city council.

The case hinges on two main issues (1) the authority of the board of adjustment and the city council and (2) definition of a special use.

Iowa Code 414.7 states that a city council should appoint a board of adjustment so that it, “may in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinances…”

Further on in 414.12 Iowa Code defines the powers of the board of adjustment including, “to hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance…”

Courts in Iowa have been very clear that no other entity has this power. In The City of Des Moines v. Lohner in 1969 the court said that the power to make special exceptions are “placed exclusively in the board [of adjustment] and effectively restricted by statute.” Likewise in Depue v. City of Clinton in 1968 the court asked itself, “[I]s the jurisdiction of the board of adjustment, conferred by sections 414.7 and 414.12 and exclusive jurisdiction? We think the answer[ is] affirmative.”

It is clear then in Iowa case law that approving special uses is the exclusive jurisdiction of the board of adjustment. At issue is whether conditioning a permitted use on “prior approval of the city council” was essentially the same as a permitted use. Wal-Mart argued that the council’s grant of permission was not a special exemption because it was listed as a permitted use and the council had only a “limited, technical review.” Walmart argued that the city council was not examining whether the proposed change was consistent with the city’s comprehensive plan. Instead they were simply ensuring that the appropriate permit had been obtained from the Department of Natural Resources and that the fill material was free from waste materials.

In its reasoning, the court took special note of the contested nature of the public discussion period before the vote at the council meeting. During this meeting evidence and opinions were presented on both sides and one council member even attempted unsuccessfully to convene a task force to study the issue further.

The issuance of special-use permits is quasi-judicial or administrative. […]  The problems with allowing a political, legislative body such as a city council to rule on applications of this nature (in addition to lacking statutory authority) are apparent in this case.  The city council had no hearing procedures, notice requirements, or the type of guidelines that would govern the board of adjustment.

Even on the cold minutes of the meeting, it is apparent the council would have known by the time the discussion was concluded, if they did not already know, they had a tiger by the tail.  The residents were deeply divided on the issue, raising concerns about the environmental impact, the fairness of the proceedings (especially in view of the fact the board of adjustment had denied a similar permit), and the prospect of 120,000 cubic yards of fill being placed in the floodplain in the event the DNR appeal was successful or the construction plans were thwarted for some other reason.

In the end, the court concluded that whether or not dumping fill in the floodplain was a special or conditional use in Decorah’s code, the city council’s actions violated state code.

If it was a special use, is clear that the city council had no authority to allow it. Even if it is not, however, it would violate chapter 414 of Iowa Code which requires that zoning be done “in accordance with the comprehensive plan.” In fact, Decorah’s comprehensive plan expressly addresses protecting its floodplains as natural resources “for use as permanent open space.” In making a decision in direct opposition to the comprehensive plan, the application of the ordinance would still be illegal.

 

Historical Note:

Walmart had already completed construction on the $20 million building that their superstore would occupy at the time of this decision. The building had been sitting vacant since the previous fall awaiting the outcome of this lawsuit. Eventually, the parties settled. Wal-Mart agreed to make a donation to the Decorah library and to fund a study of the floodplain. Wal-Mart also agreed to lease their old building the the city for $1 a year with all proceeds from subleases going to fund the construction of a river trail. The Wal-Mart, much like confusion over roles in planning and zoning, is still with us today.

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Zoning Board of Adjustment properly carried out its role in approving application for CAFO

Gary Taylor

by Andrea Vaage

Grant County Concerned Citizens & Tyler v Grant County
South Dakota Supreme Court, June 24, 2015

Teton LLC applied for a conditional use permit to construct a confined animal feeding operation (CAFO) to house 6,616 swine larger than 55 pounds (“finisher” swine according to the Zoning Ordinances of Grant County (ZOGC)) and 1,200 swine smaller than 55 pounds (“nursery” swine in the ZOGC). The proposed operation would classify as a Class A CAFO-the largest possible designation under the ZOGC.  The Grant County Board of Adjustment (BOA) approved the permit after a hearing attended by 200 individuals. Grant County Concerned Citizens (GCCC) appealed.  Several procedural events are not included here, but the case eventually made its way to the South Dakota Supreme Court.  The Court’s conclusions on GCCC’s claims follow.

After the circuit court made a decision affirming the Board’s decision, GCCC submitted an affidavit signed by Tyler explaining the purpose of the excavation was to obtain water for his horse herd. The Board and Teton moved to strike the affidavit from record, upon which the circuit court granted the motion.

Private well. Under the ZOGC, a CAFO cannot be constructed within 2,640 feet of a private well. The ZOCG does not provide a definition of a “well,” however, SDCL 46-1-6(18) defines “well” as “an artificial excavation or opening in the ground, made by means of digging, boring, drilling, jetting, or by any other artificial method, for the purpose of obtaining groundwater.” GCCC claimed that the BOA’s decision improperly allows a CAFO within 2,640 feet of a well on neighbor Tyler’s property; however, the evidence showed that the well was actually dug on or just before the day of Teton’s application and that the excavation produced 12 gallons of water that day. The Board determined the Tyler’s constructed the well in order to frustrate the Teton’s application and as such the excavation did not meet the definition of “well.”  The Court affirmed, concluding that the BOA’s finding that the purpose of the excavation was to frustrate the CAFO application was material to the statute’s definition of “well” when the definition requires a well to be dug “for the purpose of obtaining groundwater.”  It was irrelevant that the excavation actually obtained 12 gallons of water.

Manure management and operation plan. Section 1034(4) of the ZOCG stipulates that the proposed CAFO must provide a manure management plan. GCCC contests that Teton’s did not find adequate acreage on which to spread manure, because Teton “significantly overstated” the amount of land on which it could apply manure.  The Court concluded that the Board made proper factual determinations on this issue, noting that ZOCG offers little in the way of specific requirements for a manure management and operation plan.

Failure to give notice to Melrose Township. The access road to the CAFO was jointly maintained by two townships. One of the two townships, Melrose Township, was not notified of the proposed CAFO by Teton.  Section 1304(12)(K) of the ZOCG requires “Notification of whomever maintains the access road (township, county and state).” An individual at the hearing for the permit testified that both townships had known about the proposed CAFO and decided not to upgrade the access road. It is irrelevant that the township was not notified by Teton, because the township had actual notice of the proceedings as evidenced by this individual’s testimony.

Nutrient management plan.  GCCC asserts that the proposed CAFO would not be able to obtain the water required to operate as evidenced by Teton’s nutrient management plan.  The Court considered this argument waived because the ZOGC’s requirements related to nutrient management plans do not address the water requirements of a CAFO.

GCCC made a number of other similar claims, but the Court found nothing in the record to suggest in these or any of the discussed claims that the Board did not regularly pursue its authority. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

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In the end, the Cleveland Clinic got its helipad

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by Hannah Dankbar

Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals
(Ohio Supreme Court, November 5, 2014)

The Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Cleveland denied a permit to Cleveland Clinic Foundation and Fairview Hospital to build a helipad on the roof of a two-story addition to the hospital.

The land that the hospital sits on is zoned as a Local Retail Business District, meaning “a business district in which such uses are permitted as are normally required for the daily local retail business needs of the residents of the locality only.” (Cleveland Code of Ordinances (C.C.O.) 343.01(a)). The hospital has been granted many variances since this zoning was put in place.

In October 2010, the Clinic filed an application with the City’s Department of Building and Housing seeking approval of three construction projects, including the construction of the helipad. The City cited C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8), which says “accessory uses” are allowed “only to the extent necessary [and] normally accessory to the limited types of neighborhood service use permitted under this division,” and rejected all three projects.

The Clinic appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA).  Opponents testified about potential noise and traffic problems.  The hospital representatives testified that almost all of the hospitals in the Cleveland metropolitan area have helipads, and that the use of helicopters in the transport of patients reduces travel time and, therefore, saves lives.   The BZA approved the other two projects, but denied the permit to construct the helipad citing C.C.O. 343.01(b)(8) by saying, “those uses that the Zoning Code characterizes as retail businesses for local or neighborhood needs would not involve a helipad as normally required for the daily local retail business needs of the residents of the locality.”

From here the Clinic appealed the denial to the Cuyahoga county Court of Common Pleas, who reversed the decision. This court used C.C.O. 343.01(b)(1) that provides that with limited exceptions, all uses permitted in the Multi-Family District are also permitted in the Local Retail Business District. Hospitals are expressly permitted in the Multi-Family district, and so the Court of Common Pleas concluded that a helipad is “customarily incident to” a hospital and therefore qualifies as an “accessory use.”

The BZA appealed to Eighth District Court of Appeals, who reversed again. The court found that ambiguity exists in C.C.O., and ultimately decided to give deference to the BZA and its original decision, saying “When the BZA reasonably relies on a code provision, its determination should hold so long as its decision is not unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence on the whole record,” This is to be true regardless of the fact that the law requires any ambiguity in a zoning ordinance to be construed in favor of the property owner.

The Supreme Court of Ohio determined that the wrong standard of review was used by the Eighth District Court of Appeals. Rather than review the BZA’s decision for clear error, the Court of Appeals should have been reviewing the Court of Common Pleas decision, and only overruling the Court of Common Pleas if the decision is not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence. Reversal is only appropriate when there is an error in the application or interpretation of law.

The Supreme Court of Ohio refers to C.C.O. 325.02 and 325.721 (to define “accessory use”), 337.08 (types of buildings permissible in a Multi-Family District), and 343.01(b) (permitted buildings in a Local Retail Business District). “Given the record before us, we have little trouble concluding that the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence supports the [Court of Common Pleas’] conclusion that helipads are customarily incident to hospitals, at least in Cleveland.”

Accessory uses, Ohio courts, Zoning board of adjustment , ,
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