Sioux Falls, SD slaughterhouse proposal gives me an excuse to talk about zoning by initiative and referendum

In South Dakota, the people have a right to propose or refer legislation at the state and also local government levels through initiative (propose new legislation through direct public vote) and referendum (put a recent legislative action up for public vote to accept or reject).

Legislative power–Initiative and referendum. The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a Legislature which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives. However, the people expressly reserve to themselves the right to propose measures, which shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state, and also the right to require that any laws which the Legislature may have enacted shall be submitted to a vote of the electors of the state before going into effect, except such laws as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions. Not more than five percent of the qualified electors of the state shall be required to invoke either the initiative or the referendum….This section shall apply to municipalities….

South Dakota State Constitution, Article III, Section 1

Sioux Falls City Charter Section 6.03 expressly reserves the powers of initiative and referendum to the citizens.

In September of 2021, Wholestone Farms announced their intent to build a $500 million-plus pork processing plant on a 170-acre parcel of land in northeast Sioux Falls. Soon after the announcement, an opposition group emerged seeking to halt construction of the plant. Smart Growth Sioux Falls objected to building a slaughterhouse inside the city limits. The group gathered the required signatures to have the voters of Sioux Falls weigh in on whether the city should prohibit future slaughterhouses in Sioux Falls city limits. The question is on the November 8 ballot. If approved by the voters the following language would be added to the city’s code of ordinances:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code to the contrary, no new Slaughterhouse may be constructed, or be permitted to operate, within the city limits.

This section does not apply to any existing Slaughterhouse constructed and operating before the effective date of this section. This section does not apply to the expansion or alteration of any Slaughterhouse constructed and operating before the effective date of this section so long as such expansion or alteration occurs at the existing site.

Governor Noem has weighed in, saying that the ballot measure was bad for business and that “at the last minute one person(1) can get mad, do a ballot petition and end my business and my investment.” The Sioux Falls Chamber of Commerce also opposes the measure and states its reasoning here.

Iowa does not allow zoning questions to be put to the people through either initiative or referenda, but a number of other states do and this South Dakota situation gives me an excuse to visit the topic. Referenda are commonly used to call for voter review of legislative actions such a rezoning or a major change to the ordinance. Administrative or quasi-judicial actions – such as conditional uses, variances, and staff decisions – are not subject to referendum, although the line between legislative and administrative decisions is well-known to get messy.

Would we be better off in Iowa if “ballot box zoning” were possible? From a policy perspective the availability of initiative and referendum for zoning matters is controversial. Proponents support ballot box zoning as the most direct expression possible of residents’ wishes for how their communities should grow and thrive. Opponents are concerned that such measures undermine planning, block needed reforms such as increased residential density and fair housing, and violate the due process rights of property owners (see the Sioux Falls Chamber’s policy position).

Zoning initiative and referenda have been the subject of a wide variety of state court cases. They focus on the validity of the ballot box process when a state’s zoning statutes define a process for notice and hearing, when individual referenda appear to conflict with state mandates for fair housing, when referenda appear to conflict with state statutes and/or caselaw requiring consistency with a comprehensive plan, and other issues. The US Supreme Court has weighed in on federal constitutional questions related to zoning referenda twice. In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises (1976) the majority opinion supported zoning referenda as giving “citizens a voice on questions of public policy” when it dismissed the developer’s contention that the referendum violated due process as a standardless delegation of legislative power to voters. The Court’s majority stated that the Ohio Constitution contemplated a reservation of the power of referendum by the people, and was not a delegation of power to them. The dissent asserted that the “‘spot’ referendum technique appears to open disquieting opportunities…to bypass normal protective procedures for resolving issues affecting individual rights.”

In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation (2003) voters petitioned to place site plan approval for a low income housing complex on the ballot. At city council meetings and independent gatherings, some of which the mayor attended to express his personal opposition to the site plan, residents voiced concerns that the development would cause crime and drug activity to escalate, that families with children would move in, and that the complex would attract a population similar to the one on Prange Drive, the City’s only African-American neighborhood. Voters rejected the site plan at the ballot box, and the Court rejected the developer’s Equal Protection challenge to the results. The Court affirmed previous holdings that “[S]tatements made by private individuals in the course of a citizen-driven petition drive, while sometimes relevant to equal protection analysis…do not, in and of themselves, constitute state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment….[R]espondents put forth no evidence that the ‘private motives [that] triggered’ the referendum drive ‘can fairly be attributed to [city government].”

In fact, by adhering to charter procedures, city officials enabled public debate on the referendum to take place, thus advancing significant First Amendment interests. In assessing the referendum as a “basic instrument of democratic government,” we have observed that provisions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice.

City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 188, 196 (2003)

(1) Over 6,000 petition signatures were in fact required for the measure to appear on the November ballot.

Flag policy catches City of Boston flapping in the breeze

by Gary Taylor

Shurtleff v. City of Boston
United States Supreme Court, May 2, 2022

For years, Boston has allowed groups to hold ceremonies on the plaza in front of city hall, during which participants may hoist a flag of their choosing on a flagpole in place of the city’s own flag and fly it for the duration of the event, typically a couple of hours. Between 2005 and 2017 groups raised at least 50 different flags for 284 such ceremonies, including flags from other countries, flags honoring EMS workers, the Pride Flag and others.

Shurtleff, director of a Christian group, wanted to hold a ceremony to celebrate the civic and social contributions of the Christian community, and raise the “Christian flag”: a red cross on a blue field against a white background. Until Shurtleff’s application, the city had never denied a request to fly a flag. No written policies existed outlining what groups could or could not participate, or dictating the contents of the flag, and city employees did not ask to see the flag before the event. The application itself only asked for contact information and a brief description of the event.

City officials found no record of ever allowing a religious flag to be raised in the past. Because of concerns that flying the ”Christian flag” would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, officials told Shurtleff that his group could hold the event, but could not raise the flag. Shurtleff challenged the denial of the flag-raising in federal district court, contending that it violated is right to free expression under the First Amendment. The district court sided with Boston, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.

The United States Supreme Court did not. It observed that, generally speaking, flags’ contents, presence, and location have long conveyed governmental messages. The boundary between government speech and private expression can blur when, as here, the government invites the people to participate in a program. In these situations a Court must conduct a “holistic inquiry” into whether the government intends to speak for itself or, rather, to regulate private expression. Among the factors to consider in this inquiry are the history of the expression at issue; the public’s likely perception as to who (the government or a private person) is speaking; and the extent to which the government has actively shaped or controlled the expression. As noted above, other than day, time and location, Boston exerted little control over the expression. The lack of meaningful involvement in the selection of flags or their messages means the flag-raising event is not “government speech,” and flying the flag for a short period of time does not constitute government promotion of a particular religion; therefore, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was not implicated. However, Boston’s refusal to let petitioner fly his flag did violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment as it was ”impermissible viewpoint discrimination” that “abridged [Shurtleff’s] freedom of speech.”

US. Supreme Court upholds distinction between on- and off-premises signs

by Gary Taylor

City of Austin, TX v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin
United States Supreme Court, April 21, 2022

The city of Austin, Texas regulates off-premises signs differently than on-premises signs. At the time this dispute arose Austin’s sign code prohibited construction of new off-premises signs. Existing off-premises signs were grandfathered, but could not be altered in ways that increase their non-conformity. Reagan National Advertising (RNA) sought permits to digitize some of its billboards and was denied. RNA sued, claiming the differential treatment of off-premises signs from on-premises signs (on-premises signs were allowed to be digitized) violated the First Amendment. The District Court held that Austin’s code provisions were content neutral under Reed v. Town of Gilbert and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found the distinction to be content-based because the sign’s message must be read to determine the distinction between on- and off-premises signs, and therefore did violate the First Amendment. Austin appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that the on- versus off-premises distinction was facially content neutral and therefore did not violate the First Amendment. Reed held that a regulation of speech is content based if it “targets speech based on its communicative content”; that is, if it applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Reed – that a sign regulation cannot be content neutral if you have to read the sign to understand how to regulate it – is “too extreme” an interpretation. Unlike Reed, Austin’s sign code does not single out any topic or idea expressed for differential treatment; the message matters only insofar as it informs the sign’s location. In this respect, the on- vs. off-premises distinction is more like ordinary time, place or manner restrictions, which do not require the application of the strict scrutiny standard. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has previously validated distinctions between on- and off-premises signs as being content neutral. Reed did not overrule those cases.

Justice Thomas authored a dissent joined by Justices Gorsuch and Barrett. He asserted that the Fifth Circuit correctly interpreted Reed. The Austin code discriminates against certain signs based on the message they convey. This is not changed because the restriction depends on a content neutral factor: the sign’s location. A code enforcement official must not only know where the sign is located, but also what it says.

Suppose a sign [in a storefront window] says “Go To Confession.” After examining the sign’s message, an official would need to inquire whether a priest ever hears confessions at that location. If one does, the sign conveys a permissible “on-premises” message. If not, the sign conveys an impermissible off-premises message.

Justice Thomas contends that the majority “misinterprets Reed’s clear rule for content-based restrictions and replaces it with an incoherent and malleable standard.”

SCOTUS to decide major takings case in 2017

The National Constitution Center has listed Murr v. Wisconsin as one of the ten most important US Supreme Court cases to be decided in 2017.  If you attended the Planning Law session at the APA-Iowa Annual Conference in Burlington you heard me discuss the nuances of the “parcel as a whole” rule as it pertains to this case.  The National Constitution Center gives its take on what the case is about here (you’ll need to scroll about halfway down the page).

Constitutional law and history geeks will want to explore the Center’s website generally.  A lot of fascinating reading.

SCOTUS accepts takings case from Wisconsin

Last Friday the United States Supreme Court agreed to take a case from Wisconsin that has implications for takings jurisprudence.  The case is Murr v. State of Wisconsin, and the question certified for the Court is “Whether in a regulatory takings case, the ‘parcel as a whole’ concept as described in Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York, establishes a rule that two legally distinct but commonly owned contiguous parcels must be combined for takings analysis purposes.”

Links to law presentations from 2015 APA-Iowa Annual Conference

The powerpoint presentations from the 2015 APA-Iowa Annual Conference held in Sioux City on October 14-16 are now available here.

Thursday afternoon session on Signs and Cell Towers, by Peter McNally, Dustin Miller and Gary Taylor

Iowa APA 2015 Cell Towers
Iowa APA 2015 Signs

Friday morning AICP Law session by Gary Taylor

Iowa APA 2015 Law session

US Supreme Court finds local sign ordinance an impermissible content-based restriction on speech

by Gary Taylor

Reed v. Town of Gilbert
United States Supreme Court, June 18, 2015

Gilbert, Arizona adopted a comprehensive sign code governing outdoor signs.  It identifies various categories of signs based on the type of information they convey, then subjects each category to different restrictions.  The Sign Code generally prohibits the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but exempts 23 categories of signs from the permitting requirement.   Three of those 23 categories were relevant to the litigation before the Supreme Court:

  • Political signs – defined as signs designed to influence the outcome of an election, may be up to 32 square feet and only displayed during an election season.
  • Ideological signs – defined as signs communicating a message or idea that do not fit in any other sign code category, may be up to 20 square feet and have no time restrictions.
  • Temporary directional signs – defined as signs directing the public to a church or other qualifying event, are limited to 6 square feet, no more than 4 may be on a single property at the same time, and may be displayed no more than 12 hours before, and 1 hour after the event.

Good News Community Church (Church) is a small congregation that meets in various temporary locations in Gilbert on Sunday mornings.  The Church posted signs early each Saturday morning bearing the Church name and the time and location of the next service.  The signs were not removed until around midday Sunday.  Gilbert cited the Church for violation of the Sign Code, for failing to abide by the time restrictions for temporary directional signs and for failing to include an event date on the signs.  The Church appealed the citation and lost, brought suit in federal district court and lost, and lost on appeal to the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.  The 9th Circuit ultimately concluded that the Sign Code’s sign categories were content neutral, and that the Code satisfied the intermediate scrutiny accorded to content-neutral regulations of speech.  The Church appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Unlike the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court found the Sign Code to be a content-based regulation of speech.  It defines the categories of temporary, political and ideological signs on the basis of their messages and then subjects each category to different restrictions.  The restrictions thus depend entirely on the sign’s communicative content.  The 9th Circuit’s conclusion that the regulation was not based on a disagreement with the message conveyed “skips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is neutral on its face.  A law that is content-based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motives, content-neutral justification, or ‘lack of animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech….In other words, an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.”

The 9th Circuit also erred in concluding that the Sign Code was content neutral because it does not mention any idea or viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential treatment.  The Supreme Court noted that while government discrimination among viewpoints, or based on the opinion or perspective of the speaker is a more blatant and egregious form of content discrimination, it is also discriminatory when government prohibits public discussion of an entire topic.  Gilbert’s Sign Code gives ideological messages more favorable treatment than messages concerning a political candidate, which in turn are give more favorable treatment than messages “concerning announcing an assembly of like-minded individuals.”  “That is a paradigmatic example of content-based discrimination.”

The 9th Circuit’s conclusion that the Sign Code made only speaker-based and event-based distinctions was also in error.  The restrictions for political, ideological, and temporary event signs apply equally no matter who sponsors them. “If a local business, for example, sought to put up signs advertising the Church’s meetings, those signs would be subject to the same limitations as such signs placed by the Church.”  Besides, speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.

Having determined that the Sign Code was content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court went on to conclude that the Sign Code did not pass Constitutional muster.  Gilbert did not demonstrate that the Code’s differentiation between the various types of signs being discussed furthered a compelling governmental interest.  Gilbert cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is necessary to beautify the town when other types of signs create the same problem.  Nor has it shown that temporary directional signs pose a greater threat to public safety than ideological or political signs.

The Supreme Court further observed:

Our decision today will not prevent governments from enacting effective sign laws. The Town asserts that an “absolutist” content-neutrality rule would render “virtually all distinctions in sign laws . . . subject to strict scrutiny, but that is not the case. Not “all distinctions” are subject to strict scrutiny, only content-based ones are. Laws that are content neutral are instead subject to lesser scrutiny. The Town has ample content-neutral options available to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics. For example, its current Code regulates many aspects of signs that have nothing to do with a sign’s message: size, building materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability. And on public property, the Town may go a long way toward entirely forbidding the posting of signs, so long as it does so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner. Indeed, some lower courts have long held that similar content-based sign laws receive strict scrutiny, but there is no evidence that towns in those jurisdictions have suffered catastrophic effects. We acknowledge that a city might reasonably view the general regulation of signs as necessary because signs “take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation.” At the same time, the presence of certain signs may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians, to guide traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety. A sign ordinance narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers—such as warning signs marking hazards on private property, signs directing traffic, or street numbers associated with private houses—well might survive strict scrutiny. The signs at issue in this case, including political and ideological signs and signs for events, are far removed from those purposes.

More on cell towers…”in writing” requirement

In keeping with the cell tower theme from yesterday, the following is an excerpt of my article that appeared in this month’s Iowa County regarding the T-Mobile case.

U.S. Supreme Court decision impacts local administration of cell tower applications.

The Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FTA) injected federal law into local control over the siting of wireless facilities (cell towers). The FTA requires, among other things, that a local board or commission’s denial of an application for a wireless facility “shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” This has come to be known as the “in writing” requirement. Since 1996 federal courts have come to different conclusions about what local boards and commissions must do to satisfy this requirement. Last year the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take the case of T-Mobile South v. City of Roswell to clear up some of the confusion caused by the disagreements among the lower courts.

T-Mobile South applied to build a 108-foot cell tower in a residential neighborhood in Roswell, Georgia. The tower was to look like a pine tree, branches and all, though it would have stood at least twenty feet taller than surrounding trees. The city’s zoning department recommended approval subject to several conditions. At the city council’s public hearing four council members expressed concerns about the tower, and a motion to deny the application passed unanimously. Two days later, the city sent T-Mobile a denial letter. The letter did not provide reasons, but did explain how to obtain the minutes from the hearing. At that time, only “brief minutes” were available; the city council did not formally approve detailed minutes recounting the council members’ statements until its next meeting, twenty-six days later. T-Mobile filed suit, won in District Court, lost in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court issued its decision on January 14.

The following three points important to local governments result from the Supreme Court decision:

  1.  Local government must provide written reasons for denying a cell tower application. The Court determined that “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record” imposes upon local governments a requirement to provide written reasons when they deny cell tower applications. The Court explained that it would be extremely difficult for courts to review local decisions on cell towers if localities did not state their reasoning in writing. The Court went on to stress, however, that “these rea­sons need not be elaborate or even sophisticated, but rather…simply clear enough to enable judicial review.” Although not stated by the Court, it remains important that local boards and commissions base their decisions on the criteria found in the local ordinance when approving/denying cell tower applications.
  2. The denial and written reasons do not need to be in the same document; i.e., separate detailed minutes satisfy this requirement. Local governments are not required to provide their reasons in the denial notice itself, but may state those reasons in some other written record. The practice in many communities is to let detailed minutes (or even a verbatim transcript) of hearings stand as the “written record” of board and commission decisions. The Court held that this practice satisfies the “in writing” requirement of the FTA. At the same time the Court gave advice to local governments that “if the locality writes a short statement providing its reasons, the locality can likely avoid prolonging the litigation – and adding expense to the taxpayer, the companies, and the legal system – while the parties argue about exactly what the sometimes voluminous record means.”
  3.  If the decision and written reasons are in separate documents they must be issued “essentially contemporaneously.” The Court further determined, however, that because the FTA requires a wireless company challenging a denial to commence its lawsuit within 30 days of the denial, the denial and written reasons, if separate documents, must be issued “essentially contemporaneously.” “Because an entity may not be able to make a considered decision whether to seek judicial re­view without knowing the reasons for the denial …the locality must provide or make available its written reasons at essentially the same time as it communicates its denial.” The Court suggested that “if a locality is not in a position to provide its reasons promptly, the locality can delay the issuance of its denial … and instead release it along with its reasons once those reasons are ready to be provided.”

The Court concluded that because Roswell did not issue its denial and written reasoning (in the form of minutes) “essentially contemporaneously” it had violated the “in writing” requirement of the FTA.  The case was a loss for Roswell, but for local governments generally it affirms the practice of many local governments that do not issue formal denials containing the rationale for the decision, but instead rely on the minutes for the rationale.

 

US Supreme Court issues opinion on “in writing” requirement of Federal Telecommunications Act

Today the US Supreme Court issued its ruling concerning the “in writing” requirement of the Federal Telecommunications Act.  My previous post explaining the case, and the disagreement among the federal circuit courts, is here.

by Gary Taylor

T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Roswell, Georgia
United States Supreme Court, January 14, 2015

T-Mobile South submitted an application to build a 108-foot cell tower on a vacant lot in a residential neighborhood in the city of Roswell, Georgia. The company proposed a tower designed to look like a pine tree, branches and all, though this one would have stood at least twenty feet taller than surrounding trees. The city’s zoning department found that the application met the requirements of the relevant portions of the city code, and recommended approval of the application subject to several conditions. The city council then held a public hearing at which a T-Mobile South representative and members of the public spoke. Five of the six members of the city council then made statements, with four expressing concerns and one of those four formally moving to deny the application. That motion passed unanimously. Two days later, the city sent T-Mobile South a letter stating that its application had been denied. The letter did not provide reasons for the denial, but did explain how to obtain the minutes from the hearing. At that time, only “brief minutes” were available; the city council did not approve detailed minutes recounting the council members’ statements until its next meeting, twenty-six days later.

T-Mobile filed suit, alleging that the council’s decision violated the “in writing” requirement of the Federal Telecommunications Act (FTA) that says that a denial of an application for a wireless facility “shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” The District Court agreed with T-Mobile.  On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reversed.  Noting that T-Mobile had received a denial letter and possessed a transcript of the hearing that it arranged to have recorded, the Eleventh Circuit found that this was sufficient to satisfy the “in writing” requirement.

The US Supreme Court first determined that “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record” imposes upon local governments a requirement to provide reasons when they deny applications to build cell towers.  It would be extremely difficult for a reviewing court to carry out its review of a local decision if localities were not obligated to state their reasons in writing. The Court went on to stress, however, “that these rea­sons need not be elaborate or even sophisticated, but rather…simply clear enough to enable judicial review.” In this regard, it is clear that Congress meant to use the phrase “substantial evidence” simply as an administrative “term of art” that describes how an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court.”  It is not meant to create a substantive standard that must be proved before denying applications.

Local governments are not required to provide their reasons in the denial notice itself, but may state those reasons with sufficient clarity in some other written record such as in detailed minutes. At the same time, the Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s brief that “the local government may be better served by including a separate statement containing its reasons….If the locality writes a short statement providing its reasons, the locality can likely avoid prolonging the litigation – and adding expense to the taxpayer, the companies, and the legal system – while the parties argue about exactly what the sometimes voluminous record means.”

The Court further determined, however, that because the FTA requires the recipient of a denial to seek judicial review within 30 days from the date of the denial, the denial and written reasons, if contained in separate documents, must be issued “essentially contemporaneously.”

Because an entity may not be able to make a considered decision whether to seek judicial re­view without knowing the reasons for the denial of its application, and because a court cannot review the denial without knowing the locality’s reasons, the locality must provide or make available its written reasons at essentially the same time as it communicates its denial.
The Court observed that this rule ought not to unduly burden localities given the range of ways in which localities can provide their reasons.  Noting that the FCC “shot clock” declaratory ruling [discussed in the blog here] allows localities 90 days to act on applications to place new antennas on existing towers and 150 days to act on other siting applications, the Court suggested that “if a locality is not in a position to provide its reasons promptly, the locality can delay the issuance of its denial within this 90- or 150-day window, and instead release it along with its reasons once those reasons are ready to be provided. Only once the denial is issued would the 30-day commencement-of-suit clock begin.”

The Court concluded that it was acceptable for Roswell to provide its denial and written reasoning (in the form of detailed minutes) in separate documents, but did not issue these documents “essentially contemporaneously.”   As such, the city did not comply with the statutory obligations of the FTA.  The Court remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit to address the question of the appropriate remedies.

US Supreme Court declines to take Grain Processing Corporation nuisance case

The US Supreme Court has declined to hear Grain Processing Corporation’s appeal of the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision that neither the Federal Clean Air Act nor state emissions regulations preempt nuisance suits brought by neighbors complaining of the chemicals and particulate matter from the company’s facility in Muscatine. The original blogpost of the Iowa Supreme Court case is here.

A brief article from of all places, Fox News Montana.

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